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WAR

NO GLORY, NO PROFIT, NO NEED

By NORMAN THOMAS

*Author of "Human Exploitation in
the United States"*



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To
MY CHILDREN'S GENERATION

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FOREWORD

THIS book was begun on Easter Sunday, 1935. The skies were then by no means clear but as war cloud Abyssinia seemed scarcely as big as man's hand. The book was sent to the publisher early in July. By that time we had learned that Abyssinia preferred to be called Ethiopia and we knew that Mussolini's threatened raid on it, the worst tradition of the old imperialism, was itself a crime and put the League of Nations to a new test which it was not effectively meeting. It was only as the summer wore on that we can

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later finds that only war can satisfy his megalomania, and perhaps if successful perpetuate his power over a people who are finding him out. In the background the sinister figure of another dictator and war lover, Adolf Hitler. Oil, always somewhere near the bottom of modern international disputes. In this case nobody knows just exactly how valuable are the deposits of petroleum or other mineral wealth, but Mussolini thinks they are worth fighting for, the British concession hunter, Francis Rickett thought them worth scheming for, and the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company thought them worth taking up even at the cost of dragging the United States into a nasty mess. Incidentally high officials in the Standard Oil Company revealed themselves either as unconscionable liars when they disclaimed all knowledge of Rickett's negotiations, or else as habitually giving their agents and subsidiary companies a free hand to commit them and their country to dreadful hazards in the secret war for oil. And the British Minister to Ethiopia was revealed as singularly innocent of the activities of his fellow countryman in little Addis Ababa. But for once both the British and American governments got busy to check and not support the imperialism of their citizens and under their pressure this deal was called

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off. Nevertheless the drama went on with plenty of representatives of British and French imperial interests in its cast and plenty of ghostly voices from the past to mock their professions of disinterested zeal for justice and peace.

It is necessary that the book go to press before the final act in the Ethiopian drama is written. Indeed who knows how soon the final curtain can be rung down on this new tragedy on the ancient theme of exploitation, or how far the flames of racial hate may spread which Mussolini sedulously fans. The one encouraging factor is the sincerity with which the European masses have condemned Mussolini's raid and demanded a vindication of treaty rights for the weak.

But this is not a book about Ethiopia and Italy but about war. Its main contentions would be sound if Mussolini had not embarked on this adventure, or if the League of Nations had earlier shown real zeal in behalf of justice and peace. It is not too soon, however, to find new lessons, or rather new illustrations of old lessons, in the Ethiopian tragedy. And I have therefore inserted in chapters V and VI certain material commenting on Ethiopian developments and on the new American stand for neutrality.

As for the book it must speak for itself. It

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represents an effort on the part of the author to put in brief space and simple language not only a description and indictment of war but some study of its causes and its possible cure. In notes on the chapters I have not only cited my authorities with occasional supplementary information, but also I have added comment on points on which I thought some readers would be interested in hearing my position more fully expressed than seemed to me essential in the main body of the book.

My thanks are due to many soldiers and authors besides those from whom I have quoted directly. As always, it has only been with my wife's active help that I have been able to write the book in the midst of many other duties. Once again my thanks are also due to my secretary, Freda Straus, for putting a much interlined manuscript into shape for the printers.

NORMAN THOMAS

September 8th, 1935

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CHAPTER I

WAR AS SOLDIERS KNOW IT

EASTER SUNDAY morning: the most striking page of a rotogravure section of a great newspaper contains pictures of English school children being drilled in the use of gas-masks for protection in the event of air-raids. The same paper reports the protests of some stockholders in Vickers, the British armament firm, against the profit-mad policy of their company in selling arms to any nation with the price. Their cry, as the headlines give it, was: "Our bullets killed British soldiers."

All this is part of the world's war madness. In every country of Europe boys and girls are drilled in using gas-masks or seeking prompt refuge in cellars to protect them against destruction rained down upon them from heavens to which they once had been taught to lift up hands for blessing. In every great country, including our own, the boys

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who die for it in battle will likely have a double satisfaction in the hour of their agony; they can consider not only "how sweet and pleasant it is to die for the Fatherland" on distant shores, but also how considerably they have added to the profits of some of their fellow citizens who sold the arms, or the raw material for them, by means of which they died.

This "homicidal mania" which men call war, or, in more sober language, this armed strife between nations or other organized social groups, is very old. For thousands of years men—most men—have hated it, and for thousands of years they have accepted it. More than that, they have glorified it. Poets have sung of "arms and the hero." Flags, gay uniforms, the beat of the drum, the call of the trumpet, and the pageantry of great fleets have stirred men's blood to the heat of battle. Glory and honor, power and riches, have been the reward of the victorious conqueror. Our histories have been made up of lists of battles and tales of victories.

The power, the loot, and the fame have gone mostly to the commanders we call great. Rarely have they known the worst of the hunger, the thirst, the cold of the trenches or the brutality of the battlefield. But even the unknown soldiers

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who have experienced to the uttermost all these things have felt the strange compulsion of war. Quite by chance, on a day when I was working on this chapter and thinking of the stupid and futile horror of war, I heard over the air from different broadcasting stations that popular and stirring song, "The Two Grenadiers." For them neither battle, defeat, nor imprisonment could blot out devotion to Napoleon. What mattered wife or child to them; their Emperor, their Emperor was prisoner! Now, the poet Heine and the composer Schumann were not the two grenadiers. They were never French soldiers who had tasted prison life in Russia. Yet they could not have written the song, nor would it be listened to so eagerly, if there was not about this thing we call war a strange, hypnotic compulsion. Let us look at it more closely to see what part of it is glory and what part boredom, brutality and shame.

Why men fight and what they have got or hoped to get by fighting we shall inquire in later chapters. Here we are interested in *how* they fight. That is a long story if we go back to the earliest wars. How men fought depended upon what mechanical contrivances they had for transportation and for weapons. It was always a cruel business. But for long centuries there was a large share of

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personal daring, skill and fitness that went into deciding the issues of the combat. The earlier warrior had to hit, stab or cut his enemy with something. He fought him hand-to-hand with sword and spear. He could not possibly get farther away from him than David when he killed Goliath with a sling-shot, or Robin Hood when he killed the sheriff's men in Sherwood Forest with his well-aimed arrows. It was of these hand-to-hand conflicts and their heroes, Hector, Achilles, Æneas, King Arthur, Richard the Lion-Hearted or the Chevalier Bayard that Horace and Vergil and the minstrels of the Middle Ages sang. There was excitement, skill, and sometimes chivalry about them. Usually it was the fittest who survived.

When gunpowder came into common use the situation changed. The armored knight no longer maintained his old advantage over the unarmored and untrained peasants and artisans. He resented the change. Bayard, the mirror of chivalry, "without fear and without reproach," thought guns very unsporting. He ordered every prisoner of war, caught with gun in hand, summarily executed. But he did not stop the revolutionary change in warfare. The soldier, however, was still under obligations to hit a particular man with some projectile if he wanted to kill or wound him. Most

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bullets missed. It was only the development of poison gas and of aviation which made it possible for men to sow death and injury wholesale, to send clouds of destruction sweeping across the battlefield or rain death on cities far behind battle-lines. No longer did man have to hit to kill.

Apart from poison gas and airplanes, the invention of machine-guns, shrapnel, long-range cannon, high explosives and tanks has vastly increased the range of man's destructive powers. The untrained man with a gun is to-day at more disadvantage before the trained and well-armed forces of the government than was ever the peasant with a sling-shot before a knight in armor. The "embattled farmers" of Concord would have a poor time of it with modern redcoats—whose coats, by the way, would certainly not be red.

Modern war is indiscriminate in destruction, but for its most deadly and effective work each government must take its physically fittest youth and train them diligently for combat without mercy or even hope of survival by those physiologically most fit to father a stronger breed of men.

When we say that modern war is, or may be, far more destructive than ancient war we do not mean that it is in itself more brutal. The discovery of modern antiseptics to minimize the risk of blood-

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poison, and anesthetics to keep the wounded from feeling the torture of amputations or other operations, has lightened the anguish of the soldier who had not the luck to die but only to suffer. In some ways war and the treatment of the vanquished have grown more humane. Captured cities are not given over to soldiers to loot; prisoners of war, men and women, are not condemned to death, slavery or more horrible fate. Although progress in humanizing war has been slow and many a backward step has been taken, Professor A. G. Keller is right when he tells us:

Despite notable reversions, war has been modified toward less of savagery; modern atrocities have shocked the world into a renewed search for an everlasting peace. War begins with no conventions or rules of the game, as a wholesale assassination, where any effective method of killing will do: poisoned arrows, venom-tipped splinters set in paths, attacks from the rear and in the dark, slaughter of the helpless, the young and old, of both sexes. However, along the course of evolution appear various expedients for rendering conflict less deadly: a taboo on

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poison; declarations of hostilities; truces; . . . a taboo on violence to women, children, and other noncombatants; adoption or enslavement of captives. . . .

Even backward savages have their methods of peace-making, attended by expressions of relief at the ending of hostilities and joy in the prospect of living for a while off guard. Then there are the various transitions from war to trade and intermarriage: dumb barter; peaceful access; the peace of the market, of God, of the temple, of the King; mutual exchange of women instead of rape and reprisal. . . . Men have not generally wanted war; despite the glamour of the uniform, the overwhelming sentiment of humanity has long been and is now against it.

The extraordinary devastation of the First World War and its relative lack of chivalry and the sporting spirit were the inevitable consequence of our scientific progress. The machinery which might free all of us from poverty makes war more deadly. It enables us to kill by wholesale. It compels all of us to be active in war, either as sol-

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diers or as makers of war supplies. Strictly speaking, in modern war there can be no noncombatants except the very young or the very old. Cities where every nerve is stretched to make more and more of the instruments of death, though they be far behind the lines, are as vital a part of the fighting machine as any front-line fort or trench. To bomb London or Paris from the air while children sleep; to set the tinder-box cities of Japan afire by incendiary bombs dropped from airplanes, is horrible, but it is the logical thing to do in war. If we are going to fight under modern conditions our gallant young aviators must expect to be baby killers.

This aspect of modern war is one reason why no musician, artist, poet or historian has glorified the First World War. (Another reason, as we shall presently see, is the universal sense of disappointment in the results of the war.) In Fletcher Pratt's much praised *Ordeal by Fire, An Informal History of the Civil War*, occurs the striking statement that Grant's campaign in 1864 to crush the Confederacy was "the greatest campaign in American history, one of the greatest in any history, possessing for the military student the same passionate thrill of inspired performance as a Beethoven symphony for the musician or a da Vinci

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portrait for the painter.” Does the military student, thrilled by contemplation of this campaign, never hear the cries of wounded men dying by thousands in the wilderness; or the sobs of women and children left behind to watch their houses burn while General Sherman marches to the sea? Is he deaf to the overtones of hate and despair in the harsh symphony of war?

Here I do not quote Mr. Pratt’s sentence in order to bring back what different things Grant’s campaign meant to the military student and its victims, but rather because it is so hard to find any like statement in the books written about the First World War. Even the military student does not think of a portrait by da Vinci when he remembers an air-raid over London, the sound of great cannon in Louvain, the soldiers saying farewell to their women-folk in the railway-stations of Paris on their way back to the hell of Flanders’ fields, the cold, the wet, the boredom of the trenches, zero hour and the madness of battle and all the slaughter of each nation’s bravest at Verdun or the Dardanelles. We who in the quiet of a library or our homes look over such pictures as Laurence Stallings gathered in *The First World War* do not close the book with any passionate thrill of longing for another such symphony of slaughter.

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We know too much about the years that followed August 1, 1914.

When the Great War began no one in the world, perhaps least of all the generals, knew what to expect. The real religion of Western men was nationalism. In Continental Europe in the name of that nationalism practically every able-bodied man had under compulsion received military training. Mass obedience had been carefully taught. Therefore, when the long arm of each state reached into the tiniest hamlet from Vladivostok to Antwerp to drag out the choicest youth to fight in a struggle they had not caused and did not understand, youth obeyed. There were flags and cheers and the romantic excitement that always go with war's beginning; there were men who early dreamed of power, profit, and glory out of victory. There were idealists who saw the national soul cleansed in a bath of blood and every unworthy thing destroyed, and so went with high exaltation to keep their rendezvous with death. But most men went because they must.

Rupert Brooke, a brilliant young British poet who died before he saw what the war was really like, put the feeling of idealistic exaltation into lines which were often quoted and which had less-

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perfect echoes in poetry and prose on both sides of the conflict:

*Honor has come back, as a King, to earth,
And paid his subjects with a royal wage;
And nobleness walks in our ways again;
And we have come into our heritage.*

This feeling, or some variation of it, is to be found, pathetically expressed, in many of the early letters from German students who went to war. Indeed, the similarity of emotional feeling and justification of war is a poignant illustration of the sense in which a similar culture made the war a civil conflict in which European civilization all but committed suicide.

From the beginning, and even more certainly as the war settled into its grim business of dull mass-murder, it was not the emotion of Rupert Brooke and a handful of romantic idealists, but the pitiful and unquestioning faith of the masses in each country that they died for its very existence, which made it possible for war to go on. Another British poet, far more realistic than Rupert Brooke, put into verse the pitiful belief which seemed to give meaning to the mass insanity of war. In his "Five Souls" W. N. Ewer comparatively early in the war

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made the slain of many nations avow a common
faith:

*I was a peasant on the Polish plain;
I left my plough because the message
ran,
Russia in danger needed every man
To save her from the Teuton: and was
slain.
I gave my life for freedom, this I know:
For those who bade me fight had told
me so.*

*I was a Tyrolese, a mountaineer;
I gladly left my mountain home to fight
Against the brutal, treacherous Musco-
vite;
'And died in Poland on a Cossack spear.
I gave my life for freedom, this I know:
For those who bade me fight had told
me so.*

*I worked in Lyons at my weaver's loom,
When suddenly the Prussian despot
hurled
His felon blow at France and at the
world.*

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*Then I went forth to Belgium and my
doom.*

*I gave my life for freedom, this I know:
For those who bade me fight had told
me so.*

*I owned a vineyard by the wooded Main
Until the Fatherland, begirt by foes
Lusting her downfall, called me and I
rose*

*Swift to the call and died in fair Lor-
raine.*

*I gave my life for freedom, this I know:
For those who bade me fight had told
me so.*

*I worked in a shipyard by the Clyde;
There came a sudden word of wars de-
clared,*

*Of Belgium, peaceful, helpless, unpre-
pared,*

*Asking our aid; I joined the ranks and
died.*

*I gave my life for freedom, this I know:
For those who bade me fight had told
me so.*

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By the time America came into the war it was difficult, even under conditions of war hysteria and war propaganda, to hold up the idea that soldiers in France were fighting for the national existence of the United States. Hence President Wilson had to sound more loudly a note already heard in Europe, and the war into which the nations had stumbled and blundered, as they walked down the road of rival imperialisms, became "the war to make the world safe for democracy" and "the war to end war."

But by this time the soldiers in the trenches were fighting more because they did not know how to stop than for any other reason. Very early the war had settled down to a stalemate in which armies on the Western Front, from the English Channel to Switzerland, dug themselves into the ground and faced each other across the No-Man's-Land of barbed-wire entanglements and shell holes. It is an important commentary on militarism that not a single general on either side had anticipated this type of war, or prepared for it, or knew what to do about it. It was not until the end of 1918 that the Allies got around to plans involving a really effective use of airplanes and tanks. And before these plans could be carried out the war was ended, not by any striking military victory, but by the

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physical and mental exhaustion of Germany and her allies against enemies with far greater manpower and even more immensely superior resources in such necessities as foodstuffs, petroleum and rubber. It was a civilian, a Polish Jewish banker, a certain M. de Bloch, who as far back as 1898 came nearest to predicting the kind of stalemate of entrenched armies which occurred. He made two mistakes: First, he did not believe that it was possible for human endurance to permit soldiers to face each other in trenches as close together as actually turned out to be the case. His second mistake the English writer, Esmé Wingfield-Stratford, puts in these words:

Another mistake that Bloch made was in attributing to military commanders the amount of common sense that he was accustomed to find in his fellow men of business. He could not imagine that the supreme command of a great military nation would actually discourage its soldiers from entrenching and be satisfied with nothing less than their rushing into the field of fire to be mowed down in swathes; nor could he have imagined that even when the trench lines had been sta-

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bilized the men would for years continue to be driven over the top to be massacred because their chiefs could think of nothing better to do and yet felt that they must be doing something.

Men of all the combatant nations showed a capacity to endure misery, filth and destruction from every conceivable direction, which no one would have believed possible had it not been for the grim testimony of four years of war. They lived, summer and winter, in trenches and dug-outs with lice and rats as their constant companions. For months at a time they existed in ditches deep in mud. Often decaying bodies made a part of that mud. Never a day passed when "all was quiet on the Western Front" but that there was a heavy bombardment on both sides of roads over which supplies had to be brought, or of the trenches themselves. In reading or hearing accounts of the trench war one is struck by repeated references to the torment of the smell, not only of rotten corpses but of unwashed men. One soldier swears that he was often awakened when off duty dozing by the odor of marching men.

The brutalizing boredom of the trenches was broken on the active front by the horror of "zero

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hour" and the attack, which, once the war was stabilized, rarely got anywhere of genuine military importance. Conscript armies provided plenty of raw material which generals worried less about than about their supply of ammunition. The conditions of trench warfare and the very nature of attack and counter-attack, rather than any peculiar brutality on either side, made it often completely impossible to bury the dead or to bring in the wounded. The nature of wounds, not followed by instant death, for which no medical service could bring relief, frequently imposed suffering by the side of which ancient Roman crucifixion was merciful. And this is what conscript armies endured for four long years.

Medical science, especially on the Western Front, was advanced enough to avert plague under these extraordinary conditions. It was able to restore many of the wounded to a second, third and fourth stay in hell. There were rest camps and leaves for soldiers. Sometimes the men took great pains to fix up these camps. One German student writes to his family about what his regiment did in the reserve position, only 600 yards behind the trenches. It was a little wooded valley which had been frightfully torn and scarred by artillery fire and by hand-to-hand fighting. Yet

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there the troops turned their dugouts into little rooms. From the woods they took the best tree-trunks, cut off by shells, and stuck them into the ground. "Out of the gardens of the ruined Château of Hollebecke and Camp we fetched rhododendrons, box, snowdrops and primroses and made quite nice little flower-beds. We have cleaned out the little brook which flows through the valley and some clever comrades have built little dams and constructed pretty little watermills, so-called 'parole clocks,' which by their revolutions are supposed to count how many minutes more the war is going to last. We have planted whole bushes of willow and hazel with pretty catkins on them and little firs with their roots, so that a melancholy desert is transformed into an idyllic grove. . . . Luckily there is no lack of birds, especially thrushes, which have now got used to the whistling of bullets and falling of shells and wake us in the morning with their cheerful twittering."

The whole monstrous tragedy would have been unendurable were it not for the comradeship of soldiers in the midst of squalor and danger. It is that comradeship which gives to literature of the war, from *Under Fire*, *What Price Glory?*, *Journey's End*, down to that great and very moving novel, *Paths of Glory*, some redeeming

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and ennobling and cleansing quality to restore faith in human beings and in life itself, even amidst the futile madness of trench war.

Yet those who have written about the First World War have not idealized it. The trenches did not turn men into saints or make all of them good comrades. To support war at all men had to cultivate callousness. That note of callousness and what it meant comes out poignantly in a book which is alive with the joy of flying and of comradeship, Norman Archibald's personal record, which he calls *Heaven High, Hell Deep*. Archibald was an American aviator at the front. Once he had the remarkable experience of coming to after a crack-up which deprived him of the memory of what had gone before. Fortunately he was on the French side of the line and a Frenchman helped him back to his squadron. The story goes on:

Light inside the tent. A radiant welcome for it meant that other pilots were awake. . . . The joy that flew through my veins! Taking a deep breath, I walked in. The indescribable happiness!

"Hello," I said, beaming.

"Archie! Look! It's Archie!"

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“God Almighty! It is! Why, Archie!”

“Well, I’ll be damned! And where have you been, Rip Van Winkle?”

Their words hurt. The curt, half-finished ejaculations and would-be humorous sentences curdled my blood. Were these my friends, these men who stared at me with vacant faces? Was this my longed-for greeting? . . . Like a stranger, unexpected and unwanted, I walked stiffly down the tent aisle.

Only to discover that his cot was gone and his personal possessions divided up. Then follows a vivid account of his rage and the clumsy but well-meant effort of the other pilots to bring things back and calm him. Finally, in bed, his anger spent, Archibald reflects:

I had acted like a lunatic, a wild lunatic. They thought I was killed; no fault of theirs; look how I raved and tore around. Of course they divided my things—always did—what of it? If dead I would want them to use everything. An extra blanket was a luxury,

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and as for my flying clothes, who had a better right?

So understanding came to Archibald again. But not in time to a YMCA girl who had opened in camp a little store to sell chocolates and cigarettes. She often dined at the aviators' mess or heard their curt remarks about some comrade who was dead or missing. Then one evening:

The YMCA girl ran up. "Well, Lieutenant Curry got bumped off to-day," she said crisply in the excited off-hand manner of one who delights in news.

Her remarks struck like lightning. An icy stillness! . . . Our own expression, yes, but from an outsider it cut like a two-edged sword.

The girl knew too late. She left the mess. Archibald went out to find her.

She burst into tears! "I will never forgive myself," she sobbed. "Never . . . never . . . Oh, I know now—and I can never come back!" She never did.

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This callousness which must have grieved many another soldier than Archibald, was a necessary and justifiable defense against intolerable pain. There was worse and less excusable brutality. War gives scope to cruelty and releases brutish men from the restraints which peace puts upon them. Fortunately for the human race we now know that most of the well-propagandized atrocity stories were false. The records of every country show that not even the mechanized destruction of the last war crushed every vestige of chivalrous respect for a brave enemy. It was manifested many a time by Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, even Turks, as well as by English, French, and Americans. A medical officer tells how during the fiercest fighting at the Dardanelles the Turks opposite to his regiment several times during a lull in the fighting permitted him to go out to minister to the wounded without firing on him. But there are also true and very different stories of the killing of prisoners by both sides in the heat of battle, of inexcusable harshness in the treatment of prisoners, and cold-blooded cruelty to civilians, particularly in the wholesale expulsion by the Turks of Armenian peasants from their native villages.

What war meant to soldiers while attack and

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counter-attack were in progress has been told many times. Its repetition benumbs us. I quote, almost at random, one passage from *All Quiet on the Western Front*. German troops in the front-line trenches are under the bombardment which precedes attack. It lasts day and night for three days. Food cannot be brought up regularly. Men fight with rats for scraps of bread. One new recruit goes insane. The soldiers beat him up to keep him from rushing out alone over the top. At last comes the attack.

We recognize the distorted faces, the smooth helmets: they are French. They have already suffered heavily when they reach the remnants of the barbed-wire entanglements. A whole line has gone down before our machine-guns; then we have a lot of stoppages and they come nearer.

I see one of them, his face upturned, fall into a wire cradle. His body collapses, his hands remain suspended as though he were praying. Then his body drops clean away and only his hands and the stumps of his arms shot off, now hang in the wire. . . . We make for the rear,

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pull wire cradles into the trench and leave bombs behind us with the string pulled, which ensure us a fiery retreat. The machine-guns are already firing from the next position.

We have become wild beasts. We do not fight, we defend ourselves against annihilation. It is not against men that we fling our bombs, what do we know of men in this moment when Death with hands and helmets is hunting us down—now, for the first time in three days we can see his face, now, for the first time in three days we can oppose him; we feel a mad anger. No longer do we lie helpless, waiting on the scaffold, we can destroy and kill, to save ourselves, to save ourselves and be revenged.

We crouch behind every corner, behind every barrier of barbed-wire, and hurl heaps of explosives at the feet of the advancing enemy before we run. The blast of the hand-grenades impinges powerfully on our arms and legs; crouching like cats we run on, overwhelmed by this wave that bears us along, that fills us with ferocity, turning

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us into thugs, into murderers, into God only knows what devils; this wave that multiplies our strength with fear and madness and greed of life, seeking and fighting for nothing but our deliverance. If your own father came over with them you would not hesitate to fling a bomb into him.

One of the darkest chapters in wartime history will never be fully written. Students of such matters tell us that there is a psychological connection between war and sexual excess. At any rate, all the circumstance of war, the reaction from the hardship of the trenches, the complete break-up of normal family life, the sense that one might not live but a day and must get the most intoxicating pleasure available—these things help to explain the extraordinary extent to which soldiers threw over the standards which decent men and women have generally accepted. Some writers have observed that while stories of rape in French territory occupied by Germans during the war and in German territory occupied by the Allies after the Armistice were grossly exaggerated, that was in part because women as well as men were infected with the madness of the time. It became

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almost a patriotic duty during the war to oblige the soldiers of one's own country and some were found who not too unwillingly surrendered to the lust of their country's enemies.

What I have been saying about the war and the lot of the soldier in the trenches and behind the lines suffers from the faults of all attempts at generalization. Soldiers differed as individuals. Soldiers differed in the kind of job they had. There is a realistic passage in *Under Fire* in which French soldiers discuss the relative ease of different kinds of soldiering and express their resentment, half envy, half disgust, with the soldiers farthest from the trenches. Generals, especially, had a bad name. One book of war memories has for its title *Generals Die in Bed*. Siegfried Sassoon has written:

*If I were fierce, and bald, and short of
breath,*

*I'd live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
And speed glum heroes up the line to
death.*

*You'd see me with my puffy, petulant
face,*

Guzzling and gulping in the best hotel,

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*Reading the Roll of Honor. "Poor
young chap,"*

*I'd say—"I used to know his father
well;*

*Yes, we've lost heavily in this last
scrap."*

*And when the war is done and youth
stone dead,*

I'd toddle safely home and die—in bed.

The circumstances of modern war necessarily make a greater gap than even in the days of Napoleon between the High Command and the soldiers. Devoted line officers did share many of the privations of the soldiers, but they had more to look forward to in the way of honor and promotion. I knew an American colonel, a decent domestic sort of man in ordinary life, who when the Armistice was signed moaned to his friends: "If only the war had lasted two weeks longer I'd have been a general."

The extraordinary indifference of many generals to the lives of their soldiers, as compared to the success of their own plans, is the theme of that most moving of war novels, *Paths of Glory*. The climax of the story is the summary execution of three brave soldiers as an example to a regi-

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ment which had failed to do the impossible at the command of a general with an eye on decorations and advancement. General Assolant is a character in fiction, but there were too many like him in life. Before the war was over many a general had found summary court-martial of his own soldiers an example upon which he depended to make his men fear him more than the enemy. The World War produced no crop of stories like those told of Abraham Lincoln's mercy to the sleeping sentry.

We Americans when we try to form a picture of war naturally think of it as it showed itself to aviators, artillerymen and infantrymen on the Western front. We must not forget that the greatest suffering and the greatest losses were on the Russian front. No one can understand events in Russia who does not remember that a corrupt and thoroughly incompetent high military command at one period sent Russian soldiers into battle, the first line armed with rifles, the second with pikes, the third to pick up weapons from the slain. The government failed to maintain in an agricultural country a reasonable supply of food for soldiers or civilians. The army's arrangements for sanitation and medical service were so inadequate along most of the Eastern Front that those ancient allies of the warrior in the task of destruc-

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tion, rats, and lice, and germs, got in their most deadly work. There is no thrill or glory in death from hunger or from typhus.

Some of my readers who have observed or perhaps shared in the boisterous reunions of veterans of the World War may protest that the picture I have tried to give of it must surely have omitted part of the truth. It is one of the singular things about war, perhaps it is one of the things that makes war possible, that there is a kind of social and collective memory of it which softens reality and turns horror into jest, much as the English cartoonist, Bruce Bairnsfather, tried to do during the war itself. This is easier to do in America than in some other countries, because so many of our soldiers never saw front-line service or got out of the hurrah-boys atmosphere which our country was in the war too short a time to outgrow. An American soldier, however, who had seen front-line work in France and had marched with the army of occupation to the Rhine learned to hate the whole business. Shortly after his return to a New England town he wrote me that already he began to wonder whether he had seen and felt the futility, brutality and lies of war as once he had thought he would always remember them. In his own well-chosen phrase he found that "a conventional

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social memory of war and victory, as civilians wanted them to be," was taking the place of his own memory of what was. This sort of thing, plus the joys of the reunion spirit which brings Americans together on so slight a ground as the fact that they had all used McGuffey's readers in school, may help to explain the carnival spirit which surrounds an American Legion Convention and the reminiscences of its members. But ask a soldier from the trenches, even a soldier lucky enough to return whole-bodied, unmarred, and unmaimed to civil life, whether war was glorious or worth its cost and he will add his voice to the bitter chorus of the generation which lost its youth in battle and the difficult years of adjustment to the poor thing called peace, utterly without compensation or gain to its members or to mankind.

CHAPTER II

KEEPING THE HOME FIRES BURNING

IN war days few pictures moved us more than those which showed French refugees with children and a few cherished possessions loaded in a cart, moving they knew not where, except that it was away from the enemy. And that was away from the homes which they and their ancestors had lived in so long. These pictures of refugees from the battle-front, and the peasants and village-folk who stuck to their farms and homes even though the earth they cultivated was shaken with great guns, illustrated the desolation and destruction that war has always brought to civilians within the zone of conflict. The sorrow of women-folk parting from their sons and husbands and lovers, bound for the living death of the trenches from which so many of them never returned, was not confined to the wide zone of actual hostilities. It was as far flung as the claim of war upon conscript armies. Nor were all the tragedies of war at the front. Prison and alien internment camps in

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peaceful countrysides far from the battle had their share, and more, of frustration and actual cruelty. The victims of spy-fever, the conscientious objectors to war, the opponents of war, guilty of no "sedition" except the advocacy of immediate negotiations—these all learned how cruel could be the herd to any of its members who tried to stand out from, or judge critically, its mass stampede.

Disease in epidemic form is an inevitable accompaniment of protracted war. Modern medicine and sanitation on the Western Front, at least, protected the soldiers and civilians from scourges like typhoid and typhus which took immense toll of life in Russia and the Near East during years of war and revolution. But the World War had its accompaniment: influenza in virulent form which baffled medical science. It raged in cantonments and cities. It did not spare the open country. It did not recognize the boundaries of neutral states. The great Swiss authority, Professor L. Hersch, puts the total loss of life from influenza in all countries at 15 million—eight and a half million in poverty-stricken India alone. By a careful calculation of surplus deaths among civilians, mostly from influenza, during the war years in neutral as well as combatant countries, he raises the usual estimates of from 26 to 30 million deaths to a total

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of almost 42 million. In the neutral countries of Europe alone the surplus dead numbered about 600,000. He concludes: "Science and social organization have enormously increased our means of protection against the murderous effects of war, but they have increased to a far larger extent its scope and intensity: the real ravages have, as a consequence, outstripped all the imagination of the ancients."

But there was another side to war which especially in America brought compensations to civilians—compensations not always admirable. The war called forth a considerable degree of social planning, the ultimate purpose of which was destruction, but on the way there was an end for industrial workers of that monster Unemployment. Farmers found a better reward for their labors than they had found before, and certainly than they have found since in times of peace. Decidedly, for them war had its good side! We know now that there was a great deal of myth about the stories of extraordinarily high wages which war poured into the laps of workers. In the race between wages and prices, wages often lost! As usual, not workers but profit-takers were the chief beneficiaries of war prosperity. Housing, despite some government construction projects, was neg-

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lected in all nations. Food and fuel were subject to restrictions. Even America knew heatless Mondays, limitations on flour and sugar, and other minor annoyances. Some of you who read this book will remember how these light restrictions were utilized for patriotic ends. Perhaps you were among the children told not to waste food because food would win the war, or more popularly, to "lick the plate and lick the Kaiser."

But even in England, despite the menace of the German submarine raids, and certainly in America, there was enough food, and it was more equitably shared in war days than in times of peace. We did not suffer as did the Germans and their allies from a blockade continued, to our shame, long after the Armistice. It was a blockade which none escaped, but from which children were the chief sufferers. The German submarine campaign was an answer to that blockade. Under the logic of war it was, as Admiral Sims and many another American and Allied soldier have long since admitted, justified. It came dangerously close to success, but at the price of being an important factor in dragging the United States into the war. Eventually it failed because the Germans did not have enough submarines, and because the convoy system, which the Allies ultimately adopted, proved successful. The

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Allied blockade, which had no spectacular incident of horror toward civilians, like the sinking of the *Lusitania*, succeeded. No one will ever know just how much of the post-war condition, psychological as well as physical, of the German people, was due to the effect of hunger, especially upon growing children. Inevitably, in the event of another war, any nation with the naval strength or any group of nations which commands the sea, will at once impose a similar blockade. It is a recognized method of warfare, and in establishing or fighting this blockade the submarine will be used, present pious declarations of British and German statesmen in the first flush of enthusiasm over their naval pact to the contrary notwithstanding.

As late as the years 1928 and '29 a thoughtful American student, then resident in Germany, reported that the chief memory of most of the German students with whom he talked, young men and women, not old enough ever to have gone to war, was their eager desire for the full meals which as children they never had. For many of them that hunger continued on into the lean post-war years. Resentment of that hunger and a kind of sense of national humiliation that it should have been suffered were tremendous factors in producing that state of mind among the youth

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which Hitler so successfully exploited for Fascist
ends.

But America never knew what it felt like to have the noose of the blockade tied around her neck. No submarine ever menaced her sources of food supply. She had enough and to spare for other nations.

At first the war was not popular in our country. Many observers thought that it would have been defeated by a referendum vote. There are some who believe that on a secret ballot the majority of Congress would not have declared war. A great many of those Congressmen who did vote for war had no idea that it would entail immediate conscription. A United States Senator, member of the Military Affairs Committee, at the time war was declared, told me that even if we should have the draft we should send comparatively few men outside of the United States and we would select those to be sent largely from the street-corner loafers who were no particular good, anyhow! It was quite an achievement in administration and in propaganda to persuade the American people to accept conscription as willingly as they did.

But despite our national reluctance to enter the war, despite conscription and the dislike of it in the

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hearts of many Americans of German and Irish birth, among a great many people, perhaps the majority, the war acquired temporarily a kind of hysterical popularity. We were not in the war long enough to feel the full force of its horror. Our casualty lists were comparatively small. No considerable number of our soldiers had to endure winter in the trenches. Mark Sullivan reminds us that the average experience of the 1,400,000 men who fought in France comprised six months in training on this side, two months overseas before entering the line, and one month thereafter in a quiet sector. When the Armistice was signed the cantonments over here were full of men who never even saw a troop ship. Several such have risen to be very militant commanders and other high officials in the American Legion.

In other words, both rookie soldiers and civilians in America were still viewing army life as it looked in cantonments. Mr. Sullivan in his volume entitled *Over Here* gives a racy account of cantonment days. The songs the soldiers sang, the entertainment so carefully organized for them, the sports, the games, and the rest of camp life fill many of his pages.

He concludes:

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Yet in spite of "fall in," "K.P." [kitchen police] and "doggey dog," [the guard-house] the average soldier undoubtedly had a rather better time in camp than in civil life. Certainly everything conceivable was done to keep him entertained, contented, and happy.

Only the other day a man who had done most of his soldiering on this side of the water was reminiscing in a somewhat more philosophical mood than Mr. Sullivan. He concluded that for himself and many another man the army days were about the best they had known. They felt a sense of purpose. They had security in respect to food and shelter. They were free to pick their own friends in the army regardless of the class lines of civil life. My friend forgot about military caste lines—he was himself an officer. This ex-soldier, though not a Socialist, concluded from his rather sentimental reminiscences of brief army days that civil life could be better organized and that regimentation was not altogether a bad thing. That, of course, depends a good deal upon temperament. At any rate, the army training camps dotted all round the United States were not

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gloomy places and did not depress the civilian population.

Meanwhile that civilian population in America, or large sections of it, despite some irritation at war restrictions, was rather enjoying itself. First Europe's war and then our own had brought profits to an owning class, some of which spilled over, as we have said, to the workers. The war millionaires did not get and keep all of the false and temporary war prosperity. Wheat and cotton farmers, soft coal operators, and textile manufacturers, little as well as big, shared in it to an extent that they never were able to maintain in the years which followed the post-war deflation.

The pursuit not only of profit but of pleasure was rationalized into a kind of patriotic duty. It was part of the business of keeping the home fires burning, of maintaining morale, and what not. This was true not only in the United States, but in England, France, Italy and Germany, where the war was a more tragic fact.

It was respectable, even admirable, to enjoy an orgy of collective hate of the enemy: with us, of the Kaiser or the Hun. Preachers enthusiastically shared in it and smacked their lips over atrocity stories—for some of these men of God the more sadistic the better. It was a great deal easier to

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preach the duty of hating your own enemies, who of course were also the enemies of the Lord, than to proclaim Christian love. Besides, there were far more propaganda agencies in England and America willing to supply material for sermons on hate than to illustrate such difficult texts as those which bid us love our enemies. To be sure, a theologian, who perhaps lived to regret it, did occasionally take time to explain that it was possible to love your enemy even while you were bayoneting him, and that the Christian doctrine of immortality made it easier for the soldier to send his Christian brother, so unfortunate and so misguided as to be in a German uniform, to an untimely death. The theologian illogically was exempted in England and in America from illustrating his argument with his own bayonet. War, for preachers, editors, the so-called four-minute men who sold the Liberty Bonds, and the men and women on innumerable committees for war activities, wasn't so bad. As one woman said: "I hope I'll be glad when the war is over, but for me and a whole lot of people like me the days are going to be dull."

That woman had no near relatives at the front or on the way to the front, as she candidly admitted. Nevertheless it is an amazing fact that

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some fathers, yes, perhaps some mothers, even in countries which knew the full horror of war, found a vicarious patriotic pride in the soldiery exploits of their sons, a pride which those sons did not always share. In several of his poems Siegfried Sassoon has expressed a deep note of bitterness at civilian satisfaction in war. There was the editor who

*Seemed so certain "all was going well,"
As he discussed the glorious time he had
While visiting the trenches.*

Women—

*You love us when we're heroes, home on
leave,
Or wounded in a mentionable place.
You worship decorations; you believe
That chivalry redeems the war's dis-
grace.*

Even fathers—

*Snug at the club two fathers sat,
Gross, goggle-eyed, and full of chat.
One of them said: "My eldest lad
Writes cheery letters from Bagdad.*

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*But Arthur's getting all the fun
At Arras with his nine-inch gun."*

*"Yes," wheezed the other, "that's the
luck!*

*My boy's quite broken-hearted, stuck
In England training all this year.*

*Still, if there's truth in what we hear,
The Huns intend to ask for more
Before they bolt across the Rhine."*

*I watched them toddle through the
door—*

These impotent old friends of mine.

But there was another side to it even in America. In the summer of 1918 in less than a month one mother of four sons received this batch of news from or about them: A son at the front was seriously wounded; another still in an aviation camp wrote of seeing his best friend in the company suddenly crash to death before his eyes; a third, a conscientious objector, was one of the men who by a hunger strike tried to force action in their case. They got action. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in Fort Leavenworth Military Prison. The fourth was a member of a group whose headquarters was raided and whose indictment was sought by some of that army of ballyhoo

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patriots with government commissions who were doing their bit in the war to make the world safe for democracy by persecuting all those who tried to defend civil liberties in wartime. This mother lived to see a happy ending to all threatened perils to her sons. Thousands, yes millions, of mothers throughout the world were not so fortunate.

References to civil liberties and conscientious objectors remind us of the existence of minority groups of men and women quite unable to share the compensations which the crowd-mind found in war. No German prisoners of war were in camps in the United States, but we had internment camps for enemy aliens. We had our political prisoners and our conscientious objectors. There was nothing new about camps far away from front lines for prisoners of war except the scale on which it was necessary to maintain them. One of the ugly sides of war is the treatment usually afforded to prisoners. Not many men can stand the kind of authority given to those who are guards over prisoners, especially if the prisoners are enemies of their country in the bargain. When a country is hungry, that country is not likely to feed its prisoners well. That is one reason why probably Allied prisoners in Germany, and German and Austrian prisoners in Russia, fared worse than pris-

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oners of war in England or France. It is one reason why probably prisoners during our Civil War fared worse in Southern prisons than in Northern. In the South there was a shortage of food even for soldiers. But prison sufferings and indignities aroused a peculiar resentment. The commander of the Confederate prison at Andersonville was the only man executed after a court-martial trial by the victorious North. Twenty-six per cent of his prisoners had died of hunger, filth and privation. The reader of stories of prison experiences during the World War in noncombatant areas—let us say the stories that Norman Archibald tells of his experiences in various German prison camps—will understand that if hate could have killed, a great many commanders and guards of prison camps in the World War would have died miserable deaths.*

The new kind of camp in the World War was set up for civilians who were enemy aliens. There is no record of similar camps in the Napoleonic wars nor in our Civil War. The existence of these camps in the First World War shows the progress of the herd mind and the growth of the feeling

* Too late for use in these pages appeared Mykytiak's translation of Osyp Turiansky's: *Lost Shadows* (Empire Books), the story of a survivor of the forced march of 60,000 prisoners of war in Serbia from a region near the Austro-German drive toward Italian prison camps. Forty-five thousand perished on the Road of Death.

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that there are no real noncombatants in war. What these camps could mean to a man of sensitive temperament is shown by that remarkable war record with the suggestive title, *Time Stood Still*, written by Paul Cohen-Portheim. It is the diary of a German citizen, an internationalist at heart, with a great many friends in England, concerning his devastating experiences in English enemy alien camps. It was prison life for the innocent in places of confinement less well run than some prisons.

The mob-mind in wartime by no means confines its suspicions and hates to members of the enemy nation. It has a special degree of wrath against nonconformists at home. It would take not one short chapter, or one short book, but a whole library, to describe what happened to freedom in America during the World War. Liberty was a popular word, much used or misused. We not only had Liberty Bonds and Liberty Loans to raise money for war, but Liberty cabbage instead of sauerkraut. In more than one patriotic community the children suffered perhaps somewhat less from German measles when they became Liberty measles. We used the name in many other strange connections, but we had no liberty of the press or speech.

Under wartime laws the Postmaster General, a

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Texas politician named Burleson, became thought controller. Virtually all radical magazines were banned from the mail—and it took very little to make a magazine radical in his eyes. In the late summer of 1919 a magazine called *The World To-morrow* printed an issue which contained a Parable of Hate by John Haynes Holmes. The point of the parable was that the author had searched in vain for hate in the front-line trenches and in the hospitals where the wounded soldiers were, but at last found it in a beautiful garden where an old man, a childless matron, and a curate sat at tea—and the fourth was Hate. The same issue of the magazine carried a long article questioning the American course towards Russia and especially the sending of soldiers to Archangel and Vladivostok. No less than five sets of censors complained to the Post-office Department of the magazine. The Postmaster General assured the editor that not only would he suppress the magazine, but that he personally would see to it that the responsible editors were sent to jail. The threat was not fulfilled, because this was one of the two or three cases in which President Wilson himself intervened. But the story shows the spirit in which the government understood liberty of the press in wartime. Few were the magazines or

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newspapers which were lucky enough to reach the ear of the President. He purposely kept it closed.

With his approval, sedition laws were made so severe that men were literally arrested for quoting from his own book, *The New Freedom*. A story widely credited at the time, which I believe to be true though I have never been able to verify it in detail, concerned a man in a Southern state who had been somewhat free in questioning the wisdom of the war. One day a local police officer arrested him on suspicion, and, searching him, found in handwriting a statement which the shrewd constable instantly recognized as seditious. It spoke of self-evident truths about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. "Now," said he to his victim, "I've got you." "But," said the latter, "I did not write it." "Who did?" was the constable's rejoinder. "A man named Tom Jefferson." "Lead me to him," said the constable; "I'll take both of you."

Whether or not this particular story is true, there were plenty of other arrests and some convictions, for no more serious offenses. President Harding, after the war was over, commented in my hearing on the frivolous reasons under which men had been arrested and convicted. He was talking to a small committee which had come to

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ask the release of Gene Debs, the famous Socialist, and other political prisoners guilty of no overt act against the government. Mr. Harding was not yet willing to commit himself with regard to Debs, but he spoke with considerable feeling of the mass of applications for pardon from men, usually German born, whose personal enemies or ill wishers, sometimes in their own families, had seized upon a chance remark as proof of sedition.

In many cases the Sedition Act was a heaven-sent opportunity to deal under cover of patriotism with the radical workers. Ninety-five members of the Industrial Workers of the World were sentenced for wartime sedition, really for no reason except that they were radicals who had not liked war. No sane man can read Eugene V. Debs' speech at Canton, Ohio, for which he was sentenced to ten years in a Federal penitentiary, without a new appreciation of hysteria in wartime. Debs spoke against war in general, against imperialism, and for a negotiated peace. He said that the roots of war were economic, which is precisely what Mr. Wilson himself said after the war was over in a speech in St. Louis. Altogether, 1,532 persons were arrested for disloyal utterances, 65 for threats against the President, and 10 for sabotage.

The number was small compared with those who

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were harassed under the suspicion of spying. The most innocent acts were taken as evidence of pro-German plots. When the country had begun to recover its sanity again, Judge George W. Anderson of Boston, who had been a Federal District Attorney during the war, declared: "I assert as my best judgment that more than ninety per cent of the reported pro-German plots never existed. I think it is time publicity was given to this view."

Worse than the legal persecution of those who held minority opinions—mind you, none of them was charged with overt acts against the government—was the fate of victims of the mob. Frank Little, a radical worker, was hung by a mob in Montana. The Rev. Herbert Bigelow of Cincinnati, a notable progressive, not a Socialist, who had incurred the rage of certain powerful corporations, was kidnaped and badly beaten on the pretext that he had opposed the entry of America into the war, despite the fact that he had given the war support after America had entered it. In the Northwest not only German-born but Scandinavian-born Americans had their houses streaked with yellow, met with personal violence—in a few cases with approaches to actual lynching—simply because they did not buy as many Liberty Bonds as some self-appointed body of patriots thought that they

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should. Wisconsin's once popular hero, Senator Robert M. LaFollette, was burned in effigy in Madison, Wisconsin. The mob spirit rode triumphant, and greed and hate found protection by waving the flag.

The defeat of the prosecution in two famous cases, that against the editors of the radical paper, the old *Masses*, and against the eloquent Socialist, Scott Nearing, in New York, shows that there was a sense of justice still alive in the country which could not be stampeded. These two cases did much to save other people in large cities who could make a powerful address to a jury from persecution, but neither in New York nor in other cities were those who spoke imperfect English so fortunate.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that men of draft age who for conscientious reasons refused to fight had short shrift in public sympathy and at the hands of the government. Conscientious objection in the World War was mostly a phenomenon of the English-speaking world, which had a tradition of respect for the individual conscience, especially if it claimed respect on religious grounds, and where, moreover, there had been no long institution of compulsory military training and service. There were conscientious

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objectors in the Continental countries. Russia made some provisions for religious objectors, but most of them met with summary treatment and there are no authentic records of their numbers.

In America there were, according to the government records, less than 4,000 conscientious objectors out of a draft army which approached 3,000,000 men. Out of these all but 450 found it within their conscience to accept some form of non-combatant service or were furloughed to agriculture or to the Friends' Reconstruction Units in France. Conscientious objectors differed like other men in temperament, in character, and also in their reasons for objecting. The majority were religious objectors, many of them of a rather literalistic sort, willing to help in the war provided they themselves were not compelled to kill. Under the law, exemption from combatant service was given to those who belonged to a religious group whose creed or principles were opposed to combatant service. Membership in such a sect gave a kind of special privilege not granted to men who had arrived at their objection through political or social or religious reasoning which did not lead them to belong to a particular religious sect. Before the conscientious objectors were finally offered some service which they would accept or were

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definitely court-martialed to jail, they suffered many brutalities of an ingenious sort. In prison some of them knew solitary confinement in dark dungeons, yet most of them would admit that their sufferings were light compared with what their brothers endured in the trenches. In spite of this, it was a common experience to have soldiers admit that they would have been conscientious objectors, or that they had intended to be conscientious objectors, but they were afraid. The sufferings men endured together were easier to accept than the stigma and loneliness of a jail sentence.

The War Department, which at first rather prided itself upon its liberal treatment of conscientious objectors, in the end made an inglorious record. All objectors, from the standpoint of the law, were equally guilty. They had refused to obey military orders. Yet after the Armistice was signed, their sentences, usually to life imprisonment, were commuted in the most capricious way. It was not until November 23, 1920, two years after the signing of the Armistice, fifteen months after the release of the last of the English objectors, and two weeks after the defeat of the Wilson Administration at the polls, that thirty-one objectors who had been longest in jail or in intern-

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ment camps were released without any official statement from the President or Newton D. Baker, the Secretary of War.

Capricious, unreasonable, and even cruel as the record of governmental dealing with conscientious objectors was, it is probable that the Administration was more and not less just and generous to them than public opinion. Although most of the objectors rested their case upon their interpretation of the New Testament, generally speaking preachers and churches, including some who are now much opposed to war, were in the very front of the pack which pursued the objector. One of the latter writes: "I think it was a common experience of conscientious objectors that their most bitter and intolerant enemies in the Army were the chaplains and the YMCA men." The tendency was to present the conscientious objector as a dull, selfish, cowardly sort of fellow. The popular press certainly never played up the story of Richard L. Stierheim, which did not become known even in limited circles until a year after the end of the war. Stierheim was drafted and sent overseas before the government had provided any machinery for dealing with conscientious objectors, of which he and his company commander were aware. He believed it wrong to kill. Hence in

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France he deserted, but awaited recapture, expecting conviction and the death sentence, which he received. While awaiting approval and execution of the sentence, on November 3, 1918, he volunteered to go out into No-Man's-Land at the peril of his life to rescue the wounded. He succeeded in rescuing six of them, unassisted, under machine-gun fire. Later he volunteered to go into No-Man's-Land and bury the dead, and for nine successive days he continued to render service of this character, unhesitatingly exposing himself to peril of death for the aid of his wounded comrades. As one might expect, or at any rate hope, his sentence was remitted and he was honorably discharged. His devotion and his courage had parallels among other objectors, who had to find other ways to show these qualities.

I have summarized the experiences of conscientious objectors at a length out of proportion to their numbers because the fact that there were any conscientious objectors at all presented a standing challenge to the religion of implicit obedience to the state which modern war requires. It will continue to require it. To-day, for reasons which we shall discuss in a later chapter, a great many outstanding young men in England and America, and in some of the Continental countries of Eu-

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rope, are announcing in advance their intention to be war-resisters; that is to say, to refuse military service. They ought to know—indeed, they do know—that if the nations are mad enough to go to war again, conscientious objectors in English-speaking countries will probably be met with more ruthless measures than those which caused such real suffering in the First World War.

Yet those same war-resisters in future wars, like their brethren in the First World War, will doubtless confess that it was not so much punishment which broke down the spirit of objection as the storm of propaganda which beat upon soldiers and civilians alike. Every government organized its own propaganda service. The military censors controlled the news which came out from the front. One of the most interesting of post-war books was that written by Sir Philip Gibbs, the brilliant war correspondent, under the significant title *Now It Can Be Told*. Every effort, truthful and untruthful, was made to compel the masses to believe the same stories and to respond to the same emotions. Truth and liberty are the first casualties of war. The home fires were kept burning by a definite and official propaganda of lies and hate. After the war was over and sanity had partially returned to men, Arthur Ponsonby made a

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careful examination of the principal lies which had been pressed into service in Great Britain. He began with some of the disingenuous statements concerning the degree of Great Britain's commitments to France in the event of war. He ran down the more famous atrocity stories, including the widely spread and wholly false story to the effect that the Germans had a factory in which they distilled glycerine from the bodies of their dead. In all it takes the author thirty chapters to list and refute the falsehoods he has run to earth. No one can understand the nature of war or its effect upon either soldiers or civilians who refuses to consider that all governments thought it necessary not merely to permit, but in many cases to encourage, the dissemination of these lies in order to keep the mass hysteria at sufficient pitch to support the tragic insanity of mass murder. Of course, this propaganda was not intended merely to affect the folks at home. It was also cunningly directed to the winning of favor abroad. The story of America's final entry into the war is in part the story of the triumph of a very one-sided propaganda of the British case against Germany. The propaganda was sweetened by immense war orders.

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One of the most despicable examples of the deliberate use of falsehood in war is not furnished by Arthur Ponsonby. It is the story of Roger Casement, told in considerable detail in a manuscript written by a competent student which I trust will soon see the light of day.

As those familiar with the World War may remember, Roger Casement was put to death because as an Irish patriot he had negotiated for help from Germany on behalf of the Irish who sought independence. He did for Ireland what Thomas Masaryk, now the beloved President of Czechoslovakia, did with far more success for the rebels against the Austrian empire. His execution was in accordance with the stern rules of war. Of itself it did not imply dishonor. Roger Casement had won for himself a great name in the world by his work in the British Consular service exposing atrocities in the Belgian Congo and later in South America. There were in America millions of sympathizers with Ireland who would doubly resent the execution of a man whom they regarded as a hero. Hence the British government encouraged the discreet circulation of what was reported to be the diary of Sir Roger. It showed him as the devotee of unnatural vice; it made any popular

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hero-worship of him impossible. All the evidence, positive and negative, now shows that this destruction of the reputation of a man of high conscience and great courage was deliberately and maliciously false. It seems highly probable that what was done by British officials was to doctor the diary rather ingeniously so that it appeared that Sir Roger was confessing for himself vices that he was denouncing in another. So a brave man lost that which was dearer to him than life. Why? Because in war it is not only expedient that one man should die, rather than that the nation should perish, but also that truth and liberty should perish to the end that one group of exhausted nations should at last dictate a treaty—not to end war, but to sow the seeds of fresh conflict!

In no country was the propaganda of hate and falsehood or the denial of civil liberty ended with the signing of the Armistice. In America some of the most shameful chapters in intolerance were written after November 11, 1918. Hate of the Kaiser was transferred with the aid of the elaborate propaganda machinery which partially survived the war, into fear and hate of a mythical Red menace. A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General of the

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United States, treated us to shameful anti-Red raids. A whole boat, the *Buford*, was loaded with deportees. Socialist legislators were arbitrarily unseated at Albany.

Those infamous chapters in the prostitution of justice, the Sacco and Vanzetti and the Mooney and Billings cases, in some degree were bound up with war hysteria although they did not originate while we were at war. Their roots lay in class rather than national conflict, but without the war, with its inflaming of passion, the history of both cases might have been very different. The crime for which Mooney and Billings were framed up was a bomb outrage during a Preparedness Day parade antedating our entrance into war. Russian demonstrations in their behalf during the war drew President Wilson's attention to the case and won for them commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment. But only now, in the summer of 1935, is there any sign of hope that the courts will be ready to do men innocent of this crime a tragically belated justice. As for Sacco and Vanzetti, it is difficult to imagine that they ever would have been falsely convicted of murder during a hold-up after the war if they had not been known anarchists and opponents of the war.

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The home fires we kept burning during the war were not soon extinguished, and in the conflagration they all but completely consumed our most precious traditions of tolerance and civil liberty.

CHAPTER III

THE NEXT WAR

WHAT will the next war be like? The average man who stops to think about it, in the army or out, probably believes that it will be like the last war, but worse in respect to the damage done by tanks, airplanes, and poison gas. It will be a war in which each nation must call out its whole strength, industrial as well as military. It will be dependent upon certain basic industries, and, above all, upon the possession of resources of food, iron, coal, and petroleum. Yet these four things are not enough. In our own country in 1930 Colonel F. H. Payne announced that he had drawn up a list of 3,876 products of peacetime industry that should be classified as strategic in war.

But these generalizations that the average man draws from experience in the last war do not altogether answer our question. Some of them are sharply challenged; for instance, some students hold that already the day of the mass conscript

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army is done. Hoffman Nickerson in his provocative book, *Can We Limit War?* believes that the stalemate of trench warfare, the possible revolutionary effect of the tank, and the expensiveness of use to the full of modern machinery, should compel us to think in terms of a new war fought by comparatively small, immensely mobile, highly mechanized armies, with the civilian population organized to furnish them with weapons and supplies. On the other hand, Mr. Nickerson poohpoohs what he considers the exaggerated fear of the airplane and poison gas in war. The revolutionary instrument, in his opinion, is the tank, virtually an armed fortress, capable of going "60 miles an hour by wheel on roads and over 42 by caterpillar over bad grounds."

Let us look into these differing opinions. The starting-point for all speculation is the plans of the Allies for the campaign of 1919. Winston Churchill describes them vividly:

Arrangements were being made to carry simultaneously a quarter of a million men, together with all their requirements, continuously forward across country in mechanical vehicles moving ten or fifteen miles each day. Poison

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gases of incredible malignity, against which only a secret mask (which the Germans could not obtain in time) was proof, would have stifled all resistance and paralyzed all life on the hostile fronts subjected to attack. . . .

Should war come again to the world, it is not with the weapons and agencies prepared for 1919 that it will be fought, but with developments and extensions of these which will be incomparably more formidable and fatal.

It must be remembered that the Allies never had a chance to try these plans. German resistance collapsed not so much at the front as through exhaustion. At that it took a revolution to get Germany out of the war, as earlier it had taken a more drastic revolution to end Russian participation in what had become a massacre of her troops. England and France were becoming so war-weary that General Haig and Prime Minister Lloyd George would have accepted an armistice much less drastic than that finally imposed on the Germans. It is a question whether a revolution might not if necessary keep a nation from entering,

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or speedily take it out of, a war "incomparably
more formidable and fatal" than the last.

But assuming that nations which have intensified preparation for the next war will, when that war is begun, give their military leaders the same blind support that they gave them in 1914, what then? The war plans of the chief military nations, except Great Britain and America, are still based on the idea of huge conscript armies to which the preparations for 1919 may be added. Germany, despite her experimentation through necessity with a small, highly trained army, and her avowed intention to seek mobility above all things, has under the dictator, Hitler, rejoiced in reestablishing conscription. After this grim and stupid fashion have her rulers and, it is to be feared, many of her people, found healing for injured pride in releasing themselves from the limited armaments allowed them under that "peace to end peace," the Treaty of Versailles.

We in America do not have conscription, but we have a military framework under our National Defense Act which is completely insane unless our War Department contemplates in crisis the preparation of another mass conscript army. Until the recent unnecessary but small increase in our army we had less than ten enlisted men for every com-

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missioned officer. On the basis of war strength of regiments, we have about fifteen times as many colonels and lieutenant colonels as we need, and thirty-three times as many majors. But that isn't all. Thanks partly to the ROTC in colleges we now have over 119,000 reserve officers, of whom only 12,000 are members of the National Guard. Some cynic has remarked, apropos of military conservatism, that the army never learns; hence each country is preparing, not for the next war or even the last war, but the one before the last. Certainly the United States is preparing for the kind of war that it entered in 1917, and not doing a good job at that. For everybody knows how ridiculously inadequate is ROTC training for any other purpose than to encourage the acceptance of militarism.

But while the nations prepare in terms of the old mass army there is a general acceptance of the idea that war, at least in Europe, will begin with some kind of a surprise attack by airplanes or a mobile force of tanks and picked men considerably before the mobilization of conscripts can be completed. If the surprise attack is effective enough there may be no time for the victimized nation to complete mobilization. Assuming, however, that there is a knock-out blow, it is possible that great

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mass armies will go out and face each other across a fresh No-Man's-Land, leaving the significant fighting to be done by such picked troops and with such weapons—but immensely improved—as Winston Churchill says were being prepared for 1919.

The great controversy concerns the effectiveness of airplanes against cities, factories and transportation centers far behind the lines. Some competent writers hold that fear of airplanes and their powers of destruction has been exaggerated. Weapons of defense against airplanes, they say, such as searchlights, sound detectors, anti-aircraft guns, wire nets to catch bombs, to say nothing of gas-masks, and bomb-proof shelters with arrangements for filtering the air of poison gas, have been improved since 1919 as fast as the means of destruction which airplanes can use. There is no explosive bomb which, even in quantity, dropped from the heavens, could destroy New York's skyscrapers. Mr. Nickerson repeatedly reminds us that to cut steel an explosive must be carefully placed on a girder and tamped on. Professor J. B. S. Haldane in England has argued that in practice 40 tons of poison gas could not be so laid down as to produce the "lethal concentration over London," which a brother scientist, Lord Halsbury, had predicted.

We are not experts in these things. It seems

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possible that certain pacifist orators have talked a little wildly about the extent and ease of the physical destruction that can be wrought by incendiary bombs, different kinds of poison gas, and explosives, even when these are used, as they would be, in the most diabolical combination. The actual destruction in the poorly organized air-raids over cities during the last war was not very great. It might be multiplied and still cities would not be destroyed. But the psychological effect of these same small-scale air-raids on cities and factory centers was tremendously great. There is no drill of school children in putting on and off gas-masks which can equal the discipline of adult soldiers. The army men who play down the horror of the airplane as an instrument of frightfulness behind the lines, or for the destruction of factories and the morale of the workers, forget two things: (1) the immense cost of the kind of protection of cities which is technically possible; and (2) the inescapable and inevitable fact that panic among the civilian population will do what actual bombs cannot.

What actual incendiary and explosive bombs, to say nothing of poison gas, can do, is bad enough. It is commonly believed that one reason why Japan has not attacked Russia before Russia's strength

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grows greater is her fear that the well-trained Russian aviators could wipe out by incendiary bombs whole Japanese cities or at least the flimsily built residential portions of them. There are no possible defenses through which bombing planes can never sneak; no defensive squadron can always find the enemy in the sky. This is so well known that in Europe most of the plans for aërial warfare assume that the best defense is to attack first. The opening hostilities of any new war may be a battle in the heavens between rival fleets—a battle from which there can be no rescue of the wounded—or else it will be the surprise attack of the first air squadron which can reach the enemy's centers of mobilization and the production of munitions.

One of the experts assembled by the Committee of the Red Cross at Rome, a certain Dr. Ruth, estimated that the partial protection of a city of a million people by means of underground shelters, served by air-shafts, provided with compressed air installation for the renewal of the air, the protection of roofs of important buildings against destructive bombs, etc., would cost \$160,000,000. Even then the protection on which he calculated would be very partial. Cities with the maximum protection against air-raiders who used a combination of every possible weapon of destruction would

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have to be built anew, along lines advanced by some European architects. The cities would be as little adapted to the ordinary comforts and conveniences of life as were the fortified cities of the Middle Ages.

The most recent and striking discussion of what air attack might mean to European cities, particularly London, is to be found in a careful paper by Philip Noel Baker in the book *A Challenge to Death*. He gives frankly the conflicting statements of the damage that could be done simply by poison gas, and yet concludes that it probably cannot be long after war begins before "London and Paris and Berlin will each be a shattered, flaming hell." He quotes the military correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* as follows:

It has been suggested that in the event of severe air attacks forty per cent of London's 7,000,000 population would leave the city in the first forty-eight hours and eighty per cent within the week.

Such an estimate may be exaggerated, but it is nevertheless essential to consider ways of controlling any mass evacuation and of feeding and housing the refugees.

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Mr. Baker gives good reasons for believing that the suggestion about mass evacuation which he quotes from the military correspondence of the *Daily Telegraph* was founded on official information. It is not fantastic. Assume, if you like, that London or any other great European city escapes or wards off for a considerable time successful air attack. Suppose, moreover, that the coolness of the civilian population should exceed what military observers expect of it; still it is not conceivable that any considerable European war should be fought for any length of time without one or more severe and successful attacks upon major centers of population, with civilian panic as a result. Even in peace-time Stuart Chase has pointed out to us that the marginal safety in a large city is not great. All through every street, beneath the surface, lie electric cables, gas mains, water mains, sewers, telephone cables, signal services for traffic and fire, and often steam pipes. Imagine the actual damage and the greater panic that might be wrought by a few lucky strikes scored by bombers from the air! Consider the effect of a few doses of a comparatively harmless but irritating gas like tear-gas on the average crowd. Multiply that a hundred times over for the effect of a combination of mustard gas, or worse, which acts on and

through the skin with various asphyxiating gases. The terror will begin probably at night. Lights will be turned off, a combination of incendiary bombs, explosives and poison gas will begin their deadly work in one or more sections. The fires are not easily extinguished nor is the gas quickly banished from the streets. The defending air squadrons do not drive off all the enemy, so that the first wave of attack is followed by the second. The panic and the exodus begin. Now imagine five million—or even one million—in “a London without water, light, or transportation, struggling out to open country away from the streets where they have been battered day and night by high explosives and where they cannot take a step without the danger of contamination from poison gas. Imagine their arrival in the country; their search for food and drink and shelter; their struggle for the inadequate supplies they find. Imagine the gradual collapse of old men and women and small children, of mothers who have carried their babies, until they can walk no farther, in search of the milk without which the babies will die. Imagine the break-up of families that will follow; the children who will lose their parents.”

Imagine these things and then reduce the estimate by half, and still you will have to picture

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such horror as Dante scarcely imagined in Hell.

Mr. Baker's picture of aërial warfare does not stress one feature of the next war which may make its destruction most complete. That is the possibility of using all sorts of electrical devices, especially remote control of unmanned airplanes, and germs for the purpose of attack on cities and factories.

The English authority, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, says that already the electrical wave has been used to command airplanes and can be used to control tanks and gun-fire. He does not develop these possibilities at length, but sums the matter up in this challenging sentence: "Whilst in mechanical and chemical science I see possible fertilizers of war, in electrical science I see its possible end." But first an end of cities which will be made one with Nineveh and Tyre!

After the first draft of this chapter was written, a story in the *New York Times* (July 2, 1935) reports the invention by an American engineer for the British of a sound detector. "Great horns resembling electric amplifiers pick up on a beam the sound vibrations of aircraft motors." Thus an approaching air squadron can be heard and its direction determined 720 miles away! Score one for the defense!

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But three days later the *Times* records the completion for the U. S. Army of a "mystery bomber designed to carry six tons of bombs for 6,000 miles without refueling and to have a top speed of 230 miles an hour." Such mystery bombers will not be confined to one nation, nor can any sound detector guarantee safety against them. Bombers might carry bacteria as well as explosives and poison gas. The mechanical or military expert may rejoice in this race of offense and defense. The plain man can see in it only agony, perhaps more prolonged because invention which makes the range of the offensive so much greater inspires the defensive also with hope! The very uncertainty of experts whether the taboos against the use of bacteria or poison for destroying populations by polluting water supplies will break down, or whether this is practically a method which enemy aviators or spies can successfully use, ought not to suggest to us optimism about war, but the determination to take no chances.

In the same symposium to which Mr. Baker contributes the notable article from which I have quoted, Gerald Heard carries the story a step farther. The war is over, at least as far as effective fighting is concerned; the major cities in both England and its enemy country are in ruins; millions

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of human beings have fled London to the country. The elaborate system of supplies on which England depends for food is disrupted. The complex and artificial arrangements on which the population of a machine age depends are broken down. A real danger lurks in poison gas which still hangs around shops and food depots, and this danger is magnified a thousand times over by popular fear. Possibly the war was carried on to a pitch where the water supplies in some districts were poisoned or polluted by bacteria. What then?

Mr. Heard gives a grim answer of chaos and terror. To make his answer more probable he might have appealed to history. The blackest night of the Dark Ages, H. A. L. Fisher, the historian, tells us, did not settle on Rome or Italy until the desperate struggles of the Justinian epoch in the first half of the sixth century. In the course of the struggle with Justinian's troops, the Goths cut the aqueduct which supplied Rome with water. When the war was over the survivors had become exhausted. The population had lost the energy, and perhaps the knowledge, to rebuild the aqueduct. What happened once can happen again, but it is not exactly that which Mr. Heard anticipates.

Instead, he imagines a period of anarchy and confusion. Regional strong men, generals perhaps,

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become dictators. They dragoon the countryside for food; they come into conflict with each other. After a period of anarchic strife, the strongest of these local dictators wins and extends his power; a power that rests upon violence and is enforced by terror. There is no certainty whatever that the dominant dictator who survives will have any such social vision as the Bolsheviks in Russia. In the anarchy of anguish and despair and the complete disorganization of life as civilized men had been wont to live it, luck and brute force are likely to win whatever victory is possible.

Some optimists who believe that we can accept war and still save civilization will retort to Mr. Heard that his picture is too bad to be true. But why? What is improbable about it? Assuming that there is one chance in ten that it will be true, what madmen human beings are to accept that chance!

The optimistic revolutionists of a certain school may retort to Mr. Heard that out of such chaos, especially in view of the history of Russia, men will turn Communist. We shall have more to say on this subject later on; for the present it is enough to point out the sorry limitations which inevitably terror and poverty impose upon Communist achievement. These limitations were great enough

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in Russia, where the people were mainly agricultural and where Moscow and Leningrad were able to endure a degree of disorganization and suffering that would have made London, Paris or New York so many bedlams.

My reference to New York may prompt the American reader to say: "You are talking about European war, the horrible fate you and the authors you quote predict for European capitals could scarcely happen in the United States." The point is rather well taken. The United States still enjoys and is likely to enjoy for a considerable time a degree of immunity from the worst sufferings of war, far greater than that enjoyed by any European people, except possibly the Russians, in their vast territory.

Effective warfare against a strong nation still requires bases of action near the country which is attacked. It is inconceivable that either Mexico or Canada will have the desire or the power to direct an attack against the United States. Unless we offended our neighbors beyond all reason they would not permit themselves to become allied with other nations in an attack against the United States. In the event of such an alliance, both of them would probably suffer more from our air forces than we would suffer while the air forces of

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the alliance were being brought into play. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans can be crossed by ships, submarines, and airplanes, but the narrower of them is still far broader than the English Channel. The experience of the First World War indicated how difficult was the landing of any sort of army on enemy shores. At first our greatest fear in terms of an attack upon our own territory would be of naval and aërial raids not likely to do catastrophic injury to us.

But the next war, so far as the United States is concerned, is not in the least likely to be a defensive war against aggression. It is a war into which we will be drawn by some high pretext of saving civilization, but in reality to serve the usual economic interests. We shall go to war in the Far East "to preserve the open door in China," or "to protect civilization against Japan." Or perhaps we shall be drawn into a European war to protect a very profitable trade with one group of belligerents. In either case most of the fighting, at any rate at first, will be by the boys in the Navy and the soldiers who might be landed on other shores than our own. Further great improvement in air navigation might change the picture. But so it stands to-day.

The war into which we might blunder or be

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drawn would be bad enough. As I was writing this chapter, my eye fell on an article in the *New York Times* quoting a distinguished, but unnamed American soldier, who predicted that a war between the United States and Japan would last ten years and would only be won by America after we had built our second fleet. Remember, one battleship costs around \$40,000,000. Military and naval experts, when they are candid, will admit that there is no navy that it is practicable to build which will enable us to hold the Philippines against the Japanese. I once heard President Roosevelt, before he was Governor of New York, tell a small meeting that when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy there were not even any plans in the Navy Department which were based on a successful holding of the Philippines. They might be won back after the Japanese Navy was destroyed. Just what trade advantages as the reward of victory would be worth one-hundredth part of such a war in money alone, no sane man can imagine. Our whole trade with Japan, China and the Philippines in 1933 amounted to 525 million dollars or enough to have carried on the First World War for less than two and one-half days! Though the United States is at present less vulnerable to the horrors of war than the European nations, it does

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not follow that our sufferings in another war would be light or that victory would repay even the monetary cost.

The picture which we have drawn in such imperfect outline would be greatly changed if, as is all too likely, war between the United States and Japan turned out to be war between us and certain allies. The more nations that might be called in on either side, the greater would be the hazards of destruction.

There is probably not a sober man in the United States, unless there might be a military officer almost insane with desire for promotion or glory, who would desire a war with Japan or any other first-rate military power. Even Mr. William Randolph Hearst might find a war less satisfactory than the Spanish War of his youth and far less satisfactory than he finds the reckless exploitation of the yellow peril in time of peace. The First World War was child's play for us compared with what we should suffer in war with Japan or in any European conflict into which we might be drawn. Wars are neither made nor averted at the last moment. If the horror of the next war appals us, the time to avoid it is now.

But this is getting ahead of our story. We are

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still discussing the nature of the next war. Let
us, then, sum up our conclusions:

1. On the basis of experience, in an interdependent world it is a practical certainty that the next great war, if and when it comes, will be a world war. That is, it will involve on both sides many more than the two nations whose quarrel may begin it.

2. The war, when it comes, will probably be begun in terms of mass conscript armies. But tank and airplane squadrons will likely prove sooner or later the effective agents of conflict. The excessive conservatism of military authorities, their respect for tradition, and their lack of ideas, make it improbable that the next war will be "limited," as Mr. Nickerson and many other authorities reasonably argue that it should be limited, if for no other reason than in order to make the most effective possible use of modern weapons. Certainly the military authorities in every country are still thinking and preparing in terms of mass armies. Nevertheless a limitation of war to relatively small armies, equipped with the most scientific weapons of destruction, may take place. That will depend on unknown quantities such as the rise in some one country of a real military genius or the

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overwhelming success of some experimental use of new means of warfare.

3. Simply to supply the armies with what they need will mean the mobilization of all the forces at each nation's command. Even in a "limited war" there will be few noncombatants. It will be legitimate by the logic of warfare to strike at cities where civilians make the essential supplies of war. Airplanes, poison gas, and other weapons, at the most conservative estimate, furnish the means to make that war against the cities indescribably dreadful and its aftermath one of chaos and terror. It is not probable that men will lose the technical knowledge now so generally shared. The new Dark Ages which new war will usher in will be the more unendurable not because barbarians revert to the primitive technique of an Attila, but precisely because they can ride airplanes instead of horses.

4. It is probable that there will be some moral and practical restraints, such as fear of reprisal, against the most extreme forms of frightfulness in the next war, but these restraints will be of small comfort in or behind the lines. It pays both sides to have their wounded patched up and their men in prison camps protected from starvation. Even modern war will not altogether quench every spark

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of human kindness in individual soldiers. It is possible that the ancient taboo against the use of poison or bacteria for polluting food or water will persist. Prophets of the future have a respect for this taboo, and moreover they have some doubt as to the technical efficiency of bacteriological warfare. Nevertheless most of them agree that there is a chance that it will be added to other forms of war that we have discussed. It is certain that electrical control will add to the deadliness of modern weapons. All students will agree that it is useless to talk of limiting war by banishing certain weapons already accepted, like poison gas, tanks, or submarines. If men are mad enough to fight at all they will use the best weapons they have. Obviously they are planning now to use them in spite of proposed treaties, few of which are ratified and fewer still observed. Always the argument will run: "Our enemy will use this weapon unless we beat him to it," and it will be convincing.

Generals have been ultra-conservative in the use of new inventions. Napoleon loved artillery, but never encouraged inventors to improve the gun. The tank was forced upon the British high command, but the objections of the generals never arose out of humanity, and finally the new inventions won. We men cannot hate and fear each

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other's nations enough to go to war and still effectively limit the weapons of war by treaty. It is far more Utopian to talk of this kind of limitation of the weapons of destruction than to talk of ending war. You can kill a man-eating tiger far more easily than you can catch him, manicure him, pare down his claws, file his teeth, pat him on the back and let him loose again in the jungle to be a tame tabby-cat. It is possible to imagine that some sort of civilization will endure even through a new world war or cycle of wars. It is a dreadful gamble to take, and there is not even a gambler's chance that in the event of such a new war or cycle of wars, mankind will escape as it did in the First World War, the effects of which it feels so sorely to this day.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT HAVE MEN GAINED BY WAR?

THE Man from Mars who saw how men suffered in the last war and how frantically they are preparing for the next war, which they know will be worse, would come to the conclusion that he was looking at the denizens of a lunatic asylum. Either that or that men got sufficient advantage out of war to compensate them for what it cost. He would be interested to inquire what that advantage might be.

The Man from Mars is a convenient imaginary character; we are real people who live on this earth. How much greater ought, then, to be our curiosity concerning the gains of war for which men have fought at such great cost. Our inquiry is not easy. Unquestionably men must have thought there were some gains or they would not have made war an institution. What have been those gains down through the ages? In a chemical laboratory the student can repeat an experiment over and over, changing the conditions and controlling them until

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at last he finds precisely which causes produce which effects. We can do nothing of the sort in the laboratory of history. We can only make the most intelligent possible guesses concerning certain phases of our problem. Other conclusions, as we shall see, will be more certain.

To begin with we must remember two things:

1. Before there was history there was war. While man probably lived on earth for milleniums without war, war has become so intertwined with human life on this planet that it is almost impossible to take out of the tapestry the threads which war and only war has woven into the warp and woof of it. For instance, it is impossible even now to say with precise certainty for how much of the present economic depression of the world the World War is responsible, and for how much the disintegration of capitalism would have accounted without the war—which war, by the way, is to be explained as the logical product of capitalist imperialism. Or, to take another illustration: historically there has been an interesting reaction between war and mechanical progress. Miners taught the military engineers some of their arts for the purpose of destroying fortresses. In return the makers of gunpowder for war use taught miners something of a better use of explosives. All sorts of inven-

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tions, from the making of steel to airplanes, were stimulated by their use for military purposes. Lewis Mumford, who has written some stimulating pages on this subject, reminds us that there is a relationship between the discipline of the drill-ground and the discipline of modern factory production, a relationship which works both ways. He also tells us that probably the first big order for mass production of a standardized product was Louis XIV's order for 100,000 uniforms for his troops. But Mr. Mumford is the first to admit, or rather to insist, that much of this interdependence of war and what we call industrial progress has been hurtful to man both as soldier and factory worker. Without war and the search for better weapons of war, which despite the conservatism of generals has played a large rôle in technological progress, we might have had a far healthier development of machinery for the purpose of supplying human needs. War, as I remember learning in a school history, has promoted educational contacts between peoples, even if primarily they met for purposes of destruction. It has advanced civilization by promoting a helpful cross-fertilization of cultures. This is particularly true, we are often told, of the Crusades. Yet who can deny that without the war attitude and tradition we might

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have had an interchange of cultures through trade and travel far more stimulating. The seeds of culture and civilization have sometimes flourished in the barren ground of war; why not better in the fields of peace?

2. The second thing to remember is that history is always written by the survivors or their children. We have to be in a very pessimistic mood indeed not to believe that the tangled chain of events which finally produced us is somehow good! A certain battle was won by the armies of a certain race or tribe. Afterwards certain things happened which seem good to us. Therefore the battle was responsible and becomes good. The effect of climate, trade, and invention is forgotten. The course of the history of Europe is explained over and over in terms of the successive victories against various foes by an Aryan race which nobody can prove actually existed as a biological entity! Thus, in 732 A.D., near Poitiers, Charles Martel, or Charles the Hammer, defeated a great Arab army under the Moslem Governor of Spain, with a loss of life which the none-too-accurate chroniclers of the times put at 375,000. This victory has been hailed as the deliverance of Aryan and Christian Europe from the fate of the Arab world. Yet at the time the Arabs in Spain had more genuine cul-

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ture than the rude soldiers of Charles the Hammer. The Moslems were not numerous enough to supplant the Europeans they found on the soil of Europe, and the survivors of them would have been subject to the same conditions of climate and geography as affected those inhabitants. Who, then, can say that the victory of Poitiers saved the world from ruin?

This game of historical "ifs" is fascinating when one once begins it: fascinating, but none too profitable. Let two other illustrations be enough. Suppose Napoleon had won instead of lost at Waterloo. Might there not have been a United States of Europe or some other form of unification which would have prevented the World War? If I were debating the issue I should hold that probably Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo was better for mankind than would have been his victory. But who can be absolutely sure, or who can regard the fruits of Wellington's victory as satisfactory? Again, suppose the United States in the War of 1812 had succeeded in its very blundering attempt to conquer all or part of Canada. Unquestionably we should have had school histories to teach us how fortunate was the result of that war for the people of Ontario and how valuable a lesson it finally taught the British about the need for enlightened rule! Yet

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to-day the Canadians who remained within the British Empire would say that they have more real liberty than their neighbors to the south of the border!

By contrast men sometimes fly from praising wars which it is alleged produced or defended "our" civilization to a sweeping condemnation of war in general and wars in particular. Benjamin Franklin put this point of view in the memorable saying: "There never has been a good war or a bad peace." Yet his own actions, like the actions of innumerable others, seemed to give the lie to his words. Alas, man has had a talent for making what he calls peace so cruel and oppressive that by comparison war has seemed good. But that is only saying that war itself is part of the pattern of human exploitation.

Even those who defend particular wars as the less evil of the courses open to men at a given time cannot to-day scientifically defend war as an institution. The notion that war is a necessary and even glorious part of the evolutionary program of progress, bound up with the struggle of the fittest to survive, is to-day one of the most completely exploded of the many myths which have masqueraded for a while under the name of science. In the evolutionary process it is true that nature

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appears "red of tooth and claw," but the cruelty of nature among animals is more merciful than the cruelty of men to one another in war. Animals do not prove to one another their fitness to survive by organized warfare upon those of their own species. They hunt for food but not for sport, and they do not hunt those of their own kind. Moreover, the survival of the fittest, in so far as it is a fact of evolution, was never the survival of those most skilled in organizing mass murder or best armed for violence. The prehistoric monsters—dinosaurs, mastodons, and what have you—who by their size and their apparent preparation for offensive and defensive conflict would have seemed to the eulogist of force most fit to survive, all perished. They needed too much food and they had too little brains. Similar faults have characterized military states among men.

Many years ago Peter Kropotkin wrote a notable book called *Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution*. In the light of more recent scientific research that book may need some correction in detail, but not in its fundamental thesis. Peter Kropotkin pointed out that man had not survived and risen to dominion over the other animals because he was physically fit for combat. As a matter of fact, man came upon this earthly scene not as a

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widely acclaimed conqueror, but inconspicuously—as it were, through the side door. Until he discovered how to make and use the first rude tools he was at a tremendous disadvantage compared with elephants and lions and tigers and even with some of the more powerful of his very distant relatives of the simian world, like the gorillas. Man's invention of the first tools, like all human invention, was itself a social process to which many have contributed. The prolonged infancy of the young of human beings compelled some sort of social organization and mutual aid in order that those young might have a chance to grow up. Man won out in the end because he of all the mammals was the most capable of mutual aid and coöperation.

Indeed war, the great destroyer, is of itself only possible because men have learned the secret of mutual aid. In order to sustain war, even primitive war, there has to be a far greater capacity of the warring group for coöperation than has been developed by lions or tigers. It is part of the tragedy of man that he has turned his high virtue of loyalty and his marvelous capacity for coöperation so often to war against his neighbors rather than to the complete and final victory over poverty.

In so far as struggle, danger, or adventure are

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good for men, opportunity in plenty is afforded to them by the very circumstances of our life upon a planet which is by no means adapted to the ways of softness and ease. A world with air and sea, tropical jungles and the ice fields of polar zones to be conquered; a world of earthquakes, fire and flood, is not a world which required man to invent war in order to free himself from ignoble sloth. If the progress of science somewhat softens life and removes from many men the hardships and dangers of certain kinds of struggle, it also opens up new fields of victory against hunger and the great plagues which our forefathers accepted as an inescapable judgment upon their sins. Only slowly are we learning that the heroes to whom we owe the most are the men and women who have pioneered in the discovery of new and better forms of food or who have hazarded their lives by voluntarily accepting risk of terrible sickness or death in order to discover the germs of disease and so make possible its cure.

It is against a background of such facts as these that we can appreciate the dangerous drivel talked by certain romanticists, who call themselves realists when they eulogize war. Over and over again in days of war some of the sayings of that pathologi-

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cal genius, Nietzsche, have been quoted. Here are two of the most famous: "Let man be formed for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior, everything else is foolishness." "They have said unto you that a good cause makes any war good, but I say unto you that a good war makes any cause good." The first of these sayings would have condemned men to a primitive savagery too ignorant to read or understand the author's eulogy of their brutality and sensuality. The second, at the very least, requires a curious definition of the word "good." Nietzsche himself might have been put to it to apply it to the lice, the boredom, and the brutality of the trench warfare of 1917.

Even a defender, almost a eulogist of limited war, like Mr. Hoffman Nickerson, has bitter words to say about the wars that get out of hand, as most wars do. The glory of the Golden Age of Greece perished in the Peloponnesian war. Of its end Mr. Nickerson writes: "The greatness of Athens, the intellectual and artistic capital of the ancient world, died no clean death but basely of the filth of evil deeds."

Of a later period, that of the Roman civil wars, Mr. Nickerson quotes a striking passage from the poet, Vergil.

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Therefore Philippi saw Roman armies turn their swords against each other a second time in battle, and the gods felt no pity that Emathia and the broad plains of Haemus should twice be fattened with our blood. . . .

Gods of our fathers, gods of our country, god of our city, goddess of our hearths who watchest over Tuscan Tiber and Roman Palantine, forbid not this last savior to succor our fallen generation. Our blood has flowed too long. We have paid in full for the sins of our forefathers—the broken faith of ancient Troy. . . .

The bonds are broken between neighbor cities and they meet in arms. Ungodly war rages the world over. The chariots launched on the race gather speed as they go; vainly dragging on the reins the driver is swept away by his steeds and the team heeds not the bridle.

That judgment could have been written of many a war from times long before Vergil down to the World War. Once started, war is usually

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uncontrolled. The driver is swept away by his own steeds. There have been exceptions. Mr. Nickerson rejoices that finally in Vergil's own time Augustus did put restraints on war. During the early Roman Empire the entire Mediterranean world was policed by an army of not much over 300,000 men. By contrast Mr. Nickerson reminds us that in the First World War little Serbia alone mobilized over 700,000 soldiers. It takes an optimist, no, a fool, to call that progress.

Cities, tribes, states, and nations which have gloried most in war have come to quick exhaustion. The Spartans, the perfect example of warlike people, did not successfully build or maintain an empire. They produced no leaders of great importance in any field of human achievement, not even war. (Leonidas and his men at Thermopylæ won fame by a gallant defense.) Those terrible warriors of antiquity, the Assyrians, did indeed build an empire with a certain culture taken over largely from the conquered, but their military brutality proved their ultimate undoing. In the pages of the Old Testament one can still hear the rejoicing of the peoples that Nineveh had fallen. By striking contrast one of the little peoples, on whom the Assyrian giant planted his iron

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heel, the Jews, still lives, and, despite the history of persecution from the Pharaohs down to Hitler, it is this race which of all people in proportion to its numbers has made the most sustained and extensive contribution to the arts and sciences which are the chief glory of man. It was another race, the Chinese, who for many centuries were most successful in limiting war, and partly by reason of that fact established a fruitful civilization which has endured down to the confusions of our own day.

In view of such facts as these which I have cited, he who calls war "good" or who finds good in war, can only do so in a very unusual sense. The most that he can claim with any show of reason is that some wars have been good because they have prevented or ended greater wars, greater violence, or greater misery. They have been good in proportion as those who were victors in them hated them and turned from them at the earliest possible moment. Few victors have ever learned the lesson which the famous Chinese King Wu, who dethroned the tyrant Yin Chang and founded the Chou Dynasty, tried to teach his people. Thus Mr. Wingfield-Stratford quotes the story from R. Wilhelm's *Short History of Chinese Civilization*:

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When on the homeward journey Westward he [King Wu] had crossed the Yellow River he set free the war horses and . . . dispersed the draught oxen to pasture in the wilds of the Peach Forest, never to be yoked again. He had the chariots and the coats of mail smeared with the blood of cattle and kept in the arsenals to show that they were not to be used again. He had the shields and swords turned upside down and set on one side wrapped in tiger skins. He turned his generals and commanders into feudal princes and commanded them to seal up the bows and arrows in quivers.

So it was known throughout the kingdom that King Wu would have recourse to weapons no more . . . the army was disbanded . . . the heroes with the strength of tigers put off their swords.

For the wise King Wu it was not war that was good, but the peace which it won. What would he say of our day when wars only sow the seeds of new and worse conflicts? Might he not agree with another wise man of the East, a man of our

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own day and generation, the Indian leader Gandhi, that it is necessary for man to seek a method of struggle against great wrongs other than the method of war?

Most of the defenders or eulogists of war manage their defense by thinking not of men as individuals who love and hate and kill and die, but of an abstraction, "Man." Or perhaps they refuse to think of the masses of common soldiers as individuals, the masses whom nature produces so prodigally, and think instead only in terms of the splendor of the conqueror, a superman, for whose glory the simple soldier was born to die in unheeded anguish. Or on a different plane the defenders of war talk learnedly about the rôle of war and its Siamese twin, the plague, in keeping down human population. Certainly war has performed that task at terrible cost.

We have few accurate figures of the loss of life in antiquity. The wars of the Emperor Justinian, most of them temporarily victorious, are said to have cost ten million lives in Italy and Africa alone. At a much later period, as we have seen, the Thirty Years' War, nominally fought about differences of opinion concerning the road to heaven, speeded out of this life—one may hope to heaven—between two-thirds and three-quarters

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of the population of Germany. They died some of them in battle, more of them in the agony of massacre, and the misery of untended plague. In those tortured years thousands of the living must have envied the dead.

In the nineteenth century, Paraguay, under the dictator, Francisco López, fought a senseless war against three neighbors, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. It lasted from 1864 to 1870. When it was over the population of Paraguay had been reduced from 1,337,000 to 221,000, of whom 29,000 were men, 106,000 women and 86,000 children. López was a suspicious coward who "destroyed at least three-quarters of his own army by wanton sacrifice, decimation and hundreds of executions." Why his people endured war so long nobody can say. By 1932 the poor Indians of Paraguay, disease-ridden as they were, numbered 800,000. Once more they were put into a senseless war with Boliva, over the "green hell" of the Gran Chaco—valuable only if the oil, which along with national pride was one of the war's causes, brings wealth to politicians and land-owners. This second-rate minor war brought profit to armament makers in Europe, and America, and torture to soldiers on both sides. When it ended in 1935 it

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was estimated to have cost 100,000 deaths, with an equal number of wounded.

We have more accurate figures of the costs of the World War. I quote those compiled by Kirby Page. There were:

- 10,000,000 known dead soldiers
- 3,000,000 presumed dead soldiers
- 20,000,000 wounded
- 13,000,000 dead civilians
- 3,000,000 prisoners
- 9,000,000 war orphans
- 5,000,000 war widows
- 10,000,000 refugees

Professor L. Hersch, as we have already seen, brings up the total of the dead to nearly 42,000,000 by adding the victims of influenza throughout the whole world.

If you are benumbed by the sheer weight of figures, read again some of the war books in which survivors imperfectly try to tell the story. Or read such a profoundly true imaginative reconstruction as those great novels, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* or *Paths of Glory*. Multiply over a thousand times the story of the suffering of soldiers, prisoners of war and civilian refugees there described and ask yourself whether cold statistics can teach us the cost of war.

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From costs in men we turn to costs in money.
Again we use Mr. Page's convenient summary:

SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT COSTS OF THE WAR

	GROSS	ADVANCE TO ALLIES	NET COST
United States	\$32,080,266,968	\$9,455,014,125	\$22,625,252,843
Great Britain	44,029,011,868	8,695,000,000	35,334,011,868
Rest of British Empire..	4,493,813,072	4,493,813,072
France	25,812,782,800	1,547,200,000	24,265,582,800
Russia	22,593,950,000	22,593,950,000
Italy	12,413,998,000	12,413,998,000
Other Entente Allies..	3,963,867,914	3,963,867,914
Total	\$145,387,690,622	\$19,697,214,125	\$125,690,476,497
Germany	\$40,150,000,000	\$2,375,000,000	\$37,775,000,000
Austria-Hungary	20,622,960,600	20,622,960,600
Turkey and Bulgaria...	2,245,200,000	2,245,200,000
Total	\$63,018,160,600	\$2,375,000,000	\$60,643,160,600
Grand Total	\$208,405,851,222	\$22,072,214,125	\$186,333,637,097

The total indirect costs of the war, Mr. Page continues, have been summarized by Professor Bogart as follows:

<i>Capitalized value of lives lost</i>	
Soldiers	\$33,551,276,280
Civilians	33,551,276,280
<i>Property losses</i>	
On land	\$29,960,000,000
Shipping and Cargo	6,800,000,000
Loss of production	45,000,000,000
War relief	1,000,000,000
Loss to neutrals	1,750,000,000
Total indirect costs	\$151,612,542,560
Total direct costs, net	186,333,637,097
Grand total costs of the war	\$337,946,179,657

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Observe that the net direct cost of war was over a hundred and eighty-six billion dollars, that the property losses were over a hundred and fifty billion dollars. All this was exclusive of the capitalized value of lives lost. The figures are so great that they benumb our minds. Remember that this is what the world paid to fight, although the same world has always thought that it could not afford to abolish slums or provide decent schools, hospitals, parks and playgrounds for everybody. All this could have been done many times over for what was wasted on war. Mr. Page reminds us that one hour of the war cost more than the support of the schools of the city of Detroit for a year! *Time* reckons the 50 million dollars allotted by President Roosevelt to the National Youth Administration—supposedly a generous recognition of need—as equal to the cost of the World War for five hours.

When I say this I do not forget that much of what was spent in war was used, as Mr. Page has said, to feed and clothe human beings, and in some cases even to raise the customary standard of living among the workers. But against that mitigation of war expenses must be set the other fact that our method of financing war saddled future generations with an enormous weight of debt. Actually

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we men have to pay for war as we go. We fight with men who have already grown to maturity. We use materials already produced and food already grown. We do not borrow from the future to pay the cost of war in any other sense than that we consume an immense supply of petroleum or some other useful material in war which might have been saved for the needs of future generations. It is not literally true that we are now taxing ourselves to pay for the World War—as we are in all countries which have not wiped out their war debts by repudiation or wholesale inflation. Aside from help to veterans, we are taxing ourselves not to pay for the war, but to pay some of our contemporaries for what they or their ancestors loaned at interest to the government at a time when the government was conscripting human life. We pile up war debts by a fantastic process under which the provision of credit in a great collective task like the waging of war is allowed to accumulate profit for individuals who have some savings or who can manipulate credit. But that is another story. I, for one, am for taking the profit out of war, but I do not agree with those who think that war would be endurable if only we conscripted capital as well as men, nor do I believe that we shall avoid war by taking profit

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out of it. It is not the profit that some men make out of war, but war itself, which imposes costs which modern man cannot bear.

The worst of these costs cannot be put in statistics. There are no statistical measurements for the psychological and biological effects of war. Scientists tell us that the biological, or rather the physiological, aftermath of a great war has unquestionably been hurtful for many generations. The fittest of men physically were killed in war, many of them leaving no descendants. The survivors of every great war, both men and women, have been weakened by it. Children, especially under conditions of such blockade as the Allies imposed upon Germany, have been half starved at a formative period of their lives. That is not all or the worst of it. No one knows how many poets, scientists, and leaders in every walk of life perished before the fortifications of the Dardanelles or in the mud of France or Flanders. One reason for the poverty of leadership which Europe suffers is to be found in the gap between the generations for which war was responsible.

Those who survived the war were brutalized by it. This is true even of those who were only children during the war. Homes with mothers but not fathers; homes where both parents are

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hungry and anxious, do not train the best citizens. It is a dangerous thing when youth not only on the battlefield but even in the nursery is conditioned to the acceptance of war. It is no wonder that in every country of Europe brutality is more rampant than it was in the days before the World War. A heartless schoolmaster taught men that human life was cheap and human tears of little account. Terror was a grim fact of the great Russian Revolution; but suppose there had been no Allied intervention by force of arms, and before that no conditioning of the Russian masses to acceptance of the violence of war—who knows how different might have been the story!

A loutish and inexcusable brutality has been one of the characteristic marks of Fascism in Italy and still more in Germany. Again the question arises how far is war responsible. One of the most sinister figures in Fascist Germany is Hitler's lieutenant, the vain and conceited General Goering. He was a youth of such ability as enabled him to become an ace in the German Flying Corps. His experiences as an aviator made him a drug addict. What else they made him no one can say. But is it not reasonable to imagine that war as well as the unjust and vengeful Peace of Versailles which closed it educated the Goerings and hosts of

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lesser men for the dark ages of the spirit of which Fascism is an expression?

What we are saying is that by its very nature war, especially war under modern conditions, makes a good peace impossible. The human material upon which any worthy peace depends has inevitably been brutalized and coarsened by war. The material resources for the struggle against poverty have been lessened. The "heroes," whether of the victorious or the vanquished nation, have been disciplined in the acceptance of violence and a kind of blind obedience to leaders. In war there is no choice between complete obedience and mutiny. Yet a decent civilization depends on the capacity of men to govern themselves by processes under which loyalty is consistent with constructive criticism.

It was not an accident that the ideals of negotiated peace without victory which were slowly gaining headway among the masses in all countries were thrown to the winds in the hour of the Allied and American triumph. When men could get a peace of vengeance without further fighting, they took the peace of vengeance. It was a minority which had really learned from the brutality of the battlefield that peace could only be established on a basis of mutual forgiveness and coöperation.

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Men came out of the war tired of it but with the passions wherewith they entered it strengthened. They had fought under the compulsion of the religion of nationalism. Save as that compulsion was challenged by the vision of international Socialism, it was strengthened by the war and the peace of vengeance which followed the war; strengthened for the defeated by a sense of ignominy; strengthened for the victors by an appeal to the only emotions which could make them forget how empty were the fruits of victory. So it came to pass that out of the World War there were no compensations of victory for anything which makes life glorious or peace secure. The only great achievement linked with the war was the Russian Revolution, and that was the product of a defeated, not a victorious, people, achieved at great cost by a party which had opposed the war!

And still men and nations frantically prepare for war. Why? That is a question which we must reserve for another chapter. But while we are talking about what men get out of war one further observation is in order. Men have not yet fully learned the lesson that war is loss. It is only in modern times and under the peculiar conditions of interdependence of the machine age that in a material sense it is true that no nation really

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wins by war. It was the notion of profit in victory which before the last war Norman Angell exposed as "the Great Illusion." In simpler times this belief in the profits of victory was less illusory. There were definite and tangible profits in war for tribes who won better hunting grounds or pasture lands. There was definite profit in gold, or iron, or copper, or slaves, or women. And it was a profit often won at comparatively light cost to the warrior, who usually fought for a short time only and then went home or rested in camp, where he enjoyed the plunder he had already won. The poor thing man has called peace has often been so monotonous, so poverty-stricken, so oppressive to adventurous spirits, that by contrast war has offered advantages which in men's judgment were not too dearly bought.

Moreover, in considering the historical uses of war it must be remembered that the political state had its rise in violence and has found in violence its final coercive power. Harold Laski defines a state as "a society which is integrated by possessing a coercive authority legally supreme over any individual or group which is part of the society." This coercive power has not been used historically to give the highest possible satisfaction to all the subjects of the state. Governments have acted as

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executive committees for the dominant class, originally the land and slave owners. In earlier times the ruling class got something definite out of the wars of its state. Often it bribed the allegiance of the less privileged at home by the excitement of foreign wars and a few crumbs of booty.

These definite and tangible profits the First World War proved no longer exist for victorious states or the ruling classes in them. With all the cruelty inherent in war the victors do shrink from exterminating the defeated. After the war is over victors and vanquished have to go on living after some fashion in the territories which they had before. In trying to hurt their trade rivals they discover, as the English discovered about the Germans, that they have also hurt their customers, for even rival nations trade with each other. This bad aftermath of war is particularly true of wars between nations with the same type of civilization. Great indemnities cannot be successfully and advantageously collected by the victors, as the whole world learned to its cost in the history of German reparations.

In older times white men did by their Indian wars acquire immense room to expand in North and South America. These wars, together with

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the diseases which accompanied them and the brutal enslavement of the vanquished, threatened extermination. Yet the population of Latin America to-day is predominantly Indian in stock. Even in North America, which at the time of the arrival of the whites was sparsely inhabited, the actual number of Indians has probably not decreased. William Penn proved that it was not necessary for white men to rob, cheat and kill Indians to find room in an empty continent.

To-day there are no more great empty continents which invite easy conquest. Mussolini and his Fascist swashbucklers and the Japanese militarists and imperialists have some reason to be worried about the problem of overpopulation. Within the territory of the Italian or the Japanese nation, more especially the latter, there are not the resources adequately to clothe and feed and house the people. Yet in their more rational moments these militarists do not expect to solve the problem by the comparatively simple method of conquering some place to which Italian or Japanese immigrants can go and still be under their national flag. Japan took Manchuria, but the Japanese are not colonizing it in any great numbers nor will the Italians colonize Ethiopia. If they did, the record of the nineteenth century

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shows that the reservoir of human beings at home would rapidly be filled up. Students of populations have frequently pointed out that, with the solitary exception of Ireland, no European nation which during the nineteenth century sent out great numbers of immigrants actually lost in total population. Instead these nations gained. What the Japanese wanted in Manchuria was not a place to which to export Japanese wholesale; it was a source of supply for petroleum and soy beans and for the establishment of order under which various economic enterprises could be carried on. If we were able to think in terms of human beings and their happiness rather than in terms of races and nations, we should not dream of solving problems of poverty or of overpopulation in this region or that by war. We should use intelligent birth control and a coöperative effort to increase and to share what men of all lands can produce.

Although real profit in war is an illusion, we are still organized in races, nations and classes, some of whom do profit or think they profit at the expense of their fellows at least temporarily in war.

In the agony of the World War there were profits for manufacturers and bankers. There was glory for generals and power for politicians. In

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preparation for war and in war itself the profits of the makers of the means of destruction were particularly high and alluring. Viscount Snowden in his *Autobiography* says that in England, which paid the highest proportion of its war expenses out of taxes of any country, war profits, in excess of taxes and losses, added by the lowest estimate, three billion twenty-five million pounds to the capital wealth in private hands. It took the years of war's aftermath to show how fleeting even to profiteers were these gains.

At first to many soldiers war seemed not so much worse than the ill-paid drudgery of factory work, and the camp not worse than the slums. It took Flanders Fields and the trenches to make the slums of East London look attractive by comparison. Moreover, once war was joined, there was a difference between victory and defeat. Even now, looking back on the First World War, while we can truly say that there were no victors we cannot truly say that there were no degrees of defeat. Post-war Germany and Austria knew more bitter years than post-war France or England or the United States. These are the things we must remember as tempering our surprise at men's slowness to learn in our day and generation that

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war is loss and only loss, tragedy and only tragedy, for victors as well as vanquished.

Yet for mankind as a whole that judgment stands, not to be modified or abated. There is nothing that the nations will get out of future war except the death of civilization. In that war they will use the machinery which might have conquered poverty to destroy themselves. There will be no victory which can leave even to the victorious anything but a legacy of fear and hate and woe. Victors and vanquished must go on living in the twilight of a world for whom all too likely a long night of darkness must intervene before the sun rises in new dawn. There is no hope which an intelligent man can accept—if it requires first an inescapable acceptance of new world war.

CHAPTER V

WHY MEN FIGHT

IF war is the terrible and futile thing we have been describing, why do men fight? To put it more accurately, why do men wage war? War is a special kind of fighting, depending far less upon individual rage and spontaneous hate than upon social organization. The Russian peasants had a thousand better reasons why they should hate and fight the landlord or the agent of the Tsar's tyranny than Austrian and German peasants, conscripted like themselves to fight not for personal advantage, but for their nation's glory or gain.

Part of the answer to this question we have already suggested in the chapters which have gone before. It is important, however, that if we hope to cure war we should search diligently and systematically for the reasons why men fight. In our search we may discover whether or not it is true that war is inevitable. If it is not inevitable we may discover why it is so probable and what we ought to do to end it.

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Let us begin by listening to the chorus of folks who tell us that men fight because they are combative or pugnacious. Really that is telling us nothing about war. It is merely saying that men fight because they fight. Man, like other members of the animal kingdom, is capable under certain circumstances of offensive or defensive physical combat against enemies, whether they are of his own species or some other. If man were by nature wholly incapable of physical combat, of course there would be no wars. It is absurd, however, to say that because man is capable of physical combat therefore there must be wars. We shall have to look further.

Suppose we listen, then, to the preachers. They, or a great many of them, are in the habit of telling us that wars arise out of human selfishness. Again there is truth in the statement, but, at least in modern times, if it is selfishness and only selfishness, or selfishness and chiefly selfishness, which makes war possible it must be a curious type of selfishness. Certainly it was not individual selfishness which inspired the letters of soldiers—German, French, English, and American—which have been published. It was not selfishness which enabled mothers with breaking hearts to smile when their sons marched off to war. In so far as a

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collective national or class selfishness may be responsible for war, it is evident that on the part of the soldiers themselves modern war requires a high degree of unselfishness.

Another popular answer to our question is that men fight because they want power, victory, glory, and dominion or rule over their fellows. Once more there is truth in the answer, at least as regards some men. Mr. Robert Lowie tells us that the interest of the Crow Indians in war was largely because in it was the only road to personal distinction. It was a dangerous and complicated game with honor for the players. Civilized men, who in modern wars do not expect, as a rule, to win personal distinction, get a kind of vicarious pride out of the military or imperialist strength of "their" nation. "God, who made thee mighty, Make thee mightier yet," the Englishman sings. "My father," a Briton once told me, "didn't own six feet of dirt to be buried in, but he always swelled with pride when he considered that England owned India." For myself I confess that I shall not forget the thrill that was mine years ago when I first saw the battle fleet steam out of New York Harbor.

Nevertheless, it is probably more true to say that men fight wars because they are afraid. The

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competitive armaments under which the whole world groans are primarily supported by an appeal to fear. To be sure, if a man or a nation is very small, and the enemy is very great, the little man or nation will not provoke a fight. Even so, he or it may be driven to fight in a pitch of desperation. When, however, nations are somewhere near an equality of strength or think that by alliance they can approach equality of strength, it is fear of the actual or potential enemy which leads them not only to arm, but in certain emergencies to try to get the jump on the enemy by attacking first. There is a sense in which nations rush to war because they are afraid, much as a boy learning to ride a bicycle runs into the tree precisely because he is afraid of it.

Another reason for war was given to me recently by a thoughtful army officer of high character. "War," said he, "is as bad as its critics say, but it is the only way men have found to end great social injustice." How successful or unsuccessful war has been in ending injustice has appeared from our narrative. Even the golden appeal to justice is usually mixed with base alloys. Nevertheless, after every deduction has been made, there is force in the army officer's contention.

Victory in war usually goes to the biggest bat-

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talions and not the best cause. Yet from ancient
times has sprung the hope that somehow in the
hour of battle Right will triumph and victory will
come to him whose cause is just. War as the
weapon of justice inspires the imagery of many of
the most popular religious hymns; it finds expres-
sion in Julia Ward Howe's famous *Battle Hymn
of the Republic*. Peace-loving British Socialists
join with emotion in singing William Blake's fine
lines:

*I will not cease from Mental Fight
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant Land.*

We cannot ignore facts like these in thinking about
the cause and cure of war.

To sum up this stage of our inquiry, we may
say tentatively that men fight because they are
capable of combat. They fight because they or
their leaders desire, however stupidly, national, if
not personal, glory and gain. They fight because
they are afraid and they believe that the best de-
fense is an offense. They wage war because they
are capable of working together for a collective
end. This collective end they often call "free-

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dom" or "justice" and fight because war is the sorry method by which men have sought to end the injustice which war has established.

About this time some reader may want impatiently to interrupt by exclaiming: "Why not say that man fights because he is man, or because of human nature?" Well, that has been said times without number. One of the immense crop of post-war books has the striking title: *Man Is War*. That book rather conspicuously failed to make its point, which was that there was a biological necessity for war.

We have already examined the claim that there is a necessity if not a glory about war as part of the evolutionary struggle for existence. Some men who would agree with us in dismissing this claim would nevertheless insist that, however stupid or biologically unnecessary war may be, it is a part of the curse of human nature that man cannot escape it. This, fortunately, we can emphatically deny on the basis of the history of war and of our own knowledge of the conditions under which men fight. As a matter of fact, war had a definite beginning in the history of man on this planet. Most students agree that men of the Old Stone Age lived for thousands of years in the first primitive societies without war. These were the cave

WAR: NO GLORY, NO PROFIT, NO NEED men, but the cave men of life and not of the movies! They left behind them no written records. They left behind them, however, an enormous quantity of implements, most of them fashioned very ingeniously out of flaked flint. They also left in some of the caves of southwestern Europe remarkable pictures. From the names of caves or grottos where these remnants have been found scholars have named the Cromagnon man and the periods of his development. Three main periods in the life of the Cromagnons covered the years roughly from 35,000 to 15,000 B.C.

Of the thousands of implements that have been unearthed from the Aurignacian down to the Magdalanian period, which was the golden age of the cave man's art, not one was certainly intended for war or for the destruction of men rather than beasts. There is evidence that before the finely developed Cromagnon type of man appeared on the scene, there had been a very inferior type which left to posterity the so-called Neanderthal skull. This type either died out, or possibly was exterminated in hand-to-hand conflict by the Cromagnons, who were truly men to the degree that the Neanderthal man never was. Possibly the Cromagnons, like modern scholars, were not sure that Neanderthal man was really human. But of this

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war of extermination there is absolutely no evidence. There is still less evidence that the fully developed men of the Old Stone Age were familiar with war. The earliest evidence we have of the murder of one human being by another is furnished by the skull of a woman of the Cro-magnon type. She possessed a brain and physique, as did the people of her time, fully equal to our own. "This poor woman, who was expecting a baby, was mortally wounded by some sharp instrument above the left eye driven right to the skull. Whoever it was did not finish his work, as there are signs of incipient healing." Nevertheless the incipient healing was checked and the woman died. The fact that the victim was a woman points perhaps to some domestic quarrel. Such an explanation would be more likely than war.

Another exceedingly significant fact is that the remarkable pictures left us by those pioneers of civilization, the men of the Old Stone Age, never portray war.

Mr. Wingfield-Stratford writes: "Though we have no key and must proceed with great caution in the task of interpretation, we may gather that the cave man was enormously interested in hunting and therefore in animals; that he loved to dance; that he was a lover of plump women—and the

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plumper the better—that he liked to be well turned out even if only in a handful of shells, and that he had begun to develop a religion and to take care of his dead, but that, if he had any interest whatever in war, it was not strong enough to seek for artistic expression.”

After a long time the Cromagnons gave way to another race, called by scholars the Azilians. These people seem to have come into Europe from the north of Africa. They were definitely inferior, physically and in mastery of arts, to the people they supplanted. Their only superiority seems to have been that they had discovered the use of the bow. If they owed their survival to this weapon it was not that they were more fit to survive in any other respect except that they had found a weapon. Anyway, with their appearance in Europe come the first clear signs of deadly conflict between men. A stone arrow lodged in a human back tells the story of the murder of one poor fellow by an African hunter armed with a bow. Even this does not prove organized warfare by large bodies of men. Of this there are no pictures or attempts at pictures. It is possible, perhaps probable, that the triumph of the Azilians was achieved through innumerable petty conflicts and ambushes rather than by organized war. In short, all the evidence that

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we can get points to the existence of man on earth for hundreds of generations before organized warfare appeared. Even to-day representatives of primitive human society, notably the Eskimos, are peaceful. In their own environment they have plenty of room, as did probably our earliest ancestors. Life was for them a struggle, often a most bitter struggle, but it was a struggle against cold and hunger, against other animals, and not against their fellow men. We shall grant that war is very old, that it antedated the comparatively recent appearance of written records, and that in the New Stone Age it accompanied the emergence of social organization on a larger scale than that of the clan or small tribe. Nevertheless, if it is true, as seems probable, that man with physique and brain equal to our own existed on this planet in the Old Stone Age for more centuries without war than he has existed since with war, it certainly cannot be claimed that "man is war."

Another type of evidence may be convincing to men of our time. So far is modern warfare from being natural, that it is promoted and maintained only by the most elaborate system of organization and by the most ruthless sort of propaganda. Popular joy over the signing of the Armistice, even in a country which had suffered as little as

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America, showed how temporary and trumped up was any desire for war on the part of the masses. Military and other official censors in wartime doubtless made all sorts of stupid and ridiculous mistakes in suppressing news. Nevertheless they were fundamentally right in believing that it was dangerous to let the real truth be known lest war could not go on.

We know now that high army officials were decidedly alarmed by the fraternization between the German troops and their French and English enemies on the first Christmas during the struggle. An English sergeant told me a very graphic story of that first Christmas. It ran something like this:

It was Christmas Eve and we were in the trenches close to the Germans. By and by we heard their bands playing "Holy Night." One of our men said: "Why, the blighters! they've even stolen our tune!" "Shut up," I told him, "don't you know that song was German before it was English?" By and by one of the Germans stuck up a white flag and when we didn't shoot he stuck up his head. None of our boys happened to know any German, but they

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had some that knew English, so this fellow called to us to come out of the trenches and celebrate Christmas. They had a band and we didn't, so we came out into No-Man's-Land and men sang songs and gave each other cigarettes and showed each other pictures from home, and there was no fighting there all Christmas Day. But the next day the generals said that sort of thing must stop, and the next year they saw to it that there was an artillery barrage which kept the men in the trenches.

When this sort of thing can happen it is evident that modern war has gone far beyond the stage of personal conflict arising out of personal hate. Man is not war. He is capable of fighting with courage, endurance, cruelty, folly—pile up all the descriptive words you can—in comradeship with men of his own group against men in another hostile group. He fights even although to-day, as we have seen, his wars result in general loss. And he calls himself a rational being! How is such madness possible? We must come back to more specific reasons than just "human nature."

Great as is our folly, we could not be where we

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are unless we were capable of thinking. Yet, on the average, men hate to think. Bertrand Russell has said that men fear thought more than anything else in all the world—more than death, more than hell. A great deal of what we call thinking is simply a process of putting a good face on desires and passions that we do not like to confess to ourselves. It is a process of justifying our wishes. The psychologists call it rationalizing. At the bottom of the World War, as of other great wars, lay the struggle for profit. But men could not admit this even to themselves. It was necessary to give some dignity or nobility to the terrible business of mass murder. In other generations men had sanctified it in the name of religion. We did it in the name of the end of war and the sure establishment of democracy, although most of us proved quickly enough when the war was over that we had no high regard for this same democracy and no great understanding of what we meant by the word.

Besides making us aware of men's fear of thought, and their tendency to substitute mass rationalizations for thinking, modern psychology has made another contribution to our understanding of what makes war possible. Repeatedly, in describing war, we have had to comment on man's

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capacity for loyalty or coöperation. Man came to be man not as a solitary individual but as a member of a group. Society was never formed, as the famous Jean Jacques Rousseau taught, by individuals free to make or to refuse to make social contacts. At its best fellowship is life and man's capacity for loyalty is a glorious thing. It brought some tragic nobility for the partial redemption of the bestial brutality of the war in Flanders Fields, but the other side of the picture, as we have repeatedly seen in our examination of war, is that men may be held together not by conscious loyalty but by the chains of the crowd-mind. They can be swept along like a herd of cattle. They follow a leader blindly as any sheep. Sometimes one wonders if the comparison is fair to the animals. It is hard anywhere to find anything so ugly and cruel as the lynching mob. The mob as a whole, although it may sweep along with it ordinarily decent men and women, is worse than the worst individual in it. In the mob men release their basest passions without wholly forgetting the need for finding a fair-sounding reason for infamous crimes. So they perform the most brutal deeds in the name of the thing they are pleased to call justice. This tendency to act together with others in a mob is present with more or less strength

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in all of us. It is a tendency which responds to emotional propaganda without regard for truth. The mob-spirit can be called forth like some evil demon by the insistent shouting of slogans which play on hate, fear, and greed. By endlessly repeating, "Carthage must be destroyed," the Roman, Cato, finally persuaded his fellow senators and other citizens to bring about the treacherous and perfidious Third Punic War. After heroic resistance Carthage was utterly destroyed. Even the ground on which it stood was plowed up. Cato had died, but his hate lived after him.

These psychological traits are important to the understanding of war, but they cannot of themselves explain it. The passion of the mob is short-lived; war is enduring. It could not be carried on at all without discipline, alien to the mob. The mob-spirit alone may give us riots and lynchings. It may account for some of the worst cruelties and follies of war; but alone it cannot explain war. Men have fought wars for a more tangible reason and a more definite objective than we have yet stated at any length.

The main root of war is to be found in the struggle for gain, if not for the individual soldier, then for the group to which he belongs. There would be no war for justice if injustice had not

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previously been established by the violence of those who sought profit from it. Why, then, do men continue to prepare for war and to expect war when the World War so completely bore out Norman Angell's celebrated argument that profit in modern war is the great delusion? The answer is partly that men have been very slow to learn the lesson even after the demonstration which the World War afforded. It lies more largely in the fact that war is not an isolated thing in itself, a sudden act of madness; it has become part of the system. Little, Marine-Corps-sized wars may conceivably be consciously plotted for the profits of armament makers and bankers or in the struggle for petroleum or some other valuable thing which men covet. Big wars are not consciously plotted by profiteers. They are a logical part of the struggle for profit, given the division of men into nations and classes. As Lloyd George said of the World War, the nations stumbled and blundered into war, but only because they have been walking along the road which leads toward it. Few men plan to drop the match at a particular moment into the powder-magazine, but they have meant to accumulate the powder.

If we seek an epigram, it is far truer to say that *property is war* than that *man is war*. That does

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not mean that we must abolish all kinds of property in order to have peace. Rather to the contrary. The condition of secure peace is shared abundance. Shared abundance implies more of the good things of life which we need—the food, the shelter, and a hundred and one other things. The condition of our having them is that at last we shall begin to plan for abundance. Such planning must rest upon social or coöperative ownership of the great natural resources necessary for everybody's life and of the great aggregations of power-driven machinery by which abundance is produced. We must end the profit system. Our ancestors could afford to isolate themselves in comparatively small groups as we cannot. We may begin the sharing of abundance within America's borders; we cannot end there if peace or prosperity is to be secure.

War is possible, indeed probable, because men have organized themselves in devotion to loyalties which imply strife. In our modern world we are not as much independent as interdependent. The more civilized we are the more truly we depend on one another. Work is highly specialized. We can produce more things than our ancestors ever dreamed of producing because we have machinery driven by power to help us. But machine produc-

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tion requires specialization of human beings. We have plenty of shoes precisely because few men make a whole pair of shoes. Each man or woman in a factory does one process with the aid of a machine. We get shoes because these various processes are cleverly coördinated. The men who specialize in making shoes are dependent on other men who specialize in producing food, shelter, and the rest of the things we need. These other men may live near at hand or far away. There is no modern civilized community which is economically independent; that is to say, which could get along by itself and still enjoy modern comforts and conveniences. Even a great nation like the United States is not wholly self-sufficient. Make a list for yourself of the things which you use or on which you are dependent in an ordinary day. The list would certainly include such common things as sugar, coffee, tea, rubber, steel and articles made of nickel and tin. The United States produces some sugar at the cost of a high tariff, but not enough for its people. It does not produce coffee, tea, or indispensable rubber at all. It produces great quantities of iron and coal, but not all the alloys necessary for the making of the best steel. It produces no tin and no nickel. We are dependent for our true prosperity upon trade with other

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nations. We ourselves profoundly affect the life of other nations. A few years ago the lace-makers in France organized a mighty demonstration because a threat of a change in the American tariff would have thrown thousands of them out of work by destroying their market in America. As I write, there is a new crisis in the Far East. Japan has made new and outrageous demands upon China which China may be forced temporarily to accept. One reason for China's weakness, not, perhaps, the chief, but important, is financial. Her finances were in a bad condition, anyway, when the United States began a policy of buying up silver at a price above the market. China has depended on silver for money. When the United States began to pay a price above what silver was worth in China it was drained out. Thereby the Chinese government was further crippled in its struggle for stability.

Some nations, unlike the United States, are dependent for existence on food supplies outside their borders. From ancient times until today that has been a cause for war. Today trade and scientific agriculture are far better ways than war to get food supplies. In spite of talk about Italy's and Japan's need of room to feed their populations, that is an excuse rather than a sole and

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sufficient cause for their militarism. India and China where the pressure of population on soil is greatest have not been bellicose. Nevertheless, if world organization ignores the fact that for some nations to live at all, and for all nations to live well, we must plan in terms of interdependence rather than independence we shall not escape war.

It is the more difficult to stop giving illustrations of interdependence than to continue. The point is that the fact of interdependence is ignored in our basic forms of social organization and their accompanying loyalties. Man emerged from the feudal period before large-scale machinery had made interdependence so imperative a fact in life as it is to-day. He emerged with loyalty to two principles: First, the notion of allegiance to his own nation, whose sovereign power is vested in the political state, a state which is a law unto itself in its relation with other states, above the moral code, ready to sanctify to itself anything and everything which may serve its own ends. Second, the economic system of capitalism; that is to say, the system based on private ownership of the natural resources and of the great tools of production and distribution, and their management by or for the owners in the hope of profit. Capitalism and na-

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tionalism were born together in years of strife beginning about the time of the Renaissance, the discovery of America, and the Protestant Reformation. Both of them embody a glorification of strife as the road to power and profit. Together they have come down through history tied to each other like Siamese twins. They have sometimes quarreled. Pure romantic nationalists have often complained of the "sordidness" of capitalism. Your far-seeing capitalist has been hurt by national boundaries and has had visions of an international capitalism. For a time after the World War some observers thought that possibly we might get peace between the nations through an international capitalism. Steel and other industries were to be organized by agreement or cartels which would bind together the leading manufacturers in every nation. In the end, not cartels, but high tariffs and national competition, have prevailed. There were several reasons for this. For one thing the capitalists themselves grew up in the atmosphere both of competition and nationalism and were accustomed to think in terms of competitive nationalism. For another thing it was easier, though perhaps in the long run less profitable, in time of economic difficulty to run to the national state for a high tariff or other subsidy than to organize internationally. Moreover,

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it was discovered that there is no better wine to keep the masses drunk than the heady wine of nationalism. To maintain the class division at home for their own profit, it became necessary for Fascist and other jingoistic demagogues more and more to play up the concept of a mystical and militant national unity. Practically, this could only be done by playing up hate and fear of other nations which expressed themselves in trade, tariff, and currency struggles as well as in great armaments.

This does not mean that men's motives are un-mixed. Patriots of the jingoist sort in certain matters become internationalists for profit. I shall never forget listening to the calm testimony of a man, an officer in the military forces of the United States who had been honored by being a military attaché at the White House. He and his father had invented a stabilizer for a machine-gun which through their agents they were willing to market all over the world, including countries which on their own military theory were potential enemies of the United States. The Merchants of Death have always done this sort of thing. In America they have sold arms to whoever had the price, and yet subsidized jingoism at home—as they subsidized "Big drum" Shearer to help frustrate the Naval Conference at Geneva a few years ago. Did

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not the French armament-makers contribute indirectly to the funds by which Hitler rose to power? His rise meant good business for them.

Nowadays no one is in danger of going to jail for saying what is generally admitted: namely, that the First World War was economic in its origins, born of the struggle of rival imperial systems for the profits to be derived from exploiting weaker people. Behind the World War lay the trade and naval competition between England and Germany; the desire of Russia to possess Constantinople; the Austrian ambition to control the Balkans; the French and German quarrel about Morocco; the German drive toward the East typified by the struggle to control the railroad to Bagdad; and the historic passion of the French to recover Alsace-Lorraine. All these issues were principally economic. Even the struggle over Alsace-Lorraine had a large element of cold-cash calculation in it as well as much sentiment. The German steel industries had grown prosperous by bringing together the iron of Lorraine and the coal of the Ruhr.

Behind the entry of the United States into the war lay a long story of propaganda and of diplomatic negotiations about American rights at sea. Both sides disregarded these rights when it suited them, but the German submarine menace was the

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outstanding threat to our trade. If by some miracle we had been able to trade with Germany and her allies profitably, instead of with England, France, Italy and their allies, or if we had been able to trade equally with both groups of belligerents, we should not have gone to war as we did. Propaganda itself would not have taken the form that it did and the emphasis of our diplomacy would have been different. Our dominant financial class by loans and trade had acquired too great a stake in the Allied cause to contemplate with equanimity a German victory or even a stalemate in the war. The American ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, in a cable to President Woodrow Wilson, of March 5, 1917, makes that fact clear:

. . . The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional antagonism.

It is not improbable that the only way

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of maintaining our present preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse may come.

If on August 1, 1914, Americans, including those Americans who at first profited most by the war, could have sat down and calculated in cold blood the profits and losses as they now appear to be, seventeen years after the signing of the Armistice, the story might have been different. They might have kept out of war loans and war trade. But once embarked on the road of profiting out of other nations' war our dominant group would not, perhaps could not, keep out of war which they hoped would guarantee their profits. Of course they rationalized it. There are very few men who have the strength of mind to face their own motives clearly, or to be conscious hypocrites in presenting them to others.

The war and the resultant peace treaties changed

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certain aspects of the old character of imperialist rivalries and greatly changed the rôles of the national actors. The number of nations in the world was increased, the passion of nationalism was intensified, and with these things went more military establishments and higher tariffs. Essentially the struggle, as before, was between nations seeking sources of supply of raw materials outside their own borders, places to market their surplus goods, and to invest surplus capital.

The war proved the immense importance of petroleum in military operations as well as in times of peace. It intensified the struggle for petroleum. Mr. F. C. Hanighen, one of the authors of *Merchants of Death*, has written a book about the struggle for petroleum called *The Secret War*. It is as thrilling as an E. Phillips Oppenheim novel. Some of his sensational exposures require a little more evidence than he gives. The book is open to the criticism that he lays too much stress on the struggle of the nations for petroleum and not enough on some other aspects of their rivalry. Nevertheless, the book is one of historical importance. Nations which cynically carry on this type of struggle cannot hope forever to escape plunging into war. Apart from Mr. Hanighen's revelations, it is now well known among students that the

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struggle for Russia's rich supplies of petroleum was a sinister factor in shaping the policy of other powers towards Russia for many years after the Bolshevik revolution. And oil has been revealed as one of the chief villains in the Ethiopian drama.

Now, it is not nations as a whole which profit, at least directly, from this struggle for raw materials, for markets, or for opportunities to invest. It is the owning class in these nations. The quarrel for markets, with the consequent war of tariffs and currency systems, would not take on anything like its present dangerous form if the workers at home could get the equivalent of what they themselves produce. Overproduction under capitalism is a consequence of underconsumption by exploited workers. We should not have to worry so much about cotton or textiles if those who produce them could afford to use them; in plain English, if share-croppers and mill-hands could buy underclothes for their children or sheets for their wives. The problem of surplus goods is peculiarly a problem inherent in the profit system. So, too, is the matter of disposing advantageously of profits in the hands of investors at the highest possible rate of interest. American workers had nothing to gain directly from the quarrel of English and American capitalist control of petroleum in Mexico.

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The frantic struggle of American investors to force loans upon corrupt governments in Latin America would have meant little or nothing to the masses of the American people even if the investors in the general smash-up of the depression had not lost most of what they had invested.

This statement needs qualification on two sides. American workers have a great deal to lose in a system, the logical end of which is war and the immediate cost of which is the burden of competitive armaments, and tariff and currency struggles. On the other hand, as long as the workers accept capitalist nationalism their jobs are more or less tied up with the functioning of the system which requires a desperate struggle to expand. For example, Mr. Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, in his much-discussed pamphlet, *America Must Choose*, has laid down a very convincing case for well-thought-out tariff reductions as essential to prosperity. But the actual process of letting down these barriers would unquestionably affect adversely, or seem to affect adversely, a certain number of industries dependent upon tariff subsidies. Workers employed within them would know why they lost their jobs. Other workers who as the result of a more enlightened policy might get jobs would not be so sure of the precise

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reason. To-day there is some competition in America from cheap Japanese textiles. It is increasing, but is as yet a comparatively small factor in the chaotic textile situation. To put up a tariff wall high enough to exclude those textiles, would reduce Japan's power to purchase other goods from the United States. Nevertheless, the workers in the textile industry have made common cause with the employers who have grossly exploited them. Together they proclaim that Japanese competition is the chief cause of the sickness of the textile industry, which industry has in fact been sick ever since its unhealthy wartime boom. It is hard to do the wise thing even from the point of view of theoretical capitalist economics, because so many people have been led to believe that their fortunes or their jobs are tied up with victory in the various manifestations of the struggle for markets and raw materials. It is one of the most ominous signs of the times that now in an hour of depression and capitalist disintegration some men are turning wistfully to a memory of our temporary, false and dangerous wartime prosperity.

Mr. James Rorty, a highly competent observer, in his account of a 15,000-mile automobile trip in America, entitled *An Unsentimental Journey*,

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gives us some paragraphs as alarming as they are quotable:

The ninety-five percent [of Americans who do not appreciate the nature of the present economic dilemma] don't even know the questions. They don't think; the press, the radio, the movies do not give them the materials of thought, but instead give them obsolete stereotypes. But they feel, and despite their present passivity they will respond to pressure; ultimately they will act. How will they act? It seems to me that they will take the easiest way out; not the best way, but the easiest way, a way which requires neither knowledge of the questions, nor answering the questions in either thought or action. It is the way of their ancestors, the barbarian way, the American way, the logical extension into the international arena of the interrupted sweep of pioneer conquest. It dodges all the domestic issues, of democracy versus dictatorship, of "freedom" versus security; it finances consumption and solves unemployment; it merges all the fears

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into a single fear, all the hatreds into a single hatred. It is the way of war; war in the Pacific; war with Japan, probably, as Nathaniel Peffer has predicted, in alliance with Great Britain; a trade war, designed to break Japan's grip upon the Chinese market, and so release the intolerable pressures of American capitalist overproduction and profit-sabotaged underconsumption.

The ninety-five percent don't know the questions. But they know the answer, know it in their bones. "I guess things won't get any better till we have another war." How many times did I hear that all across the continent and back! Mechanics looking for work, fruit tramps, the unemployed in the cities, the farmers stranded in the drought areas, small business men—they all had that answer. Where had they got it? The war propaganda is not yet overt, not even in the Hearst press. These people, the ninety-five percent, were untouched by socialist, communist, or pacifist education. But they knew the answer. Not that they were for it, particularly. They

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were merely resigned. Being unable to think through or act through any program for the solution of the domestic dilemma in its own intransigently difficult terms, they regarded not without hope the prospect of being relieved of the burden of all thought, all responsibility. A war would solve it, they felt, even though some of them perceive vaguely that war would only postpone and deepen the disaster.

They are admirable material for "voluntary conscription," this ninety-five percent; admirable material for "democratic fascism," or whatever other names will be devised for it.

In terms of any long-run program the desire to cure a capitalist depression by another capitalist war is a good deal like the desire of the sufferer from delirium tremens to get relief by one more stiff drink. But it is true that another war in which other powers did most of the fighting might act like a shot in the arm to our disintegrating capitalism. Fortunately, in my experience, most Americans, if you can get them to think at all, know that it would be only a shot in the arm, and

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moreover that the chance that the next war will stay a good war—that is, a war which Americans can provision but need not fight—is exceedingly slim. In the light of the history of the war debts the chance of our collecting for what we loan or sell is equally slim! Far more than five per cent of us can be made to understand this even if we do not understand it already. To this the generally favorable response to the recent embargo on arms and implements of war bears evidence. It must be remembered, however, that the prize of trade in Mussolini's Ethiopian adventure is not great and that the resolution takes no clear line on supplies like cotton, wheat and copper. A public protest which I made against a rumor of a loan to finance cotton sales to Italy for war purposes brought me a violent letter of abuse from an Alabama planter.

The conclusion of the whole matter is this: War and preparation for war are so bound up with the whole capitalist-nationalist system and all the quarrels of rival imperialisms that there is only a limited usefulness in proving that there is no profit in war or in taking the profit out of war. We have to prove that there is no advantage to mankind in the entire capitalist-nationalist system of whose evil fruits war is only one and the worst. The

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dominant class may be convinced that large-scale war does not pay, but it is by no means convinced that the system under which it enjoys power and profit does not pay. Hence it stands by that system, either blind to the true nature of war, or hoping against hope that in an interdependent world we can keep our inadequate and divisive loyalties and still escape war. War is psychologically and emotionally, as well as historically and economically, tied in with the profit system and our organization into nations.

It does not follow that if America were to turn Socialist automatically the danger of war would be over even although the scramble for private investments abroad and profits from our foreign markets, a scramble inevitable under the profit system, would be ended. Russia is under a Communist government and that government has felt compelled to protect itself by building up an immense military establishment and by making a virtual alliance against a Fascist Germany with bourgeois imperialist France. Stalin has gone so far as to give a clean bill of health to the French military establishment even although it is a probable source of French Fascism. It is conceivable that even in a world where no longer do capitalist nations constitute a potential threat to a Socialist nation, Socialism

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on a national scale and with national loyalties only, would not abolish war. Nations are very unequal in size and resources, and even a Socialist nation will have need for raw materials outside its boundaries. There will be a temptation to exploit the weak. After these words were written came the news that Soviet Russia could not or would not resist the temptation to sell the Italian camps in Africa supplies of wheat and coal tar. Hence the importance of insisting on maintaining the true and original nature of the Socialist slogan: Workers of the World Unite. It is an ideal which will require planning in world and not merely national terms.

But if the nations were turning to Socialism great would be the gain for the cause of peace. Instead, two great nations have already gone Fascist and to a greater or less degree Fascism menaces all the surviving political democracies. Everything which makes war likely is incarnate in Fascism to a greater degree than in the older forms of capitalism. Fascism has destroyed the independent organizations of the workers and hence their opportunity to function internationally with their comrades to prevent war. It seeks to regulate and defend the profit system by the power and authority of the state. It has raised nationalism

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to new heights of religion. It rejects any idea of loyalty above loyalty to the national state controlled by a dictator. It eulogizes militarism, even war itself, as good, not evil. In power, both Mussolini and Hitler on occasion have found it necessary, like other less dictatorial rulers, to pay lip-service to the ideal of peace among the nations. What they really think was put by Mussolini in these words:

Fascism above all does not believe either in the possibility or utility of universal peace. It therefore rejects the pacifism which masks surrender and cowardice. War alone brings all human energies to their highest tension and imprints a seal of nobility on the peoples who have the virtue to face it.

To prove the virtue of war Mussolini picks a weak foe and has begun a pirate's raid in Ethiopia!

It was a day of mourning for mankind when Hitler, partly as a result of the First World War, came to power in Germany. It will be the end of all hope of peace if Fascism extends its sway.

The forces which can block the extension of Fascism lie not in the field of international in-

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trigue, but within the ranks of workers with hand and brain. The nominally democratic nations will not go to war to crush Fascism in Italy or Germany. The years have given proof of that fact a thousand times over. If the ending of Fascism should ever be the slogan of new world war it will be as unreal as was the pretext that the last great war was fought to end imperialism. As that war spread, not destroyed, the seeds of militarism and imperialism, so would the next war be likely to spread Fascism or the dark ages of tyranny of which Fascism is the present expression.* We who realize how dangerous an ally of war is Fascism must turn with new zeal to the effective advocacy of those new forms of organization and those new loyalties in each country which are opposed alike to war and Fascism. It is a service to peace throughout the world to aid the underground revolutionary forces in Fascist countries.

War is clearly more probable than peace in this mad world. Probability is not inevitability. The struggle against world war or to keep America out of world war must be won. By comparison nothing else matters. In this spirit let us turn to the cure of war.

* See the notes on this chapter for comment on the newly announced Communist position on the virtue of international war against Fascism—"defensive war," of course!

CHAPTER VI

THE CURE FOR WAR

VOLUMES have been written on the subject which gives the title to this chapter. The shelves of our social pharmacists are lined with remedies proposed as sure cures for war. Some of them are good, carefully and scientifically compounded. Some of them are quack medicines pure and simple. Some of them are good as far as they go, but that isn't very far. It is one of the delusions of men that there is a cheap and easy remedy for so deep-seated a disease as war or that peace can be bought without a price.

Logically, wars would cease if men were to come really to believe that there never was a good war or a bad peace. In other words, if they came to believe that no injustice is as bad as the war that is designed to cure it. Nothing that we have discovered in the history of war or of men's social relationships justifies any hope at all that we shall come to a supine but secure peace merely because anything is better than war.

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The other way to end war would be to remove its causes. This is wholly desirable, but to most men it seems to involve a desperate surgical operation, one last war to pull down this or that tyrant from his throne. There is little likelihood that by some miraculous agreement men will amicably remove the causes of war. There is as little likelihood that the next war will automatically be the last rather than the first of a new series of which it will be the parent. The search for peace necessarily involves a search for a method of struggle against exploitation and injustice which does not involve war. Our task is to find a way to prevent particular wars while we seek by other methods to change the capitalist-nationalist system which of itself breeds war. No particular war is absolutely inevitable at the particular time under which it occurs. But our basic loyalties and institutions and their conflicts make particular wars probable, and some war, sooner or later, virtually inevitable.

Another way to put matters is this: the struggle for peace is a struggle for other methods of conflict than the method of war; it is a struggle against the easy acceptance of war as a social remedy for what men or certain groups of men think to be wrong; and it is a struggle against the causes of war.

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No successful campaign for the prevention of war or the establishment of a secure peace can be along one simple line. It is good, but not enough, to prove that modern war is as futile as it is brutal, or that the hope of profitable victory is the great delusion. It is not enough to show how arbitrary, capricious, self-defeating and destructive is war as an agency of "justice." It is necessary also to reëxamine the human values which have been lumped together in a cry for justice between nations and to find other ways than war for establishing those values which are of real worth.

It has become the fashion in some quarters to close reviews of plays and books as moving as *Paths of Glory* with some such words as these: "But these vivid pictures of what war means will not prevent another war." There is all too much truth in the conclusion. The European nations which learned most of war at first-hand in the dreadful years 1914-1918 are in the van of those who are preparing for the next. The Germany of Hitler included *All Quiet on the Western Front* in that bonfire of books which shed a lurid light on its path back to spiritual dark ages. Remarque, the author of the book, which is one of the three or four which best show what modern war means, is in exile. Germany thrills again to

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the beat of the drum and the drilling of soldiers.

Nevertheless this is not all there is to the story. The knowledge of what war means has sunk deeper into the consciousness of mankind than ever before. If it were not so, Europe would have been at war many times ere this. It is a paradoxical fact that although the emotions which normally lead to war have been intensified, and the attempt to provide effective machinery of peace has been almost a complete failure, nevertheless the nations shrink back from major conflict. The reason is, in part, that the most discontented nations are poor and not yet armed for first-rate war. Doubtless this restrains Hitler. But an even more powerful and generally operative restraint is the fact that the people are weary of war and the leaders are afraid of what might happen. Swashbuckling Mussolini has picked no adversary stronger than Ethiopia, and his imperialistic expedition if it proves long and costly may pave the way for his downfall at home. If the same poverty, hate, and fear had been upon the nations in the years from 1900 to 1914 as have been upon them since the World War, they never would have waited so long to blunder or stumble into another war. Unquestionably it is the knowledge of what war really is rather than war as drums and flags and uniforms make it seem

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to us which has held the nations back. It is a thousand times worth while to pass on the memory of war without glory or profit to the generations which have had no first-hand experience of it. It is part of the vital rôle of education in the prevention of war that the rising generation should form its judgment on war on the basis of the great tradition of realism in history and fiction which has given us Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Barbusse's *Under Fire*, Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Siegfried Sassoon's poems, and Humphrey Cobb's *Paths of Glory*, rather than on the older tradition which in my youth fed us with histories that were long records of wars and battles, novels in which the hero came through bloody combat unscathed in mind and body, and poems of the order of Maccauley's *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

Why not, then, increase this feeling and rely on it as the way to peace? Why not cut the Gordian knot of war by a simple and decisive refusal to fight? This cure has often been advocated either as a sole and specific remedy, or as part of a more comprehensive program. It has been advocated on two planes: first, on the absolute religious or ethical plane of the rejection of war as mass-murder; second, and more recently, on the practical plane that wars, at least wars between

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nations, are so useless as well as so cruel that intelligent men ought to serve notice that they will have none of them, and by thus serving notice make them less likely.

The first of these methods has a long and honorable history. It has challenged the reluctant respect of men although it has not persuaded them to end war. It was the attitude of the early Christians. For them the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church and with their physical nonresistance went oftentimes compelling spiritual power. This nonresistant position or this rejection of violence has persisted among minority groups of believers practically without interruption down to our own day. It is an attitude brought home to the generation of our fathers by the writings of Tolstoy, and to our own generation by the stand of conscientious objectors and, above all, by the words and deeds of that strange and compelling figure, Mahatma Gandhi.

There have always been wide differences of opinion and social outlook among the objectors to war. Many of them have been simple-minded literalists. They were commanded by Scriptures which they accepted not to kill. War is murder, therefore they would not take part in war, at least not a combatant part. A surprising number of them

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have failed to see that noncombatant service merely released other men for killing. Some of these literalist objectors, and some philosophical anarchists who have gone to great extremes in their opposition to the state, have had or have seemed to have no strong sense of social obligation. It was not their task to reason about the fate of nations and causes. God or fate would take care of that. It was their duty to save their own souls; to be true to their best selves; to be obedient to some explicit command or to some heavenly vision; or to establish the right of the individual over the state as, in the words of Thoreau, "a higher and independent power."

Many of these objectors to war had a high sense of social obligation. They refused allegiance to the immoral command of a state at war because of a higher social allegiance, which according to their philosophy they identified as allegiance to the Kingdom of God, or the Brotherhood of Man, or the international solidarity of workers—in short, of the ideal community which they hoped to build. The best of these objectors saw, and still see, that it is not enough simply to renounce war as a means of struggle. They must substitute for it other ways of achieving justice. They saw the ethical weakness and the logical futility of those good

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folks who had accepted without much question the benefits of a system of exploitation which rests on violence. Many religious pacifists have willingly accepted the property advantages of capitalism and the privilege of membership in a strong nation deriving some of its wealth from the exploitation of the weak. That is, they have accepted the system which leads to war and then refused to fight. They have identified pacifism with passivism. By their quiescence they have definitely allied themselves with the exploiters. They have held back from championing the cause of the weak against the strong, provided the weak appeal to violence, forgetful that the violence of the rebel is only the answer to a prior latent or open violence of the oppressor. A religious or ethical conscience which springs into brave action only against some compulsion to fight is worthy of a qualified respect, but it is wholly inadequate to facing the problem of war. The negative command, "Thou shalt not kill," even when it is expanded to the killing of war, is not of itself the sufficient basis of peace.

Tolstoy recognized this. His refusal to render military service was part of an ethical code which made him also stress the necessity of living by what he called "bread-labor." It was part of a renunciation of a complicated civilization which

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rests upon elaborate organization. However challenging are Tolstoy's ethical principles, it is the plain unvarnished truth that if the world should suddenly obey him literally it would be faced with starvation. Millions of human beings who have grown up in the collective society which modern machinery has produced would find it quite impossible to carry on life by bread-labor.

Gandhi has carried a program of practical and constructive pacifism a long step further. Yet for us Westerners he also has weakened his position by coupling, to a certain extent, his opposition to violence with his opposition to the machinery which properly used may be the instrument of our conquest of poverty. When one considers that the effective use of machinery is the only way in which abundance can be provided for the present population of this earth, one should hesitate a long time before condemning it ethically in the interest of peace. It is the proper use of machinery which affords the hope of removing the ancient economic compulsions which drove tribes to war with their neighbors for better land or food.

Gandhi's great achievement has been to bring to men's attention the possibility of non-violent methods of struggle against injustice. He did not invent those methods. Even in our Western

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world with its traditions of organized violence the workers have made great progress in their struggle against exploitation by means of the strike. Neither in theory nor in practice is the strike a weapon of pure pacifism; it is certainly a means of coercion and often it has been accompanied, particularly in the United States of America, by some degree of violence. This violence in a great many cases is initiated by the agents of the employing group. In some cases it is stirred up in the ranks of the strikers themselves by *agents provocateurs*. Nevertheless, when President Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, who opposed the Student Strike for Peace in 1935 declared: "To organize a strike against war is to show a strange lack of a sense of humor, for the strike itself is a form of war," he was talking nonsense. Historically the strike has been a substitute for riots and war, and at the worst there has not been a tithe of the violence in the whole history of strikes that was to be found in a single day of the World War, not even when the bulletins announced "all quiet on the western front." The symbol of the strike is the folded arm, not the clenched fist. It is a refusal to work, an organized refusal that often has cost the strikers and their leaders dear. It is a pity that history which records the names of

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all sorts of violent patriots who rushed to arms has given us so meager a record of the unknown heroes of labor's more peaceful struggles against injustices far worse than those which have moved the warrior fathers of the nations to rebel. Labor's struggles have been far more successful in terms of human values than the wars which history praises.

Already the threat of a general strike, or even of a fairly extensive strike, against mobilization or against the shipping of troops, has been a powerful factor in preserving peace and ending military operations. The threat of a general strike was immensely useful in leading to a peaceful separation of Norway and Sweden early in the century of the First World War. Incipient strikes and threats of greater strikes were factors in making Lloyd George end British intervention in Russia and desist from intervening in behalf of Greece as against Turkey in the turbulent post-war years. The history of mankind would have been very different and infinitely happier if international Socialists prior to the World War had organized and educated so effectively that they could have put into action a general strike against mobilization in Germany, France, England, and Russia. It is at the moment of mobilization that the mili-

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tary machine is most vulnerable and when a strike would be most serious. It would be far easier to carry on a general strike against mobilization than a general strike for some radical purpose at home. Such a strike is not of itself war. It is one of our most effective weapons in the armory against war. The cause of peace will be brighter when organized labor in America will turn to consider it.

Even when a little country is invaded by a mightier neighbor, as was Belgium during the World War, it is not hard for pacifists to show that logically civil disobedience to the invader, if properly organized, would be more effective than military resistance. It would bring less, not more danger, to those grandmothers, wives and sisters whom militarists endanger and not protect by the wars which occasionally they profess that they fight in their behalf! Strikes by organized labor and a general refusal of civilians to do anything to help the invader would doubtless be met with cruel reprisals. It is highly improbable, however, that soldiers would continue to shoot down in cold blood men who raised no hand in violence against them but only sought to show that they would not consent to the violation of their own country.

In a tropical country like India, where the Brit-

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ish garrison is wholly dependent upon the service of natives which white men cannot or will not perform, if civil disobedience were well enough organized it could drive out not only the oppressors but the entire British population more effectively than the Allied Blockade starved Germany. Gandhi, who has done most to advance the idea of non-violent resistance, never thought that his people were spiritually or psychologically ready for this extreme form of civil disobedience. Even on a lesser scale it has been an enormously successful substitute for war in advancing unity in India and the claims of the people for a greater degree of self-government. Gandhi himself would be the first to admit that it has not been a complete success, but how successful it has been in certain instances and how dramatic and how heroic have been the deeds of masses of men and women who have submitted to any form of punishment rather than to obey the orders of the oppressors can be read in Richard Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence*. Mr. Gregg quotes eye-witness stories of two episodes in the Indian struggle of 1930. Crowds of unarmed men and women advanced on the police. In the cases cited they were accompanied, as in war, by doctors and nurses. In Bombay even the war-

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like Sikhs made up one division. As Mr. Negley Farson, an American newspaper man, told the story, the police hesitated before hitting them with their lathi (bamboo poles). They pleaded unsuccessfully with the women to leave the field. "No!" said the women. "We will die with our men." The story continues:

Mounted Indian policemen who had been galloping across the field, whacking heads indiscriminately, came to a sty-mie when they faced the little cluster of blue Akali turbans on the slender Sikh men.

"The Sikhs are brave men—how can we hit them?" It was not fear, but respect.

But the police, determined to try to clear the field, at last rushed around the Sikh women and began to hit the men. I stood within five feet of a Sikh leader as he took the lathi blows. He was a short, hairy, muscled man.

The blows came—he stood straight. His turban was knocked off. The long black hair was bared with the round top-knot. He closed his eyes as the blows

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fell—until at last he swayed and fell to the ground.

No other Sikhs had tried to shield him, but now, shouting their defiance, they wiped away the blood streaming from his mouth. Hysterical Hindus rushed to him, bearing cakes of ice to rub the contusions over his eyes. The Sikh gave me a smile—and stood for more.

And then the police threw up their hands. "You can't go on hitting a blighter when he stands up to you like that."

Mr. Gregg is, I think, mistaken in arguing from the practical success of certain specific measures of non-violent resistance and its various advantages to an absolute ethical prohibition of violence. The line between violent and non-violent resistance is not ethically so sharp and clear as some of Gandhi's eulogists have supposed. In the East there is more of a philosophical and psychological background for non-violent resistance than in the West. Here such beatings as the Sikhs endured at the hands of the police would probably seem even to bystanders intolerable, and non-violent resistance

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would pass over into violence. It is, moreover, true that a *coup d'état* during which well-trained forces took over power stations and other points vital to modern life might involve far less human suffering than a general strike against the British in India would entail upon British women and children. The utter condemnation of violence, to be either effective or righteous, must rest upon a philosophical or religious approach to life, of which non-violence is only one feature. The conscientious politician or statesman, no matter how deep-seated is his hatred of war, cannot and should not be expected to act as if his people had already accepted a philosophy which includes non-violence. Nevertheless those of us who cannot acknowledge absolute pacifism as our dominant creed in a world of injustice and exploitation ought in the name of our hatred of war to give increasing heed to the possibility of non-violent struggle and non-violent coercion of the oppressor. Non-violent resistance may bring with it suffering. It rarely inflames passion to such a pitch of insane fury as does violence. It is more easily possible to stop. Reason is never quite so remote from the conduct of our human affairs as it is in the pitch of madness necessary to sustain modern war.

{The simple refusal to engage in any kind of war

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in which our capitalist-nationalist governments may plunge us does not of itself involve any complete philosophy on the subject of violent as against non-violent coercion. It may be accompanied by one of several constructive philosophies for reorganizing the world, or by no philosophy at all. A young man may say to himself something like this: "All that I can learn teaches me that another war will end civilization. It cannot possibly achieve any desirable social end. It will mean for me personally the denial of everything that makes life honorable and good. I owe it to myself and to my generation to let my government know that I am not going to be coerced or cajoled into another great war. Everything that I can learn about modern history teaches me that it takes two to make a modern war. It is highly improbable that any criminal nation is wantonly going to attack my own. Every nation believes, even when it is the military aggressor, that it is fighting a defensive war for the protection of its rights and liberties. Therefore I will ignore the fair-sounding but difficult distinction about offensive and defensive war. If my country should be involved in a truly defensive war I shall likely know it in time to act appropriately, but my first duty is to declare, in common with thousands of my own generation in

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many lands, to the rulers of the nations, that we shall not take part in their wars.”

Some such reasoning as this lies behind the now famous Oxford oath, named after the University at which it originated. In its original English form, the pledge was a resolution “not to support King or country in the event of war.” The form in which it has been used in many American student and young folks’ meetings is as follows: “This house will not support the government in any war it may undertake.” In this form the resolution has found the support of different groups for different reasons: pacifists because they are opposed to all war; revolutionists who can imagine a revolutionary struggle in which they would fight, but cannot imagine a war between capitalist nations which would mean anything but loss and disaster to mankind; pragmatists because they hope such a warning to governments may get results.

On April 12, 1935, in the United States some 175,000 students participated in a demonstration against war. Doubtless a great many of the strikers or demonstrators were not fully prepared to take the Oxford pledge, but they were prepared to show that this generation means business in its opposition to war and that it is not going to leave all the color and the emotion of collective action to the

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supporters of war. In some colleges the strike found favor among the authorities. It was not a strike against the college, of course, but against war. In some colleges the authorities were neutral; in a few they were openly hostile. High-school authorities were generally hostile and in many cases went to great lengths to repress student action.

In the event of new war, as the worldly wise and cynical are fond of telling us, a great many men and women would forget the Oxford resolution, to say nothing of any less clear-cut resolution against war which they might form. Fewer will abandon their opposition than if they had never expressed it clearly to themselves and their comrades. Those that persist in opposition to war will probably fare worse rather than better in the next war than did conscientious objectors in the last. The great value of the Oxford pledge or of organizations like that of the War Resisters is its probable effect upon potential war makers.*

* The reliable Nofrontier News Service for July 23, 1935, contained the following amazing statement about war resistance in France:

That no fewer than 132,000 Frenchmen, opposed to war and to military service, have been driven out of the country into exile, is the statement put forward by responsible students of French war plans, according to correspondents of the Nofrontier News Service. These figures are indorsed as correct not only by extreme pacifists, who have been growing more and more numerous in the French Republic ever since the War notwithstanding the increasing severity of their punishment, but by conservative peace associations. The estimates are based upon government reports.

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This is incalculably great. Governments are restrained by fear of what may happen in war. In part they are restrained by fear of violent revolution. But there are grave disadvantages in a revolutionary hope which requires men first to face the hell of war.

The announced intention of thousands of individuals not to engage in war, and a conscious effort to arouse labor organizations to strike against mobilization, is likely to be a far more desirable means of peace than the dissemination of a general fear that some soldiers may shoot the wrong way in the event of a new conflict.

I have dwelt upon the importance of this kind of resistance to war precisely because the constructive machinery of peace is so weak. To prevent particular wars in the near future we are obliged to fall back on war-weariness and the growth of ever-widening circles of relatively small minorities who now proclaim that they will not fight. Nevertheless no peace can be secure which rests solely upon negatives. (Domestic peace has always depended upon loyalty to an organized community.) Even the peace of Rome was never a peace imposed solely by force. It was a peace that men accepted.

In the hope that mankind will accept peace, all

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sorts of cures for war have been proposed, some good, some bad, some indifferent. This book would turn into an encyclopedia if we should examine them all. A mere list of the more important of those which have engaged men's attention since the World War is impressive. It includes the League of Nations; the World Court; Arbitration Treaties; the Outlawry of War; Disarmament; popular referendums before war; regional peace pacts like the Locarno agreement in Europe and some of the Pan-American treaties; and measures to take the profit out of war and preparation for war.

One of the simplest of these ideas—it would have been beautiful if it had worked—was the idea of outlawing war as an institution. This took form in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was signed by every nation of importance on the whole earth. Time soon showed that the Pact was more symbolic of the progress of anti-war feeling than of itself a guarantee of any sort of peace. It has been chiefly useful in the past in preventing, not war, but the declaration of war. Paraguay and Bolivia fought in the South American jungle for about a year before they got around to declaring war. Japan occupied the whole of Manchuria after driving out the Chinese troops; she bombarded

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Shanghai and more recently imposed upon North China demands which reduced that region almost to a Japanese colonial dependency. But neither Japan nor China has declared war! Maybe Mussolini will not formally declare war in Ethiopia in deference to the fact that war has been outlawed!

The outlawry of war was advocated by a school of pacifists who talked much of "law not war." The slogan left much to be desired. Even in domestic affairs the growing feeling of the masses is sound that justice requires change in laws if we are to prevent violence. Weaker nations and peoples believe that international law is nothing more than the rationalization of the will of the strong. To identify peace with the *status quo* is to make peace hateful. It is one thing and a true thing to say that we need laws in a community of peoples as an alternative to war. It is another thing, and an untrue thing, to say or imply that the only law we need is a law outlawing war. For that we need a flexible set of constructive laws enacted by the peoples of the world against poverty and exploitation. Until we get them, the outlawry of war, especially the outlawry not of particular wars but of war as an institution, will not mean much.

At this point the advocate of the League of Nations may want to rush into the discussion. "Cer-

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tainly," he will say, "there can be no successful outlawry of wars unless there is some international institution capable of enforcing it and also of making peacefully those changes in relations between nations which will promote greater harmony among them."

Again, the verdict of history is against any great confidence in the present League of Nations as the guarantor of peace. The League of Nations came into being cursed by being born out of war and a peace of vengeance. At the beginning the good Dr. Jekyll of the League of free nations easily became in the eyes of the Germans and their allies the evil Mr. Hyde, guarantor of the iniquitous Peace of Versailles. When at last Germany was admitted to full membership in the League, other factors, some of them inherent in the nature of a league of governments and not of peoples, and more of them inherent in the whole social situation, damned the League to relative uselessness.

The trouble was this: The League rested on the assumption that within the framework of men's capitalist and nationalist loyalties it would be possible to do justice, at least to an extent which would make war not only undesirable but wholly unnecessary. President Wilson and his more ardent disciples believed that the League would develop

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within itself the power to correct the more glaring faults of the Treaty of Versailles, and that under its inspiration international order would be enforced by agreement between disarmed nations. Nothing of the kind has happened; nothing of the kind could have happened in the very nature of things.

It would not have happened had the United States entered the League. On the contrary, the entry of the United States into the League in the passionate and turbulent days of 1919 and 1920 would have made it more probable that the League would have been used, as Clemenceau desired, as an instrument to enforce to the uttermost the Peace of Versailles. At any rate, the French would certainly have made the attempt so to use it. The failure of the United States to enter the League brought about a period of relative neglect of the League by the Great Powers, so far as using it as an instrument of enforcing the Peace of Versailles was concerned. It did have a chance to develop a little strength as a forum of the nations, an agency for adjusting minor disputes—some one has called it a children's court incapable of dealing with grown-up offenders—and an instrumentality for some useful cultural and educational work. But no major issue was tackled by the League or could

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be tackled, not even after Germany had been admitted to full and equal membership.

Three vital tests were presented to it, and the League failed in all of them. As I write, it seems likely that it will fail in a fourth—the aggression of Mussolini against Ethiopia. The first was the issue of disarmament. Even the Peace of Versailles had asserted that the disarmament imposed upon Germany was only a forerunner of general disarmament, or, to be more accurate, drastic limitation of arms. For years the League wrestled with the problem. Honest and able men put hard work into it. They got nowhere. Why? Because basically all nations were thinking in the old terms of absolute sovereignty. There was no true community spirit. Every nation, or almost every nation, had something to keep which other nations wanted or something to gain which it did not possess. The boundaries of Europe did not rest upon consent, but in the last analysis on force.

Disarmament, therefore, was tied up with a second test, that of revising the Treaty of Versailles. But this is easier said than done in an age when each nation has surrounded itself with walls of tariffs and armored itself in national pride. It is easy enough to criticize the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and possibly to point out one or two

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obvious corrections which should be made in boundaries laid down by it. But in terms of absolute nationalism, given the mixture of populations in Europe, how could one redraw the map and do justice to all? Every year that the Peace of Versailles has remained in force, Poles, Czechoslovakians, Rumanians and Italians have strengthened their relative positions in respect to percentage of population and vested rights in territories which they took away from Germany and her allies. There is no redrawing the map of Europe which will satisfy "justice" as long as men's highest loyalty is to one nation, and their economic well-being is bound up in the prosperity of that particular nation through "autarchy" or artificial economic self-sufficiency. When Europe begins to think in terms of the well-being of workers with hand and brain, and the efficient management of her resources—in other words, when the principle of capitalist nationalism is no longer dominant—it will not matter so much if some Germans are under the Polish flag and Magyars under the Rumanian. The economic well-being of all will be conserved in a United States of Europe or of the world. But there is nothing in the association of governments called the League of Nations to bring about this change in basic loyalties, and the

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organization of peoples necessary for true peace or true prosperity.

The nations which comprise the League were not even willing to maintain the *status quo* against the attack of a powerful foe by the use of economic sanctions. This became clear when the League met its third vital test. Japan and China were both members of the League. Japan proceeded to take Manchuria from China and organize it into the puppet state of Manchukuo. For that Japan had precedent in various imperialist transgressions by other powers, the United States included. But if the League was to mean anything as the highest authority for its members, it should have been able to apply economic and moral sanctions for the restraint of Japan. In that task it might have needed the help of Russia, not then a member of the League, and of the United States, which has never joined. It did not even officially call for this help. Various powers, notably France, were exceedingly cool for their own reasons towards the application of any sort of pressure on Japan: French Indo-China is vulnerable to Japanese attack. The most that happened was a belated though courageous report of a League of Nations Commission condemning the Japanese action. No sanctions were applied; Japan gave notice of withdrawal from the

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League, and that was that. No wonder that later on Hitler was able with impunity to do the same thing when he saw that the League was at a standstill on disarmaments. Still later, Great Britain ignored not only the League but her old allies, France and Italy, and negotiated a naval pact with Hitler. This in turn led France to be even more lukewarm than otherwise she might have been about joining England in using the League effectively to block the Italian imperialist attack designed against Ethiopia, which backward country is also a member of the League. In other words, there is no loyalty to the League as a League, or to international organization, which will rally any great power to the support of the League contrary to its own immediate interest, in the capitalist nationalist set-up which now prevails. If the League ever does get around to applying economic sanctions, like an embargo, against a nation which goes to war without exhausting the machinery of peace, all the probabilities are that its action will be the result of the self-interest of the major powers which dominate the League, not devotion to justice or peace. In truth, an absolute boycott or embargo against a strong nation, unless overwhelmingly supported by all other strong nations, is more likely to lead to war than to be a substitute for it.

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Developments in the Ethiopian situation, after this chapter was in print, confirm this judgment. One of three things seems possible: defiance of the League by Mussolini utterly unpunished; a compromise to save Mussolini's face and the League's at the expense of Ethiopia—which may have something to say about that; or the application of sanctions which, now that Mussolini has been allowed to go so far, may lead to war in Europe as well as Africa. The smaller nations and Russia want League action now as a precedent for the future when the aggression may be in Europe. Widespread pro-League idealism in Great Britain runs along with vital imperial interests. But Great Britain and the League cannot act without France which as an African power, only recently conqueror of the Riffs, wants no rival in Mussolini, but dares not risk driving him into Hitler's arms unless Great Britain will underwrite absolutely the *status quo* in Europe.

This is speculative and the reader will have a great advantage over the author in knowing the answer before he reads the prophecy. The author confesses that he will not be content with any answer which does not so shake the prestige and power of this despot, Mussolini, who for his own glory gambles with the peace of the world,

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that his tyranny will be overthrown by his own
people and the world rid of part of that standing
menace to peace which Fascism is by its very
nature.

But whatever happens, it is already clear that
despite the almost universal distaste of Europe for
Mussolini's revival of the old piratical imperial-
ism; despite the support to the League pledged by
the workers of all the non-Fascist countries, Mus-
solini was allowed to go ahead with all his prepara-
tions for war and in the end was checked in so
far as he may be checked only because the im-
perial interests of Great Britain and France in
Africa and perhaps in Asia, would be directly
menaced by Mussolini's success—or by his failure
if that failure should encourage a revolt of colored
races now subject to European powers. The sanc-
tions of the League will work, if they work at all,
only because they reinforce the self interest of
the nations dominant in it. Even Soviet Russia
very belatedly denounced Mussolini's action after
it had been selling him various supplies, and it
took pains to emphasize its friendship for Italy in
the very act of declaring that the League's author-
ity as an instrument of peace should be main-
tained. Official French and English discussion of
the League action was carried on with a frank

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subordination of any concern for the League to concern for their own national aims. It would have been a simple thing to check Mussolini in the early stages of his piracy had the strong nations in the League been willing to apply sanctions. Mussolini is not mad enough to have fought all Europe. What he calculated on, correctly, was that France and, to a much less extent, Great Britain, would hesitate to antagonize him lest he make common cause with Germany, withdraw his militant objection to a successful Nazi union of Germany and Austria, and in a few years, if not immediately, menace Europe with a new military coalition ready for conquest. This cannot be dismissed as an idle or discreditable fear in Europe, organized or disorganized as Europe now is; but its existence proves how unsatisfactory the League has been by its very nature from the beginning as a guarantor of peace in the midst of the clash of rival imperialisms, operating in a world where the fiction of the equal rights of independent sovereign nations, both small and great, is not matched by the hard facts of power. It is not a question whether or not the League has failed in the Ethiopian crisis, which is the fourth test of its power; it is a question how far it has failed and

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whether or not this new wound to its honor will
be mortal.

It is because the League is now so nearly swamped in the turbulent waters of the nationalist politics of Europe that to-day I should be inclined to withhold even the qualified endorsement to American membership in the League which, in accordance with the Socialist platform, I gave in 1928 and 1932. In those Presidential campaigns I said that I favored American membership in the League with rigid reservations against our being drawn into a war to enforce peace. As matters stand to-day, I think it is good that President Roosevelt put representatives of the United States into the International Labor Office which is seeking to bring about certain minimum labor standards throughout the world. It is good for the United States to coöperate with some of the cultural activities of the League, but beyond that American membership in the League would not end Europe's quarrels or assure our peace. If and when the League applies sanctions against an aggressor nation, it will be a grave matter for us to upset them by insisting on the right of unrestricted trade. But that matter can be taken care of by a proper neutrality policy on the part of our government.

It will be apparent that I do not share the hope

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of Norman Angell and other distinguished Englishmen, lovers of peace, that an international police force can be successfully and safely formed under the League of Nations. I share their belief that the economic interdependence of the world requires expression in some form of world organization. I do not believe that we shall get that organization by giving to the League of Nations police power. There is no sign whatever that the present governments would commit genuine police power to it. If the stronger governments should commit to it such power, many of those who now feel themselves discriminated against by the *status quo* would not accept the police power as an agency of justice, but simply as an agency for the perpetuation of that imperialism which they hate. Nowhere is there adequate evidence that the League is building up that kind of loyalty among men which would enable it to have first claim rather than their own nationality over Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, and Russians, who might be enlisted in its police force.

This is not to say, as do some extreme pacifists, that an international force is of itself not to be distinguished from any other type of army. There is an immense and valid difference between the use of police force and war. Within each country, in

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theory and to a considerable extent in practice, the police are the agency of some authority outside themselves which most criminals recognize as just and legitimate. The police are not complaining witness, prosecuting attorney, judge, jury, and executioner, as is a nation at war. Ideally, the force used by the police is a force to restrain and to reëducate. It is directed towards specific offenders. It is not, like war, a blind mass murder. Most of these marks which distinguish the use of police force from war might apply in a valid degree to the use of an internationally organized force against offenders, especially if it were the only recognized military force, with sole control over airplanes.

But it is a bad case of putting the cart before the horse to expect to get this kind of international police force until there is some more reason than now exists for regarding the League as the organized expression of the common interest of all peoples, in the field of economics as well as of international politics.*

In the light of the principles behind our discussion of the League of Nations, there is not much more that needs to be said about less important shortcuts to peace. The World Court has a mod-

* For further comment and references on this, see Notes on Chapters.

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erate usefulness, but true peace depends upon new and better laws rather than upon the enforcement of the international laws which we have. The fate of the future does not hang upon whether or not the United States should enter the Court. For us to stay out, however, is a bit discreditable. It makes us look like an international anarchist, and the way we were kept out by the hysterical nationalist appeals of William Randolph Hearst and Father Coughlin, the latter bringing to his aid a misapplication of the Book of Psalms, heightens that impression. We shall play no worthy rôle for the peace of mankind if we are forever to be suspicious of the good faith of our neighbors, or sure that our innocence will make us the victims of their duplicity if we join with them in a World Court.

A referendum before war might be of some use.* But forces strong enough to stampede Congress into a declaration of war could probably get over the hurdle of a popular vote, especially if they controlled, as they would, the principal means of propaganda to which the radio has been added since 1917. Our popular reluctance to enter the First World War is not an indication that our misguided political democracy inflamed by dema-

* The Ludlow amendment to the Constitution, now before Congress, providing for a referendum before war, is badly drawn and ties up the issue with conscription.

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gogues cannot be stampeded into war. Remember
the history of the Spanish War!

Disarmament is a far more important road to peace. It is nonsense to suppose that the nations will go on frantically preparing for war and never get it, or that their protests of love of peace can be sincere while out of their poverty they finance competitive armaments. As the British General Maurice once suggested, we get what we prepare for and we do not get peace by preparing for war. In order to support the immense burdens of war preparation, it is not enough for the jingoes and the profiteers to talk about preparation against war in general. We are not preparing to fight to scare off Mars or the Moon. Our militarists must have a specific enemy in mind, and fan fear and hate in order to persuade men to give to building warships the funds which might wipe out slums. When Hearst cries out against the danger of pacifism, and, quite incorrectly, cites China as an example of a nation brought low by those strange allies, "pacifism and communism," he does not stop with such generalities: he continues by suggesting, day in and day out, the particular red and yellow menaces against which we must prepare. By that very fact he increases the likelihood of war.

In spite of the value of disarmament, the ex-

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perience of the nations in seeking disarmament or drastic limitation of armament as a thing by itself, shows how impossible it is to disarm materially in a world that will not disarm spiritually. The failure or very qualified success of all conferences on the limitation of arms, a failure the more pointed in view of the certainty that the Washington and London treaties for the limitation of navies will not be renewed, is proof of the fact that war rather than peace is native and congenial to the capitalist imperialism under which we live.

"But all this," the author can hear some of you say, "is very negative. You tell us that war means the destruction of civilization, that in it is neither profit nor glory, that there is no need for it and that only the folly of man makes it so likely. Then you turn around and discredit or damn with faint praise all the steps that men have proposed to peace."

That is not the impression I want to give. If I am critical of proposals for peace, it is not that many of them do not have some value. It is that such great harm has been done by lulling men into the belief that peace can be had without struggle and without great price. We have to *wage* peace, and risk something for peace. There are, however, practical programs in every nation which

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might make peace more likely. A suggested program on which lovers of peace might well unite in the United States should include these points:

I. An immediate, solemn declaration of national policy by the President and Congress that the United States will not supply, or permit its citizens to supply, arms, munitions, or financial support to belligerents or prospective belligerents. This declaration is of the utmost importance. Our most likely road into new European war would be the road which brought us into the First World War: namely, the road of trade with one particular group of belligerents. We cannot expect indefinitely to coin the blood of the soldiers who are slain in European wars into our gold and escape war ourselves. The time to make up our minds on this point is *now*, before the temptation to get temporary prosperity out of war is too strong. Men who do not like war like the trade which other folks' wars bring. It will require a strong campaign of education and organization to keep us from following the lure of profit derived from others' wars into the abyss of our own war. Two objections are almost instantly urged when it is proposed that we place a national embargo against trade with belligerents.

The first is to the effect that it is hard to tell

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just what constitute munitions of war. A great many articles can be used for war or peace and we ought not to be asked to cut off normal peacetime trade. Cotton, for instance, can be used for explosives. This difficulty in practice could be fairly well met by forbidding the export of articles which are obviously intended for war use, and then fixing a quota of supplies which might be used for purposes of either war or peace on the basis of a quota equal to the average trade of the years immediately preceding the war.

The second objection is that we ought to be free to place an embargo against the aggressor nation and to help the wronged nation by permitting it to trade with us. The argument would be better if there were a better test of what constitutes an aggressor nation and more adequate assurance that discrimination against one belligerent would not sooner or later involve us in war. Under the circumstances, it is best to lay down the rule of no trade with belligerents and then make any exception which may seem morally desirable by formal act as we now declare war by formal act. If the rule of no trade with belligerents in munitions is made long enough in advance, its enforcement, as against particular belligerents, cannot be taken as

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a national affront. It will be in line with a policy
of which all nations are warned.

After this chapter was in print, Congress suddenly, on the initiative of a progressive group in the Senate, adopted a policy of no trade in arms or "implements of war" with belligerents. The President's opposition to the resolution resulted in a compromise which gave it a limited life and left to the next session of Congress the framing of a permanent policy. That there is any resolution at all is to the good, and it is also to the good that the resolution includes a statement that the government will not support the free right of Americans to travel on ships of belligerent powers. The resolution is very unsatisfactory because it makes no mention of loans, does not define or lay down a basis for defining "implements of war," and does not try to meet the problem of trade with prospective belligerents.

This resolution, or any similar resolution, has been criticized as an infringement on the power of the Executive; as giving encouragement to the aggressor nation or to the better prepared nation by treating all belligerents alike; and finally as arousing false hopes that by such a declaration we can always keep out of war. The first criticism has no merit. What we need is a formal *national*

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policy not a *presidential* policy. Today the right of Congress to declare war, and tomorrow the necessity of a popular referendum before a declaration of war, are both rendered almost meaningless by a situation in which the President can stack all the cards in favor of war.

The second objection has more force. There is no perfect solution of the ethical and practical problems presented by war, but, as I have already said, if there is to be an exception taken in favor of the innocent nation, it should be by a formal act, after a careful consideration of the circumstances—including the degree of innocence. There is nothing particularly noble about helping the innocent by selling them the means of wholesale destruction at a profit to ourselves while we seek to keep our own skins whole. In practice, as applied to the Ethiopian situation, we cannot very well sell goods anyway to a landlocked Ethiopia at war with a strong maritime power like Italy. Moreover, there is always the danger that to discriminate in the sale of arms against one nation is to invite that nation to retaliate if it is strong enough and so make the effort for peace lead to war. The application of an embargo on arms, as well as more extreme economic penalties, solely against an "aggressor" nation requires for its ethi-

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cal and practical effectiveness an overwhelming
weight of world-wide support.

So far as Ethiopia is concerned, the United States as sponsor of, and signatory to, the Kellogg Pact outlawing war should make far stronger representations to Italy than the Administration has yet made. These representations might well include a reminder of Italy's unpaid war debt. Fortunately, in spite of the shortcomings of the recent neutrality resolution, an earlier Congress had passed the Johnson Resolution forbidding loans to nations defaulting in debt payments to the United States. As a statement of general principles that resolution was of dubious wisdom, but it fits Italy's present case very well. For the rest it may be remembered that the American people by an unofficial boycott of Italian ships and Italian goods, and by leaving Italy off the lists of nations to be visited, can express American disapproval of an act of piracy for which the guilt is primarily the guilt of Mussolini rather than of the Italian people. This American disapproval, official and unofficial, will command weight largely as it is accompanied by a disclaimer of our own imperialism, and a constant effort to reorganize world affairs on other than imperial lines.

To the objection that no neutrality resolution

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can be made sweeping enough or strong enough surely to keep us out of war there is no complete answer. An embargo against the sale of arms would not mean much to a strong nation which could buy the raw materials from the United States. Unquestionably the attempt to draw up a list of all possible war supplies the export of which would either be prohibited or restricted would not only involve us in difficulty with a belligerent nation but sooner or later with our own citizens. It is comparatively easy in view of the present unpopularity of the Merchants of Death to ban the export of arms, and "implements of war" narrowly defined. But when there is a really big war trade in the offing in cotton, wheat, copper, iron or steel, there is a slim chance that an effective embargo against their sale can be set up or maintained if set up. In a time of capitalist depression, too many harassed Americans are frantically interested in a boom market such as war would supply, for these important commodities. All one can say is that while the discussion of the present neutrality resolution shows how unlikely it is that any neutrality resolution, however inclusive and carefully framed, can be strong enough to serve as a sole barrier against our being drawn

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into war, the realization that war trade is a road to war is a hopeful sign for the preservation of peace, and a proper neutrality resolution providing for an embargo against loans, munitions and war supplies is one of the immediate steps that can and should be taken against war.

2. The second point in a national program for peace should be the largest measure of disarmament that the public can be persuaded to accept. The United States is in a peculiarly fortunate position to practice disarmament by example. The long and happy history of peace on the completely disarmed Canadian border, a peace which has lasted since 1815, is an example and symbol of what might be done. We are far from the territorial quarrels of Europe or of Asia and have no direct concern in them. At the very least, we should insist that when we talk about defensive armament it should be for the purposes of defending our own borders, not defending our trade under all circumstances. It is likely that by making it clear that we would not fight for trade we would get more by good will than we are getting by competitive armament. Anyway, the "Open Door" in China isn't worth one day's war. A genuine defensive navy would be very different from, and much cheaper than, the one which President Roose-

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velt is now building, in part with funds to relieve unemployment!

Certainly a program of disarmament requires us not only "to take the profits out of war," as the saying goes, but also out of preparation for war. We cannot listen to the disclosures of the Nye Munitions Inquiry, cry out shame upon the Merchants of Death, and then go about our business. This sort of profit must be stopped even though merely to stop it will not of itself end the danger of war.*

Professor Robert G. Albion, of Princeton, in a paper on *Problems of Sea Power*, quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt when Assistant Secretary of the Navy to the effect that "we must create a navy not only to protect our shores and our possessions, but our merchant ships in time of war, no matter where they go." If that is still his position there will be further rich harvest for the Merchants of Death, for such a navy as against a possible alliance would have to be of incalculably greater strength. An admiral went further. We need a navy big enough to be moral arbiter of the world. "The United States is the only nation fitted to have a large navy. It is a high-minded nation. The other countries do not speak the same language. We ought to

* For further comment on this, see Notes on Chapters.

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have the biggest navy and the biggest army in the world, so that we shall be able to enforce our influence." A nation which would believe that deserves to be robbed by profiteers and bamboozled by the kind of admiral who would say it. A nation which does not believe it should steer clear of a new naval race.

It is exceedingly disquieting that, at a time of wide interest in the shocking exposures of conscienceless profiteering in the whole armament business, Congress in voting the greatest naval budget in the world defeated amendments drawn to prevent a repetition of some of the worst offenses which had been revealed. It is equally disquieting that there was no well-organized and effective labor opposition either to the naval bill—which was accepted as providing employment—or to the increased military appropriations. Yet General Sherrill, speaking for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, in a debate with me over the radio, openly advocated a larger army to deal with labor. The latter's tendency to violence the General found in the textile strike of 1934—this although in that strike with few exceptions labor was not the aggressor but the victim of the violence of militia, deputy sheriffs and hired gunmen.

Another logical accompaniment of a drastic ap-

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proach to disarmament is an end of military training in colleges and universities. It does not belong there. We do not need to add by thousands to a force of Reserve Officers already too large for reasonable use. The ROTC does not train men for war. It merely trains them to accept the ancient and discredited philosophy of Assyrian emperors. It does not compel men to practice living with rats and cooties in rain-soaked trenches; it does not teach them such arts of war as how to gouge out your enemy's eyes or where to thrust the bayonet into him. Mothers did not like that side of military training. If we mean business in our war against war we must dig out the ROTC, root and branch—polo ponies, pretty girl colonels, snappy uniforms and all.

3. It is absurd to suppose that we shall have genuine disarmament or reduce our armament to a defensive level if we are to continue the imperialist policies which are the logical product of this stage of capitalism. We Americans have not been so aggressively imperialist in the thirties as we were in the twenties. Among other things we discovered that imperialism of the aggressive sort in Latin America did not pay the dividends that our bankers and concession hunters had expected. But the secret war for petroleum continues; dollar

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diplomacy is not dead; it is not even certain that it sleeps. The Roosevelt Administration avoided military intervention in Cuba and abrogated the troublesome Platt Amendment which made us a kind of overlord in Cuba. Nevertheless our policy has been meddlesome and our meddling has been on the side of vested property interests. This is the essence of imperialism. We are about to get out of the Philippines for the unlovely reason that having dragged the Islands into our tariff orbit a great many of our producers did not like the resulting competition. But in getting out of the Philippines we still keep an uneasy degree of responsibility for ten years, and after that hang on to naval stations in the Islands. This is a poor way to terminate an adventure in imperialism. We have given the Islands a modified independence at the price of their economic well-being and have not rid ourselves of our hostages to fortune in the Far East. We have not even tried to get an international guaranty of Philippine neutrality. Neither have we yet made a solemn declaration that Americans who seek profit abroad cannot expect their fellow Americans to pour out money or blood to guaranty or collect these profits. Let adventurous capital take its own risks abroad if it must!

4. We should end at once the insult we offer

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friendly nations—China as well as Japan—by our Asiatic exclusion laws. Granting that the present stage of human development makes it unwise that there should be great migrations of Japanese or Chinese to America, or of Americans to Japan or China, we should regulate the matter by mutual treaties which would preserve the legitimate pride of the Chinese and Japanese. Failing that, we should at least govern Chinese and Japanese immigration by the quota system which we have set up for other nations. Under that system the quota would be negligible but the insult which Asiatics feel to be implicit in our laws would be removed. Under these circumstances our moral influence in behalf of justice as between China and Japan would be far greater than it is today.

5. What I have been saying may sound like a program for peace by isolation. Genuine national isolation in our interdependent world is neither possible nor desirable, so we come to the fifth and last point of our peace program. It may be phrased: *Isolation from all that makes for war; coöperation with all that makes for peace.* This is a slogan that needs intelligent application. Honest men may differ about applying it. We cannot have planned economy within a nation and complete *laissez faire* between nations. But those who

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admit this will agree that prohibitive tariffs are opposed both to peace and prosperity. They will agree that we do not show ourselves good neighbors by torpedoing economic conferences in which originally we had expressed interest. It may well be that in the early summer of 1933 neither the Roosevelt Administration nor the United States was ready to make binding international agreements upon certain important matters like stabilization of currency. That was no reason for blowing up the whole London Economic Conference without so much as trying to set up expert machinery to prepare the way for later agreement. If and when in the process of socializing its affairs the United States should set up boards to control exports and imports as a public monopoly, that control should be exercised so as to encourage the warmest possible international coöperation, especially with other nations making similar attempts, or with other nations in which there is an honest effort to raise the standard of income for the workers. Moreover we must steadily keep in mind the necessity of working for international agreements on the allocation of raw materials.

These five points will not easily be adopted in our country. They will not be adopted at all in a reactionary or a Fascist America. Unless we can

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get an efficient unity of purpose and action to forestall Fascism it will be idle to talk about a program of peace. But we shall not successfully fight Fascism unless we remember that the real enemy to peace is capitalist nationalism of which Fascism is only the latest and most abhorrent expression.

If our points are adopted, of themselves they will not make peace secure and glorious. They will make our entrance into particular wars far less likely. They must be buttressed by the steady pressure of organized workers committed to the principle of a strike against mobilization. The government must be impelled towards a constructive program of peace by the announced determination of thousands upon thousands of its young men and women that they will not be dragooned or stampeded into the madness of new war. Those of us who make this position plain are not traitors to our country, but its friends; yes, its lovers, intent upon preserving our own generation and the generations which follow us from the curse which new wars will lay upon us.

But useful as all this may be in preventing new wars, it is not enough. It does not change the system of which war has been an integral part. The struggle for peace is a struggle for a federation of coöperative commonwealths of mankind. It is a

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struggle against the contemptible and wholly unscientific doctrine of the biological superiority of one race or nation to other races or nations—a superiority which gives to the race or nation which claims it the right to exploit the inferior. It is a struggle against claiming for the national state a loyalty which man owes only to humanity.

Peace requires a broad and full program of education far different from that which has molded and twisted the lives of this generation. We must unlearn history which prostitutes truth to the cult of the peculiar glory of one race or nation. We must learn the truth about war. We must teach our children that there is a glory to be found in high adventure in the struggle against disease and poverty which can never be found in war. We must substitute the comradeship of sports and games and the sharing of creative work for the fellowship which has bound soldiers together under the shadow of death. This educational task is peculiarly the work of fathers and mothers and teachers. It ought to be the work, as never before, of churches and all those artists, writers and speakers who help to shape public opinion.*

*It is fair to say that in the churches and among some groups of teachers there is a greater sense of responsibility for peace than in 1914 or 1917. How teachers and preachers will stand out against pressure is another matter.

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This type of education is unthinkable if we are to continue our capitalist-nationalist organization and with it our worship of the twin idols, the Golden Calf of profit and the Molloch of the absolute national state. In the beginning our efforts for constructive change will have to be confined largely to the national sphere, but we shall be traitors to that solidarity of workers with hand and brain throughout the world, across lines of race and creed and color, which is our one great hope of peace unless even while we struggle to build a co-operative commonwealth in our own green and pleasant land we reach out to our brothers in other lands. It will be one of the first and chief duties of Socialist nations to consider the best methods of setting up those world controls of certain broad economic processes which are essential if we are to dwell together as neighbors in a world which science and machinery have made interdependent.

The vision of brotherhood which inspired the prophets and seers in days of old is no longer merely a noble ethical dream. Its fulfilment is a requisite to peace. In seeking that fulfilment we who are menaced by the power of science and machinery to destroy us in new war are blessed by an equal power of that same science and machinery

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to conquer man's ancient enemy, the poverty which
has kept him in thralldom to want and to fear.

The struggle against war is hard and stern. The odds are against the pioneers of peace. But the odds are not hopeless. We who have enlisted in the crusade against war have to aid us, first of all a sure knowledge that war is for our day and generation the way to utter destruction; and, second, the sure hope that a world rid of the menace of war can discover new means of making ever more glorious the fellowship of free men who shall dwell together the whole world round in security and in peace.

CHAPTER VII

A POSTSCRIPT ON WAR AND REVOLUTION

OUR discussion in the body of this book has been concerned primarily with international war. There is far more immediate likelihood that the United States will be caught up in another such war than that it will be engulfed in civil war or violent revolution. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to say that in principle what we have been saying about war does not apply to civil war or violent revolution, and equally absurd to claim that the likelihood of such internal struggle is too remote to deserve consideration.

To-day the marvelous thing is not the restlessness of the masses but what the poet, Edwin Markham, calls "the patience of the poor." In years of the bitterest depression, hungry men have let a quarter of an inch of plate-glass window protect the food which might have fed them and their children. Honest and capable men who could find no work to do have quietly watched the luxurious and wasteful spending of the idle rich. Ours is a

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country which, according to figures set forth in Harold Loeb's *Chart of Plenty*, might provide every American family with an income equivalent to that enjoyed by those who received between four and five thousand dollars a year at the 1929 value of the dollar. The famous study by the Brookings Institution of *America's Capacity to Produce* is in agreement with Mr. Loeb and his associates that in the year of 1929, the year of our greatest prosperity, 16.4 million families in the United States had less than two thousand dollars a year in family income. They are more conservative as to what might be produced, but they agree that in 1929 an efficient utilization of our then capacity to produce would have been sufficient to raise the income of all those families to the two-thousand-dollar level without cutting down any at the top. Instead, masses of workers saw the margin of unutilized capacity to produce, through no fault of their own, multiplied four times over. To-day in a country as potentially rich as the United States the patient workers still are quiet, although approximately 11 million of them are in an army of the unemployed from which they see little hope of escape. Work relief wages have been fixed as low as nineteen dollars a month in certain Southern states. And in a land where landlords are paid not to plant

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cotton, the children of those who raise the cotton are clothed in garments made of flour-sacks. A study by the Research and Planning Division of NRA, headed by a very competent economist, Leon Henderson, has recently reported that between 1925 and 1929 labor's income rose about 20% while dividends and interest increased 65%. By 1933 labor's income was 65% of the 1923 to 1925 level, while dividends and interest were 93% of the same level. The year 1934 did not change the story. Profits, although still less than one-half of their level in the good year of 1926, had shown a greater recovery in 1934 over 1933 than had pay-rolls. And still the workers are quiet. But he is a blind fool who thinks that this patience of the poor in the face of unnecessary poverty and insecurity will last forever without violent outbreak.

That it has lasted so long is largely due to three reasons:

(1) A bewildered uncertainty what to do in the face of the breakdown of our complicated economic machinery. Bread riots might conceivably win food for a day or two. They would scarcely put the machinery of production in operation. (2) Fear of the violence of government troops which would be at the disposal of the owning class. Bricks and stones and even rifles are poor weapons

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to use against police forces and armies equipped with airplanes, machine-guns, tear-bombs and more deadly forms of poison gas. (3) A persistent hope that things can be remedied or at least made endurable by peaceful means. It is remarkable how much acquiescence one can buy with very few crusts.

The first of these reasons is slowly yielding before definite and constructive radical propaganda; the second will lose some of its force if in a new economic crisis the army and the militia are themselves affected by sympathy with the masses from whom they are recruited. The best hope of warding off revolutionary violence is to open channels for peaceful change. From this point of view it is an exceedingly dangerous thing for a country to permit the dead hand of a constitution, written under very different conditions than those we now have and interpreted by nine old men on the Supreme Court Bench, to deny to the national government power to act rapidly and effectively in an emergency. This is true irrespective of one's opinion of specific legislation or one's respect for the court.

It is a plain statement of fact that few nations, if any, suffer from the hands of other nations such grievances as the exploited suffer habitually under

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the system by which they are exploited. If war is the final weapon in the struggle for justice it is bound to be used sooner or later where injustice seems most intolerable, and that, as the years roll on, is likely to be in the relation of classes to each other rather than in the relations of nations—this despite the power which the religion of nationalism still has. In two great modern nations, Italy and Germany, the maintenance of the capitalist system with its unjust and grotesquely unequal distribution of the national income has already required some degree of extra-legal and very despicable violence. In Russia the struggle to abolish the exploitation of the profit system has been accompanied by much violence and terror partly because counter-revolutionists got aid from foreign armies. We shall not escape in America from the fate of our brethren in Europe by any mere policy of drift, or blind trust in constitutional machinery already sorely strained. This does not mean that there is any such Red menace as the Hearst papers try to play up. A more imminent peril is confused discontent probably leading to a Fascist revolution of some sort or other. My immediate point is that we cannot dismiss the subject of war without some discussion of the nature and possibilities of civil war or violent revolution. (It will be observed

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that I do not say revolution but violent revolution. The greatest revolution in the world would be a peaceful revolution which would find not only new forms of social organization but also new means, differing from the ancient means of violence, for achieving it.)

On this subject of civil war or violent revolution we find a bewildering confusion of opinions and slogans. A considerable number of those who now proclaim that they would resist participation in international war on the grounds of its futility as well as its cruelty, expressly state that under some circumstances their objections to war would not apply to a revolution which they think will be compelled to use violence. On the other hand, many of those who regard resistance to international war as treason, and who never tire of celebrating the glories of their nation's victories, expect workers to be Tolstoyan non-resistants in the face of grievances far worse than those which drove our ancestors to rebel against the British crown. They who preach against the crimes of revolutionary violence are quite ready to use all that violence and more to maintain the *status quo*, ignoring the plain lessons of history in both the French and Russian revolutions that the great outbreak of terror and violence has not been from the first revolt of the

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masses, but an answer to counter-revolution on the part of the beneficiaries of the old order.

Revolutionaries as well as conservatives are guilty of some very romantic thinking in support of their own interest. Thus, I once heard a leading Communist, speaking ostensibly in the interest of world peace, declare in answer to questions that he supposed ultimately world war would be inevitable, but that it would lead to revolutionary civil war and "civil war would not be so bad." We will do the man the justice to suppose that he was thinking in terms of the result of the war and that he meant that successful revolution would accomplish a positive good that international wars do not accomplish. Even so, he was a romantic if he assumed the inevitable triumph of the right sort of revolution. In so far as he himself meant, or suggested to others, that civil war is more endurable in itself than foreign war, he talked dangerous nonsense. Try for yourself to imagine any foreign enemy inflicting upon the United States a small part of the terror and suffering civil war would entail. It is an impossible exercise of the imagination. It is not for nothing that the Southern states which felt the full weight of the four years' struggle in the Civil War, which they call the war between the states, still use the words, "the war," to refer to that con-

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flict rather than the much more recent World
War.

In the event of real civil war we might expect important cities to be taken and retaken by rival armies. Everywhere loyalties would be divided. Authorities temporarily in control of one city or state would, with reason, be suspicious of a large part of the citizenry as potential enemies. They would never know at what moment some lurking enemy of their own national family might succeed in blowing up aqueducts, paralyzing power plants or destroying the transportation system. Suspicion, fear, and hate would give us terror answering terror, ever growing in magnitude until at last one side or the other won a peace of exhaustion and starvation.

It is not cities alone which would suffer. Civil war would probably be won by command of food and other supplies; hence the struggle would be carried into country districts. It would rage along every main highway. There would be endless sabotage and private murder, avowedly in the service of a public cause. Even after the civil combat was nominally over, the side which won would feel so insecure that for an indefinite period thereafter it would resort to dictatorship, ruthless force and terror, to maintain its power. This has hap-

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pened in Russia, and however one may rejoice in certain great achievements in Russia, one would not like to repeat the history of Russia in America. Indeed, an attempt to repeat the history of Russia in America would result in sufferings worse than Russia endured. This for two reasons: First, to our shame be it said, it is doubtful if in Russia or any other supposedly civilized country there is the latent sadism and predisposition to brutality which is revealed in America by our lynchings, the third-degree procedure of our police, and the existence of underworld mobs, guerillas, or racketeers who will murder men in cold blood for money. Second, our industrial organization is much more advanced than it was in revolutionary Russia. Our people are farther from the soil. They are accustomed to a higher standard of living and unaccustomed to the dictatorship of a Tzar. For all these reasons the disorganization of life and the quality of suffering resulting from protracted revolutionary violence would be greater.

There was a time when Communists and near-Communists were fond of saying: "The First World War, the Russian Revolution; the Second World War, the World Revolution." One hears less of that slogan nowadays. It does not go well with the desire of the Communists to be leaders

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in organizing Leagues Against War and Fascism; still less does it fit in with Stalin's military alliance with bourgeois, imperialist France and his open endorsement of French military preparations.

Aside from all that, the slogan does not stand up well under critical examination. The First World War brought only one Russian Revolution. It was a factor in bringing about two Fascist revolutions immensely distasteful to the Communists. It took not only a World War, but defeat in the World War, the breakdown of a decadent system, and the great ability of men like Lenin and Trotsky, in order to give a Communist direction to the Russian Revolution. Therefore there is no certainty at all that new world war will bring about the right sort of revolution, and there is every certainty that violent revolution, following world war, even if it be headed in the right direction, will entail unpredictable suffering upon men.

If new world war is begun there may be nothing for it but to try to turn it into the right sort of revolution in order to end the war. But no sane man ought to want world war in the hope it is the road to revolution. On the contrary, the right sort of revolution with the minimum of violence would clearly be made more possible in a world where the exploiters could no longer wrap themselves in

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the flag and play up jingoistic nationalism and fear of some foreign neighbor in order to divert the workers' attention from the poverty, the denial of liberty, and the exploitation under which they groan at home.

The sane revolutionist in a country like the United States will not feel that he can utterly renounce the use of violence as a weapon for the exploited while the exploiters still cling tenaciously to it. He may feel that under certain conditions a sharp, short, decisive revolutionary act, even though it involves some violence, would prove more merciful than the indefinite continuance of the system which gives us poverty and war. But if he thinks of the use of violence at all, he will, if he is a realist, do all in his power to put the onus for it upon the Fascist or upon the defenders of the present system.

Under modern conditions the most that the sane revolutionist—not a neurotic seeker after excitement—can hope from violence is: (1) A *coup d'état* in which with relatively little violence, carefully trained forces, with the sympathy of large masses of the populace, take possession of key points in our cities. The revolutionists would seek to control electric power, centers of radio broadcasting, and transportation, rather than the legisla-

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tive capitols of city, state, or nation. In this country, since no one city dominates it to the extent that London dominates England or Paris, France, the problem of the successful *coup d'état* is difficult—probably more difficult than Lenin and Trotsky found it when, following their propaganda work and the growth of their party in the Workers Councils throughout Russia, by a relatively bloodless *coup d'état* they took power in Petrograd and Moscow. No revolutionary *coup d'état* is possible as an isolated event: it can only be used in the confusion of social collapse under conditions where there is wide mass support for those who use it in a thrust for power. (2) The second, and in America more probable, use of violence akin to war—remember, not all violence is war—might arise from the employment of armed forces in support of a revolutionary government which had won power by democratic processes as against counter-revolutionary force and violence. Such use of force is in some degree an extension of police power, and to contemplate it is not equivalent to planning for an indefinite civil war.

Perhaps we may comfort ourselves that indefinite civil war in a modern industrial state is not probable unless one side or both receive aid in money, supplies, and in troops from outside the

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state's own borders. Great violence and terror both in the French and the Russian revolutions followed allied intervention in support of the old order. Disgusting and ignoble as was the brutality which accompanied the rise of Mussolini and Hitler to power and their maintenance of it, in neither case has there yet been true civil war. Both Mussolini and Hitler had the aid of the dominant class. Mussolini won by an easy *coup d'état* supported by the sympathy of the King and the Army. Hitler won by his ability to use the machinery of the Constitution, which he hated and ultimately overthrew, to get a narrow majority at the polls. No foreign government came to the aid of the defeated.

A revolution in behalf of the exploited could not count on the factors which helped Mussolini or Hitler, but it could scarcely succeed at all without the passive or active sympathy of large sections of the armed forces of the old government. That support will be won less by direct work among troops than by propaganda among the social groups from which troops are recruited. If one thing is clear, it is that an urban proletariat, backbone though it may be of revolutionary hope, cannot win a modern revolution by violence all by itself so long as the government can recruit its forces,

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legal or extra legal, out of the white collar and
farming classes.

As matters stand to-day, in a Fascist country it is hard to imagine a revolution which will not be compelled to use some degree of violence. That is a reason for us in the United States to cling to the democratic tradition and all that we have of democratic processes, imperfect and hypocritical as the latter are. Even in Fascist countries, and certainly in non-Fascist countries, the great hope lies in the education and organization of workers with hand and brain. In nominally democratic countries if that organization is extensive enough and there is sufficient harmony between the industrial unions of workers, farm coöperatives, and a radical political party, methods of successful and orderly struggle infinitely superior to the hazards of organized violence on a large scale may be found. It is a truism, the lesson of which often escapes men, that in the hour of disintegration of an old system it is not the strength of the dominant class in numbers or physical force which most menaces the new order. It is the bitter fact that so many of the exploited can be persuaded to fight for the system under which they and their fellows have suffered so deeply. In his brilliant but con-

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troversial book, *Black Reconstruction*, Dr. W. E. B. DuBois has brought forth good arguments to modify the conventional view that the Negro had little or nothing to do with winning his own freedom. Dr. DuBois emphasizes the importance of Negro enlistments in the Union Army and Negro desertions from the plantations. Towards the end of the war the Confederates in despair were ready to arm Negroes on a large scale to save the Confederacy, but it was too late. Nevertheless, the war itself would never have lasted four long years except that Southern armies fought with incredible gallantry although most of the white troops had more to lose than to gain from secession or a continuance of slavery. They were able to fight because so many Negroes kept the productive processes of the South going while the white men were at the battle-front.

Clearly in our day no emancipation can be won with or without violence, except by processes of extensive education and organization. The more extensive and the more perfect are these processes the more impotent will be the dominant class in using ancient methods of violence to hang onto its power.

Many of us who hate war and violence have to

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admit that they are not the only evils in the world. Some of us find for mankind an inspiration in the resistance to tyranny offered by the workers in Vienna which we do not find in the supine submission of the German workers to Hitler. But no last-minute decision of German workers to fight would have saved the situation. Socialists and Communists in Germany were both defeated, not by their last-minute failure to make a gesture of resistance to Hitler, but by their earlier failures in program and organization. Among other things, the workers and their leaders did not sufficiently explore the possibility of a general strike at certain crucial moments.

The observer who from the side-lines merely seeks to predict what is likely to happen is warranted from his study of history and present-day passions in concluding that some type of violent revolution is more probable than peaceful revolution, just as new international war is more probable than peace. But here, also, probability is not inevitability. While there is any hope at all, men who know the dreadful implications of organized large-scale violence—that is to say, of war—will seek by every means in their power to avoid it even in the service of the noblest ends.

The primary responsibility for avoiding revolu-

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tionary violence rests upon all those who have it in their power to say whether or not they will smooth the path to orderly and peaceful change. If unnumbered new chapters of our history are to be written in blood and tears, the overwhelming weight of blame will lie at the door of those who in domestic as in foreign affairs prefer property to peace. But to say this does not relieve from responsibility the seekers after plenty, peace, and freedom, to consider the methods that they use. What the world must have if it is to escape tragic doom is justice. But justice is not equivalent to vengeance nor is it served by vengeance. The abstraction *liberty* is never won by the ruthless denial of freedom to individual men and women, nor will any economic change forever guaranty peace, if those who seek it have first brutalized themselves by the acceptance of the ancient delusion that by violence and yet more violence man can build the sure foundations of the coöperative commonwealth wherein peace and freedom shall dwell together. No personal disinterestedness or purity of social purpose can of themselves rid war, and the dictatorship and terror which go with war and live after it, of their curse on the individual and society. The value and permanence of the revolu-

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tion which is to establish a fellowship of free men
may well depend on our success in finding other
methods of advancing it than the appeal to the
large-scale violence which is war.

THE END

NOTES ON CHAPTERS

CHAPTER I

- Page 6. *Man's Rough Road*, by A. G. Keller. Frederick A. Stokes Co.
- Page 8. *Ordeal By Fire, An Informal History of the Civil War*, by Fletcher Pratt. Smith & Hass.
- Page 9. *The First World War*, edited by Laurence Stallings. Simon & Schuster.
- Page 11. *Collected Poems*, by Rupert Brooke. Dodd, Mead & Co.
- Page 12. *Five Souls*, by W. N. Ewer. Text as in the song, published by G. Schirmer.
- Page 15. *They That Take the Sword*, by Esmé Wingfield-Stratford. Wm. Morrow & Co.
- Page 17. *German Students' War Letters*. E. P. Dutton & Co.
- Page 18 ff. *Heaven High, Hell Deep*, by Norman Archibald. A. & C. Boni.
- Page 23 ff. *All Quiet On the Western Front*, by Eric Remarque. Little, Brown & Co.
- Page 25. On war and sexual excess see comment by Lewis Mumford in *Technics and Civilization*. Harcourt, Brace & Co.
- Page 26. *Under Fire*, by Henri Barbusse. E. P. Dutton & Co.
- Page 26. *Generals Die in Bed*, by Charles Yale Harrison. A. L. Burt Co.
- Page 26. *Attack and Counter Attack*, by Siegfried Sassoon.

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Page 27. *Paths of Glory*, by Humphrey Cobb. Viking Press.

CHAPTER II

Page 32 ff. Prof. L. Hersch is a contributor to the symposium *What Would Be the Character of a New War?* By experts under auspices of the Interparliamentary Union. On this general subject see Hans Zinsser's *Rats, Lice and History*. Little, Brown & Co.

Page 35. For an authoritative and graphic account of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, see *Road to War*, by Walter Millis. Houghton Mifflin Co.

Page 37. *Over Here* in the series *Our Times*, by Mark Sullivan. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Page 39. For a discussion of the attitude of Churches and clergymen to the World War, see *Preachers Present Arms*, by Ray Abrams (Round Table). Mr. Abrams could find only some 70 clergymen whose pacifism in wartime was outspoken enough to be a matter of any record.

Page 41 ff. Quotations are from various poems in Sassoon's *Attack and Counter Attack*, previously referred to.

Page 44. Archibald's experiences are told in *Heaven High, Hell Deep*, previously cited.

Page 47. Roger N. Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union has assured me, since this chapter was written, that the episode of a man arrested for having a hand written copy of the Declaration of Independence actually occurred in the Bronx, New York, whether or not it did in any Southern state.

Page 48 ff. I take the record of the number of arrests and the quotation from Judge Anderson from Mark Sullivan's *Over Here*, previously cited.

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- Page 50 ff. For a fuller account of the treatment of conscientious objectors, see my *The Conscientious Objector in America*, later reprinted with a different introduction as *Is Conscience a Crime?* Vanguard Press.
- Page 55 ff. *Falsehood in Wartime*, by Arthur Ponsonby. E. P. Dutton & Co.
- Page 58 ff. The best summary records of Civil Liberties cases during and after the war can be found in current publications of the American Civil Liberties Union, 31 Union Square, New York.
- Emma Goldman's *Living My Life* (Knopf) contains a vivid account of wartime hysteria, trials, imprisonment, and deportation.

CHAPTER III

- Page 61. Quotation from Col. Payne on authority of Francis Delaisi's essay on "Ramifications of War Industry," in the symposium *What Would Be the Character of a New War?*
- Page 62. *Can We Limit War?* by Hoffman Nickerson. Frederick A. Stokes Co.
- Page 62. Quotation from Churchill taken from *Can We Limit War?*
- Page 65. Figures on reserve officers on authority of Hoffman Nickerson, previously cited.
- Page 66. Reference to Haldane on authority of symposium, *Challenge to Death*, by Viscount Cecil and others. E. P. Dutton & Co.
- Page 68. Reference to Dr. Ruth from *What Would Be the Character of a New War?*
- Page 68. Reference to Major General Fuller from his paper in *What Would Be the Character of a New War?*

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- Page 74. *A History of Europe, Ancient and Mediaeval*, by H. A. L. Fisher. Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Page 78. Trade figures from *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*, edited by F. V. Field. Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- Page 79. On Mr. Hearst's responsibility for the Spanish War, see Walter Millis' *The Martial Spirit*. Houghton Mifflin Co.

CHAPTER IV

- Page 85 ff. On war and technical progress, see *Technics and Civilization*, by Lewis Mumford, previously cited.
- Page 90. *Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution*, by Peter Kropotkin (London: W. Heinemann); see also G. Nicolai: *Biology of War*. D. Appleton-Century Co.
- Page 98. On the Wars of Justinian, see H. A. L. Fisher, previously cited.
- Page 99. For a summary of Paraguay's wars, see current comment in the *New York Times* and *Time* magazine.
- Page 100 ff. *National Defense*, by Kirby Page. Farrar & Rinehart, invaluable for the student of war.

On the subject of the cost of war, Senator Nye, Chairman of the Senate's Investigating Committee, in some of his speeches has been quoting a statement which he attributes to Nicholas Murray Butler. I quote it as given in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of Monday, September 10, 1935:

"The cost to the world of the four years of World War would provide a \$2,500 home with \$1,000 worth of furniture and five acres of land for every family in Russia, most of the European nations, Canada, the United States and Australia; then would give every city over 20,000 population a \$2,000,000 library,

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- \$3,000,000 hospital and a \$20,000,000 college, and in addition would buy every piece of property in Germany and Belgium."
- Page 108. *The Great Illusion*, by Norman Angell, 1933 edition, with comments by the author. Putnam's.
- Page 108. *The State in Theory and Practice*, by Harold I. Laski. Viking Press.
- Page 112. Snowden is quoted in *Essential News*, July 6, 1935.

CHAPTER V

- Page 116. *Crow Indians*, by Robert F. Lowrie. Farrar & Rinehart.
- Page 119. *Man Is War*, by John F. Carter. Bobbs-Merrill Co.
- Page 119 ff. In reference to Old Stone Age, see discussion of the subject in *They That Take the Sword*, previously referred to; also in *Marching Men*, a history of war by Stanton A. Coblentz (Unicorn). Observe also that Henry Fairfield Osborn's authoritative *Men of the Old Stone Age* (Charles Scribner's Sons) contains no account of war and weapons primarily intended for war.
- Page 133. Newspaper notices and reviews announce that the agricultural expert, Dr. O. M. Willcox, in a book which has just appeared entitled *Nations Can Live at Home*, argues that scientific agriculture makes it necessary for no nation to acquire territory to feed its population. This is good, but it will not of itself end war, the economic motive for which is no longer a simple pressure of population on soil.
- Page 136 ff. On our entry into war and the reasons for it, see John Kenneth Turner's excellent *Shall it Be Again?* (B. W. Huebsch) and Walter Millis' *Road to War*, previously referred to.

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Page 137. Walter Hines Page: cable cited in Nye Munitions Inquiry and published in current magazines and papers.

Page 139. *The Secret War*, by F. C. Hanighen. John Day.

Page 140 ff. It will be observed that in discussing the drive of capitalism in each nation to expand its markets for surplus goods and for investments, I do not argue that in terms of pure economics capitalism has no choice but the kind of struggle that leads to war between nations. Nobody has worked out a mathematical formula to determine the precise moment when the internal market for goods or the opportunity to invest is so saturated that capital must expand abroad or perish. National trade rivals also trade with mutual advantage with each other—witness the pre-war trade of Great Britain and Germany. British and American capital has financed the development of their national rival, Japan. British and American companies have sold textile machinery to this rival. But if capitalism could adjust itself economically and psychologically more rapidly to the changes it promotes, American and British interests would find compensations in trade with an increasingly prosperous Japan even although she has captured some of their textile markets. The fact is, however, that we cannot deal with the problem in pure economics without the emotional factors of nationalism which give rise to the artificial barriers of high tariffs, etc. There is no way of rapidly restoring economic equilibrium when it is upset by the rise of a nation like Japan to strength as a competitor. Hence the menace to peace in the drive to expand which is economically inherent in a system where at no time do the workers of a nation get in social or individual income the equivalent of what they produce.

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Page 149. Mussolini quoted by Ivor Brown in *Challenge to Death*.

Page 150. Since the body of this book was written the Congress of the Third International (Communist) at Moscow drastically changed its former position of opposition to all international wars to a position of support of a war against Fascist aggression even if the non-Fascist nation should itself be capitalist or bourgeois. In other words, the Communists who heaped denunciation on the majority Socialists in 1914 are theoretically right back on the same old ground. The majority Socialists supported the war of 1914 as a necessary, if not a good, war against imperialism—German imperialism if you were English or French, and Russian if you were German. Now the Communists will support international war as necessary, if not good, provided it is against Fascism. Presumably the decision which war or which side is really anti-Fascist will be made by Stalin at Moscow and not left to each Communist Party. I repeat what I have written: Fascism will not be successfully fought by manipulating the wars of bourgeois nations but only by the development in each nation and in the world of the power of workers with hand and brain. The real enemy is capitalist nationalism, of which fact the workers will lose sight if they are encouraged to pour out their blood in the service of this or that nation which, although capitalist, is not, in the opinion of the Stalinite Communists at Moscow, dangerously Fascist. The decision will be made in accordance with Russian national interest as interpreted by Stalin.

On this entire chapter it would be well to consult H. N. Brailsford's *Property or Peace*. London: V. Gollancz.

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Parker T. Moon's *Imperialism and World Politics*. Macmillan.

Carleton Hayes' *Essays on Nationalism* (Macmillan), and Francis Delaisi's *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (Viking Press) are also illuminating.

CHAPTER VI

Page 160. For the quotation from Nicholas Murray Butler, see the interesting pamphlet by Joseph P. Lash, *The Campus Strikes Against War* (L.I.D., 112 E. 19th St., New York City).

Page 163. *The Power of Non-Violence*, by Richard Gregg. Lippincott.

Page 177. The use of economic sanctions, i.e., official embargoes—beyond those on war supplies—on goods going to or coming from an aggressor nation, might have brought Japan to an abandonment of her attack on Manchuria only if action against her included all the strong powers in the world. For the United States alone to have imposed it might have led to war. Even the continued refusal of recognition to the new puppet state, Manchukuo, is an empty, and perhaps dangerous, gesture of righteousness. It may increasingly embarrass our relations with Japan and her puppet state without corresponding advantage to China. In general, it is difficult to impose absolute moral standards for the recognition of foreign governments without encouraging pharisaical hypocrisy at home, and a meddling policy abroad which may only camouflage imperialism and invite trouble. It is a better rule to recognize the government that governs. In the case of Manchukuo able diplomacy might perhaps bring about a kind of Far Eastern Locarno or peace pact, in which China would

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share, as a price of American recognition of Manchukuo. In the long run the Chinese will take care of themselves or not be taken care of. If by any chance the freeing of Manchukuo should become an issue in an American-Japanese war, our nation, if victorious, would doubtless stay in Manchuria to civilize her—especially if her petroleum is valuable enough. Thus one imperialism would be exchanged for another.

Page 184. An able statement of the case for an international air force and other international provisions for security is to be found in chapters XI-XIII of the symposium, *Challenge to Death*, previously quoted. The arguments do not seem to me conclusive as to the wisdom or indeed the possibility of these measures, given the present capitalist-nationalist system and its loyalties.

English confidence in the League, however, is attested by the figures in the so-called National Peace Ballot. I quote the summaries from the English weekly survey entitled *Essential News* (July 6, 1935):

- (1) Should Great Britain remain a member of the League of Nations?

Yes	No	Doubtful	Abstentions
11,090,387	355,883	10,470	102,245

- (2) Are you in favor of an all-round reduction in armaments by international agreement?

Yes	No	Doubtful	Abstentions
10,470,489	862,775	12,062	213,839

- (3) Are you in favor of an all-round abolition of national military and naval aircraft by international agreement?

Yes	No	Doubtful	Abstentions
9,533,558	1,689,786	16,976	318,845

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- (4) Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement?

Yes No Doubtful Abstentions

10,417,329 775,415 15,076 351,345

- (5) Do you consider that if a nation insists on attacking another the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by

(a) economic and non-military measures?

(b) if necessary, military measures?

Yes No Doubtful Abstentions

(a) 10,027,608 635,074 27,255 855,107

(b) 6,784,368 2,351,981 40,893 2,364,441

Page 192. The difficulties in the way of *official* embargoes or boycotts against aggressor nations do not apply to *unofficial* popular boycotts, for instance on Italian or German goods or shipments to those countries. Such a boycott on shipments should not include foodstuffs for civilian populations. It should include travel in offending countries and on their ships. Here also, the case for economic action is not perfect. Unofficial boycotts, if successful, may at first hurt the German or Italian workers sooner, and perhaps worse, than the responsible demagogues. At first, they may create a kind of national unity of resentment. But they remain the only way, short of war, of bringing home to Fascist governments and the people under them how abhorrent are the policies against which the best world opinion protests, and how costly to the nation which tolerates them. They give to the bitter foes of Fascist aggression and tyranny who live in America something to do instead of going to war. Unofficial boycotts or official embargoes on arms would have more weight if

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our own or any other nation employing such measures would take the lead in opposition to exploitation at home or imperialism abroad.

Page 195. In considering proposals to make war less likely by taking the profits out of it through some conscription of wealth it is necessary to remember: (1) that it is less the profits of war, even the direct profits of preparation for war, than the profit system which leads to war; and (2) that conscription of wealth for war and only for war is Fascist in spirit rather than Socialist or coöperative. We want socialization for peace and plenty, not conscription for war's destruction. Conscription of wealth under a military and capitalist or bourgeois government would, on the whole, be friendly to the preservation of the property system. To urge it now is to accept without further protest a conscription of life which would not be friendly to the preservation of life. (The principle of paying for war by taxing as you go is a somewhat different matter.) Hence my lack of confidence in ending war by taking the profit out of it, although in the event of war I should, of course, favor seeing to it that no one should grow wealthy out of it, as thousands did in the First World War. Taking profit out of *preparation* for war means more than nationalizing the manufacture of munitions while the steel, copper and chemical industries remain in private hands.

CHAPTER VII

Page 206 ff. For a fuller discussion of conditions which invite revolt, see my *Human Exploitation*. Frederick A. Stokes Co.

Page 208. The Workers' Rights Amendment to the Con-

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stitution, originally drafted by Morris Hillquit and introduced into the present Congress by Congressman Vito Marcantonio, is the Socialist and labor answer to the situation created by the Supreme Court decisions in the Railway Retirement Act, NRA, and the Frazier-Lemke Act for reducing mortgages. Copies of it may be had by writing the National Office of the Socialist Party at 549 Randolph St., Chicago, Ill.

Pages 207-222. On this whole chapter it would be well to consult Leon Trotsky's great *History of the Russian Revolution*, translated by Max Eastman (Simon & Schuster), and William H. Chamberlin's *The Russian Revolution* (Macmillan), written from a different point of view.

Everett Dean Martin in *Farewell to Revolution* (Norton) misses a chance to show the suffering and danger in violent revolution by extreme overstatement of his case and overemphasis on psychological factors in revolution to the exclusion of economic.

Professor G. Salvemini's *Fascist Dictatorship in Italy* (Holt), Calvin B. Hoover's *Germany Enters the Third Reich* (Macmillan), Konrad Heiden's *A History of National Socialism* (Knopf), and Professor Frederick L. Schumann's *Nazi Dictatorship* (Knopf) are four of many excellent volumes dealing with the Italian and German Fascist revolutions, or rather counter-revolutions.

The best objective study of the conditions likely to make for violent revolution in the United States is George Soule's *The Coming American Revolution*. Macmillan.

